EU2.0 Needs an Information Strategy

Europe is learning to defend itself in the information war. The next step is connecting military influence, democratic resilience and communication with societies beyond its borders.

 

For years, Europe has treated information warfare primarily as something done to us. Russia interferes in European information environments.
China has developed sophisticated influence capabilities.
Extremist organizations have used digital media to recruit and mobilize.
Artificial intelligence is making manipulation cheaper and faster, while foreign actors can exploit existing political divisions rather than having to create them.

Europe's response has therefore understandably concentrated on defense: identifying disinformation, exposing foreign interference, regulating platforms, improving cyber resilience and protecting democratic processes. The European External Action Service (EEAS), for example, has developed Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) into a distinct field of activity and now regularly documents attempts to manipulate European and neighboring information environments.[1]

But something is changing.

A recent study by the French Institute of International Relations (Ifri) describes how France has gradually moved beyond this predominantly defensive conception. Experiences with Islamic State propaganda, information confrontation in the Sahel and Russia's hybrid warfare have helped persuade French defense planners that information is not simply a communications problem surrounding military operations. It is itself part of the strategic environment in which conflicts are conducted and political outcomes shaped.[2]

France has consequently begun constructing doctrine and capabilities for information warfare and influence. That may appear to be a specifically French military development. In reality, it points toward a much larger European question.

Europe Is Discovering Information Power

Military power has always involved more than weapons. Countries seek to influence what opponents expect, what populations believe possible, what allies consider credible and what choices political leaders think are available. Digital communication has enormously expanded this arena.

The important development in France is therefore not that Europe is finally learning how to conduct propaganda. Quite the opposite. The French approach described by Ifri explicitly confronts the problem facing democracies: authoritarian adversaries may manipulate, fabricate and deceive in ways democratic states should not imitate. France now accepts an offensive dimension in the information domain while explicitly maintaining its refusal of lying. Ifri argues that preserving law and truth is not simply a handicap but a defining boundary for democratic information warfare.[2]

Europe therefore needs to become better not at manufacturing reality, but at explaining, persuading and making credible alternatives visible. Doing that requires capabilities which Europe has traditionally kept in separate boxes: military information operations; protection of European societies against foreign manipulation; and strategic communication with societies outside Europe. A stronger Europe will increasingly need all three.

Competing in the Information Environment

The military lesson is becoming difficult to ignore. France's experience in the Sahel demonstrated that military capability alone does not guarantee political success.
Ifri concludes that information campaigns helped delegitimize Operation Barkhane, while Russia's hybrid confrontation has demonstrated that the cognitive environment can remain contested long before conventional hostilities begin.[2]

Russia has taken that principle considerably further. The EU already treats information manipulation as part of Russia's broader hybrid confrontation. In 2026 the Council imposed further sanctions on individuals involved in Russian FIMI activities, while the EEAS continued documenting systematic Russian efforts to manipulate political perceptions and weaken support for Ukraine.[1][3]

Information therefore cannot remain an afterthought to European defense. If Europe is serious about developing a stronger European pillar within NATO — and ultimately the greater strategic capability we might call EU2.0 — information capability belongs alongside military readiness, intelligence, cyber defense and industrial capacity.

But that is only the first layer.

Protecting Europe's Democratic Space

Information competition also takes place inside European societies, and here the issue becomes considerably more delicate. Foreign powers do not necessarily need to invent European divisions. Migration, inequality, national identity, distrust of institutions, dissatisfaction with government and arguments over European integration already exist. External actors can exploit these divisions by amplifying particular narratives, supporting sympathetic networks, injecting misleading information or simply increasing the visibility and intensity of conflicts already dividing Europeans.

This is the Threat from Within.[4] But the phrase requires an important qualification. The threat is not disagreement. People opposing immigration policy, European integration, defense expenditure or sanctions against Russia do not become agents of foreign influence simply because Moscow happens to favor similar positions. A democracy that starts treating dissent as a security problem damages precisely what it claims to defend.

Europe therefore faces a difficult balancing act: becoming considerably better at identifying manipulation, covert financing and organized foreign interference while continuing to protect political pluralism and open argument. Significantly, the French doctrine described by Ifri recognizes essentially this boundary: military capabilities may act toward an adversary, while protection of domestic civilian society should not become an attempt to influence that society.[2]

A European information strategy must therefore protect the democratic information environment without trying to control it. That distinction should become one of its governing principles.

Defense Is Only Half a Strategy

There remains another asymmetry. Russia communicates actively into Europe. Europe does much less to communicate strategically into Russia.

Europe sanctions. Europe condemns. Europe supports Ukraine. Europe strengthens NATO. European leaders explain these policies primarily to Europeans and other governments. But what political future does Europe communicate to Russian citizens?

That question was central to Europe Needs a Strategy of Confidence Toward Russia’s Citizens.[5] Its proposition was deliberately different from either appeasement or regime change. Europe can make clear that its problem is not Russia's existence, Russian culture or the Russian people's legitimate desire for security and dignity. Its problem is an imperial conception of security under which neighboring countries are denied the freedom to determine their own futures.

That leaves open another possibility. A Russia secure within its internationally recognized borders, no longer seeking domination over neighboring states, could progressively rebuild a peaceful and mutually beneficial relationship with Europe.

That proposition matters strategically because deterrence by itself describes only what Europe wants Russia not to do.
It says remarkably little about what Europe wants eventually to happen.

Deterrence Needs a Political Destination

Consider the strategic choice presented to Russians today. Continued confrontation means Ukrainian resistance, stronger European defense, NATO reinforcement, sanctions, economic separation and continuing insecurity. Europe has become increasingly credible about that side of the equation.

The alternative remains much less visible.

What would actually happen if a future Russia abandoned territorial aggression? Europe could make that possibility more concrete without promising concessions today. Changed behavior could progressively create possibilities for sanctions relief, restored travel, scientific and educational exchange, cultural reopening, economic cooperation and eventually a different European security relationship.

The important word is conditional. Europe would not be offering rewards for aggression, nor would it determine Russia's political system. Russians themselves determine Russia's political future. Europe would simply make one proposition credible: Russia's choices affect Europe's choices.

That directly challenges the narrative that permanent confrontation is unavoidable because the West will remain Russia's enemy whatever Russia does. Europe's answer can instead be that another relationship is possible, but that it depends on another relationship between Russia and its neighbors as well.

This is strategically important. Deterrence raises the costs of aggression. Conditional cooperation increases the potential benefits of changed behavior. Communication makes that alternative knowable. None works as effectively without the others.

From Information Warfare to Societal Communication

This is where the emerging French doctrine and the European Russia question meet—but they should not be confused.

Military information warfare and communication with Russian society are not the same activity, nor should they become one. Military organizations need capabilities appropriate to conflict and adversarial information environments. European societies need protection against covert foreign interference. Independent journalists, researchers, cultural institutions, universities and Russian-language voices need the freedom and means to communicate across borders.

Governments can provide infrastructure, access and strategic clarity without determining what independent communicators are required to say. That distinction allows Europe to build influence capability without constructing a European propaganda ministry.

Much of the required ecosystem already exists.
Europe has broadcasters, independent media, universities, research institutions, cultural networks, Russian-language journalists, technology companies, diplomatic services and civil-society organizations. The missing element may therefore be less the creation of an enormous new apparatus than strategic coherence, sustained access, sufficient scale and political continuity.

Europe Already Has Something to Communicate

There is another reason Europe should not imitate authoritarian information warfare: Europe possesses its own story.

The WE ARE EUROPE series identified values that Europeans have gradually built into their societies: personal freedom, democratic voice, equality before law, protection against arbitrary power, solidarity, tolerance of difference, peaceful compromise and rejection of political deception.[6] Those values are not merely something to protect inside Europe. They are also part of Europe's attractiveness outside it.

This changes the purpose of European strategic communication.
Europe does not need to manufacture an artificial story about itself. It needs to make its actual society — its disagreements as well as its achievements, its failures as well as its aspirations — together with its intentions and possible relationships with others, visible and accessible in information environments where competing powers increasingly restrict or manipulate that visibility.

The values ecosystem therefore becomes strategic infrastructure. Not because European values become propaganda, but because they give European communication something credible to communicate.

An Emerging EU2.0 Capability

The significance goes well beyond Russia. A more autonomous Europe increasingly requires several forms of capacity simultaneously.
It needs military capacity to defend itself and economic capacity to finance defense, prosperity, technological development and the welfare state.
It needs diplomatic capacity to formulate European positions rather than automatically inheriting those of Washington or merely responding to Moscow and Beijing.
It needs democratic resilience so outside powers cannot easily exploit internal divisions.
Increasingly, it also needs information capacity: the ability to understand information environments, defend its own, operate in adversarial ones and communicate convincingly with societies beyond Europe's borders.

These capabilities are beginning to appear. France's developing information doctrine is one indication. Europe's expanding efforts against foreign information manipulation are another. The growing recognition that Russia's hybrid confrontation extends into European societies provides a third.[1][2][3]

But the pieces remain fragmented. EU2.0 would bring them into a coherent strategic architecture while maintaining the boundaries appropriate to a democratic society. Military information operations should remain subject to democratic authority and law. Protection against foreign interference should not become policing of political disagreement. Independent media should remain independent. Strategic communication should remain anchored in demonstrable reality. And Europe should be capable not merely of describing what it opposes, but of communicating the futures it is prepared to support.

This also suggests a broader way of understanding EU2.0.
The WE ARE EUROPE series asked what Europe is and what Europeans want to preserve. [6]
EU2.0 increasingly asks a complementary question: What capabilities does Europe need in order to preserve it?

Power Also Means Persuasion

Europe's geopolitical awakening has understandably begun with defense. Russia's invasion of Ukraine made military weakness impossible to ignore. American uncertainty has forced Europeans to reconsider strategic dependence. Chinese industrial competition has exposed economic vulnerabilities. The information dimension is now becoming visible as another part of the same transformation.

The lesson should not be that Europe needs its own propaganda machine. It is almost the reverse. A democratic Europe needs the confidence to believe that truthful persuasion can itself be a form of strategic power.

That means protecting Europeans against manipulation without protecting them against disagreement. It means confronting hostile information operations without copying their methods. And it means speaking beyond governments to societies whose choices will ultimately shape Europe's security environment.

Europe cannot choose Russia's future. Nor can it choose America's, China's or anyone else's. But Europe can decide whether those societies encounter only Europe's sanctions, regulations, military preparations and diplomatic objections — or whether they can also understand what Europe stands for, what it seeks and what another relationship could make possible.

That is why information strategy belongs in EU2.0.

Deterrence tells others where Europe will not retreat. Communication tells them where another road could lead.

References

[1] European External Action Service (EEAS), 2025 Report on EEAS Activities to Counter Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI), 24 June 2026. 

[2] Laurent Bansept, Convaincre pour vaincre. La France et la structuration d'une doctrine de guerre informationnelle, Focus stratégique No. 135, Institut français des relations internationales (Ifri), 7 September 2026. 
https://www.ifri.org/fr/etudes/convaincre-pour-vaincre-la-france-et-la-structuration-dune-doctrine-de-guerre

[3] Council of the European Union, Russian hybrid threats: four individuals added to EU sanctions list for information manipulation activities, 16 March 2026; see also the Council's June 2026 sanctions concerning Russian FIMI and propaganda actors. 

[4] WE ARE EUROPE — Keeping Europe European: The Threat From Within, August 2026. 
https://europe-is-us.blogspot.com/2026/08/we-are-europe-keeping-europe-european_01764668262.html

[5] Europe Needs a Strategy of Confidence Toward Russia’s Citizens, June 2026.
https://europe-is-us.blogspot.com/2026/06/europe-needs-strategy-of-confidence.html

 [6] WE ARE EUROPE - Key Notes to the Series - The European Environment We Have Built Around Ourselves, European Values series, August 2026. 
https://europe-is-us.blogspot.com/2026/08/we-are-europe-key-notes-to-series.html

 

 

 Europe’s Missing Role in the Middle East Is Beginning to Appear

R.M. Westerink; September 1, 2026 

When the leaders of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation recently condemned the US-Israeli war against Iran, their statement appeared to confirm a familiar geopolitical development. American influence is being challenged while China, Russia and Iran promote a more multipolar international order.[1]

There is substance to that interpretation. Iran has found within the SCO an institutional environment receptive to its criticism of Western military intervention, sanctions and political dominance.

Looking at the Middle East itself, however, reveals another development. Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, Egypt and the Gulf states are expanding their own diplomatic and security relationships. Pakistan has become an important diplomatic participant. Qatar and Oman continue to provide mediation channels across difficult regional divides.

These countries have different interests and alliances. What increasingly connects them is a desire for greater room to determine regional affairs themselves.

Between the established American pole and the increasingly visible SCO pole, a strategic middle is beginning to appear.

And Europe appears to be moving closer to it.

American Predominance Is Changing

The United States remains the Middle East’s most important external military power.
Its relationships with Israel and the Gulf states remain substantial, its military infrastructure is extensive, and American diplomacy continues to play a central role.

What is changing is the assumption that American leadership will remain the principal organising force of the regional order.

The recent conflict with Iran demonstrated the risks of dependence particularly clearly. Regional governments found themselves exposed to decisions taken in Washington, Tehran and Jerusalem while having limited influence over them.

Their response has increasingly been diversification.

Saudi Arabia has expanded its relationship with China while maintaining close relations with Washington. The UAE similarly works across geopolitical divisions. Türkiye remains a NATO member while pursuing an increasingly autonomous regional policy. Qatar and Oman maintain channels with Iran alongside strong Western relationships.

The United States therefore remains important, but regional states are creating more room to manoeuvre around it.

The SCO Offers Another Pole

The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation represents another direction in which the international system is developing.

China provides enormous economic weight.
Russia adds military and geopolitical power.
Iran has become increasingly integrated into this political environment.
Together with India, Pakistan and the Central Asian members, the SCO covers a substantial part of Eurasia.

Its political vocabulary increasingly emphasizes multipolarity, sovereignty, opposition to unilateral sanctions and reform of international institutions.

For Iran, this environment is attractive. The SCO condemnation of the US-Israeli attack allows Tehran to place its confrontation with Washington and Israel within a broader argument about international legitimacy and the future global order.[1]

The SCO nevertheless contains very different strategic interests. India maintains important relationships with the United States, Europe, Israel and the Gulf and pursues its own strategic autonomy.

Middle Eastern governments face a similar calculation. Greater distance from Washington does not automatically imply closer alignment with Beijing, Moscow and Tehran. For countries seeking room for independent action, exchanging one dominant relationship for another offers limited attraction.

This leaves space for a third development.

The Emerging Middle

Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, Egypt, the UAE, Qatar and Oman do not constitute a political bloc. Their policies towards Iran and Israel differ, as do their security interests.

Yet their recent behaviour increasingly reflects a common search for greater regional agency.

Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have strengthened their political and security cooperation. Their Makkah Agreement framework now includes a Strategic Political and Defence Committee and a permanent secretariat in Saudi Arabia; the three governments explicitly describe their cooperation in terms of “regional ownership”.[2]
Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Pakistan have also developed the R4 consultation mechanism, reaffirming continued coordination on peace, security and stability in the Middle East.[3]

Pakistan has played a mediation role between the United States and Iran, a role explicitly commended by the EU.[4] Qatar and Oman continue to perform specialised mediation roles because they retain communication channels across competing camps.

These arrangements do not yet form a new regional alliance. They resemble a network in which different states bring different capabilities.

Saudi Arabia contributes financial resources and growing Arab and Gulf political weight. Türkiye combines military capacity with relationships extending into NATO, Europe, Iran and the Gulf. Egypt remains one of the Arab world’s central political powers. Pakistan adds strategic capacity and connections into South Asia. Qatar and Oman provide unusual diplomatic access.

Different combinations can address different problems.

The emerging common denominator is strategic autonomy: greater capacity for regional countries to manage regional affairs while maintaining relationships with several outside powers.

Europe Appears to Have Noticed

Several months ago, in Europe Needs Its Own Middle East Strategy, it was argued that Europe could no longer simply outsource its Middle Eastern strategy to Washington.[A]

Developments since then suggest that Europe itself has been moving in that direction.

The European Commission has created a dedicated Directorate-General for the Middle East, North Africa and the Gulf (DG-MENA, headed by Dubravka Šuica ). Its stated purpose is to build partnerships based on mutual interest and bring together the EU’s technical and financial instruments.[5] Kaja Kallas’s formal responsibilities also include development of an EU Middle East Strategy.[6]

Relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council increasingly include regional security alongside their established economic dimension. In July, EU foreign ministers emphasized close coordination with Gulf partners and held an EU-GCC High-Level Forum on regional security and cooperation.[7]

European engagement with individual regional powers is also becoming more strategic.

EU relations with Pakistan have included explicit recognition of its mediation efforts between the United States and Iran.[4] One European meeting was particularly illustrative: Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan and Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar joined EU foreign ministers for discussions about the Middle East. Kallas described both countries as important because of their extensive diplomatic engagement across the region and asked what more could be done together.[8]

Saudi Arabia is becoming an increasingly important centre of regional political activity. India has substantial relationships with Europe, the Gulf, Israel, the United States and Iran while maintaining its own strategic independence. Bringing both into a European Middle East discussion reflects a diplomatic environment built around overlapping relationships rather than fixed blocs.

Individually, these developments can be seen as normal diplomatic activity. Together, they suggest that Europe is positioning itself within the changing regional landscape.

Building Strategic Friendships

This emerging environment may fit European capabilities and purposes unusually well.

Many of the countries seeking greater regional autonomy are themselves building multiple relationships. Saudi Arabia can cooperate with Europe, America and China. Türkiye combines NATO membership with an independent Middle Eastern role. India works closely with Europe and the Gulf without becoming part of a European alliance. Qatar and Oman combine strong Western relationships with diplomatic access to Iran.

Europe is developing relationships within this same network.

Its contribution is broader than traditional security guarantees. Europe brings economic scale, investment, trade, technology, reconstruction capacity, regulatory expertise and extensive diplomatic networks. It also maintains working relationships with almost every significant actor in the region.

This creates the possibility of strategic partnership without requiring exclusive alignment.

India reinforces that character. European and Indian participation alongside regionally owned initiatives would provide substantial external support while leaving Middle Eastern countries at the centre of their own developing architecture.

Europe’s Missing Role [B]

This gives a broader meaning to the idea that Europe needs its own Middle East strategy.

Greater European strategic autonomy allows Europe to develop relationships based on its own interests while supporting a Middle East in which regional countries themselves assume greater responsibility.

That role does not require Europe to reproduce American predominance or compete with China for regional leadership. It is closer to becoming a substantial external partner for countries seeking greater room to manage their own regional order.

The relationship can work precisely because those countries also value autonomy.
Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, Egypt, Qatar, Oman and the UAE increasingly maintain several strategic relationships simultaneously. Pakistan and India extend that network beyond the region.

Europe’s role within such an environment depends less on organising it than on becoming a useful and trusted participant.

An Order Taking Shape

The Middle East is not moving neatly from one geopolitical order to another.

American predominance is weakening while American power remains substantial. China, Russia and Iran are developing an increasingly visible alternative environment around the SCO. Between them, Middle Eastern powers are expanding their own diplomatic and security relationships.

This emerging middle remains diverse and loosely connected. Its countries will continue to disagree and will cooperate with Washington, Beijing and others whenever their interests require it. That flexibility may itself become an important characteristic of regional strategic autonomy.

Europe’s response is also still developing. DG MENA, the forthcoming EU Middle East Strategy, stronger EU-GCC security cooperation and increasingly strategic relationships with Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, Egypt, Pakistan, India and others do not yet amount to a single European doctrine.

But they reveal a direction.

When Europe Needs Its Own Middle East Strategy was written, Europe’s missing role was principally an argument about what Europe needed to develop.

Today, the picture is becoming more concrete. Middle Eastern powers are creating greater room to determine their own affairs, while Europe is building relationships with many of the countries driving that change.

Europe’s missing role in the Middle East may no longer be missing. It may simply still be taking shape.

References

[1] Mehr News Agency, “SCO leaders slam US-Israeli war of aggression against Iran,” 1 September 2026. https://en.mehrnews.com/news/247377/SCO-leaders-slam-US-Israeli-war-of-aggression-against-Iran

[2] Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Strategic Political and Defence Committee of the Makkah Agreement for Joint Defence, Joint Statement,” 31 August 2026. https://www.mfa.gov.tr/strategic-political-and-defence-committee-of-the-makkah-agreement-for-joint-defence--joint-statement--31-august-2026.en.mfa

[3] Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Joint Statement of the R4 Following the Fourth Consultative Meeting of the Foreign Ministers,” 21 June 2026. https://www.mfa.gov.tr/joint-statement-of-the-r4-following-the-fourth-consultative-meeting-of-the-foreign-ministers-21-june-2026.en.mfa

[4] European External Action Service, “Joint Press Communiqué: Eighth Round of the European Union-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue,” 1 June 2026. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/joint-press-communiqu%C3%A9-eighth-round-european-union-pakistan-strategic-dialogue-1-june-2026_en

[5] European Commission, “Middle East, North Africa and the Gulf — Directorate-General (DG MENA).” https://commission.europa.eu/about/departments-and-executive-agencies/middle-east-north-africa-and-gulf_en

[6] European Commission, “Kaja Kallas — High Representative/Vice-President: Responsibilities.” https://commission.europa.eu/about/organisation/college-commissioners/kaja-kallas_en

[7] Council of the European Union, “Foreign Affairs Council,” 13 July 2026. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/fac/2026/07/13/

[8] European External Action Service, “Informal meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers (Gymnich): Press conference by High Representative Kaja Kallas,” 28 May 2026. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/informal-meeting-foreign-affairs-ministers-gymnich-press-conference-high-representative-kaja-kallas_en

 

[A] Europe Needs Its Own Middle East Strategy. https://europe-is-us.blogspot.com/2026/06/europe-needs-its-own-middle-east.html

[B] Europe's Missing Role in the Middle East. https://europe-is-us.blogspot.com/2026/06/europes-missing-role-in-middle-east.html

 

A European Civil Power Initiative for the Middle East

Making Political Empowerment More Powerful Than Armed Resistance

The previous articles in this series arrived at a simple conclusion.

• Europe needs its own Middle East strategy.
• That strategy requires principles.
• It requires a vision.
• And it requires a practical role.

Our proposed European Declaration for Middle East Stability [1] argued that:
Peace becomes possible when enough people feel that their history has been seen, acknowledged and incorporated into a shared future.

The resulting Compass identified three guiding principles:

• Future
• Security
• Reconciliation

Applying those principles revealed a recurring pattern.

• Settlement expansion weakens the future.
• Armed resistance weakens security.
• Permanent grievance politics weakens reconciliation.

Yet another conclusion emerged as well.
The problem is not simply that destructive strategies exist.
The problem is that too many people see no credible alternative.

---

A Different Starting Point

Much of today’s diplomacy focuses on reducing violence.
That is necessary. But it is not sufficient.
Violence rarely disappears because people are persuaded to abandon it.
Violence declines when better alternatives become available.

This observation suggests a different objective.
Europe should not merely ask actors to abandon violence.
Europe should help create alternatives that are more powerful than violence.

The purpose of a European Civil Power Initiative would therefore be simple:
To make political empowerment more powerful than armed resistance.

---

Europe’s Unique Position

Europe cannot solve the Middle East conflict.
The peoples and states of the region must ultimately determine their own future.
But Europe may be uniquely positioned to help create the political conditions under which a solution becomes possible.

• Unlike the United States, Europe is not primarily viewed as a military actor.
• Unlike Iran, Europe is not invested in resistance as a regional strategy.
• Unlike Israel, Europe is not a direct combatant.
• Unlike Hamas or Hezbollah, Europe does not derive legitimacy from confrontation.

This gives Europe an unusual opportunity. Not to impose a settlement.
But to help strengthen the political, economic and diplomatic alternatives that make peaceful outcomes more attractive.

---

A Civil Power Coalition

Europe should not attempt this alone. Nor should it present itself as the architect of a Middle Eastern future.
Instead, Europe should invite the formation of a Civil Power Coalition.
A coalition of the willing. A coalition not defined by military alliances, ideology or religion.
A coalition defined by a shared commitment to making political empowerment more powerful than armed resistance.

The founding participants could include willing European states together with key regional partners such as:

• Jordan
• Egypt
• Saudi Arabia
• Qatar
• Indonesia
• Turkey

and others prepared to support the principles of Future, Security and Reconciliation.

The coalition would remain open to broader participation.
Its purpose would not be to choose sides. Its purpose would be to strengthen alternatives.

---

Four Areas of Action

The Civil Power Coalition would focus on four areas.

Political Empowerment

Political institutions must become more effective than military organizations.

Support for governance, representation, elections, administrative capacity and political participation should therefore become a central priority.

Palestinians need a credible political horizon. Political empowerment should not be viewed as a reward after peace. It should become one of the instruments through which peace is made possible.

---

Economic Empowerment

People are more likely to invest in the future when they believe a future exists.

Reconstruction, investment, trade, infrastructure and economic development should therefore be treated not only as economic tools but also as peace-building tools.

Prosperity cannot solve the conflict. But conflict becomes harder to sustain when prosperity becomes achievable.

---

Reciprocal Security

Security must not remain a zero-sum proposition.

Israelis require security. Palestinians require security. The region requires security.

The coalition should therefore support monitoring mechanisms, confidence-building measures and practical arrangements that gradually reduce dependence on military leverage.

The objective is not simply security. It is reciprocal security.

---

Reconciliation

No durable peace can emerge if history remains permanently contested.

The coalition should support initiatives that encourage acknowledgement of historical experience without demanding historical surrender.

The objective is not agreement on history. The objective is coexistence despite different memories of history.

---

A Different Logic

The initiative does not begin by asking: What final settlement should be imposed?

Instead it asks:

• How can political alternatives become stronger than military alternatives?
• How can diplomacy become more rewarding than confrontation?
• How can coexistence become more attractive than permanent conflict?

The answers may differ over time.

But the direction remains consistent: Future, Security, Reconciliation.

---

Europe’s Invitation

The purpose of the Civil Power Coalition would not be to replace existing diplomacy.

It would be to strengthen what existing diplomacy often lacks.

• A credible political road.
• A road for Palestinians beyond permanent armed resistance.
• A road for Israelis beyond permanent domination.
• A road for regional actors beyond perpetual confrontation.

Europe cannot deliver peace. But Europe can help make peace more powerful than violence.

That may be its most important contribution to the Middle East.

---

Summary - Looking Ahead

Our proposed European Declaration for Middle East Stability proposed a set of principles.
https://europe-is-us.blogspot.com/2026/06/a-european-declaration-for-middle-east.html

This Civil Power Initiative proposes a practical direction.

The next challenge is operational.

How can the principles of Future, Security and Reconciliation be translated into concrete positions on the major issues dividing the region today?

That remains the work ahead. But every journey begins with a first step.

The first step is building a coalition willing to make political empowerment more powerful than armed resistance. 

---

Reference

[1] A European Declaration for Middle East Stability
https://europe-is-us.blogspot.com/2026/06/a-european-declaration-for-middle-east.html

More

Europe's Missing Role in the Middle East
Why Europe Must Offer More Than Criticism
https://europe-is-us.blogspot.com/2026/06/europes-missing-role-in-middle-east.html

The Road Not taken in 1948
https://europe-is-us.blogspot.com/2026/06/the-road-not-taken-in-1948.html

The Middle East Still Possible
https://europe-is-us.blogspot.com/2026/06/the-middle-east-still-possible.html

 

 

Europe's Missing Role in the Middle East

 

Europe's Missing Role in the Middle East

Why Europe Must Offer More Than Criticism

Europe has become increasingly vocal about the Middle East.
European leaders criticize settlement expansion. They criticize attacks on civilians. They criticize humanitarian suffering. They criticize regional escalation.

Often these criticisms are justified. Yet criticism alone has not moved the region closer to peace. The question is why. The answer may be uncomfortable.
Europe has become increasingly clear about what it opposes. It remains far less clear about what it actively offers instead.

---

The Limits of Criticism

Consider the main actors in today’s conflict.

• Europe tells Israel that settlement expansion undermines peace.
• Europe tells Hamas that armed resistance undermines peace.
• Europe tells Hezbollah that permanent confrontation undermines peace.
• Europe tells Iran that regional escalation undermines peace.

Europe is largely correct in each case. But from the perspective of those actors, another question immediately arises:

What is the alternative?

If Palestinians abandon armed resistance, what political path becomes available?
If Israel accepts limits on territorial expansion, what security framework replaces it?
If Iran reduces support for resistance movements, who ensures that Palestinian aspirations remain visible?
If Hezbollah abandons confrontation, what guarantees prevent its constituency from feeling abandoned?

Too often, the answer appears vague.

Europe asks actors to move away from conflict but offers insufficient clarity about where they should move toward.

---

What The Declaration Revealed

The proposed European Declaration for Middle East Stability [1] was built around a simple insight:

Peace becomes possible when enough people feel that their history has been seen, acknowledged, and incorporated into a shared future.

From that insight emerged three guiding principles:

• Future
• Security
• Reconciliation

Applying these principles to the first European Position Statements [2 (Iran), 3 (Israeli Settlements), 4 (Hamas)] produced a recognizable result.

• Settlement expansion weakens the future.
• Hamas armed resistance weakens security.
• Permanent grievance politics weakens reconciliation.

And something else gained visibility. Israel’s opponents are responding, however imperfectly, to problems they believe remain unresolved [5].

The issue is not simply that destructive strategies exist.
The issue is that too many people see no credible alternative.

---

The Missing Ingredient

Current diplomacy often assumes that violence can be reduced by asking those who use it to stop.

But history suggests something different.
Violence rarely declines because people are persuaded that it is wrong.
Violence declines when more effective alternatives become available.

This principle applies far beyond the Middle East.
Democratic politics became attractive because it offered an alternative to civil conflict.
European integration became attractive because it offered an alternative to continental rivalry.

The same logic applies here.

Europe should not ask people to abandon violence unless it is prepared to help build alternatives that are more powerful than violence.

---

Europe’s Opportunity

This is where Europe possesses a unique opportunity.

• Unlike the United States, Europe is not primarily viewed as a military actor.
• Unlike Iran, Europe is not invested in resistance as a regional strategy.
• Unlike Israel, Europe is not a direct combatant.
• Unlike Hamas or Hezbollah, Europe does not depend upon confrontation for political legitimacy.

This creates a different possibility.

Europe can help construct political leverage that competes with military leverage.
Not by replacing local actors. Not by imposing solutions.
But by creating conditions in which political pathways become more rewarding than armed ones.

---

A Different Kind of Power

Europe’s strongest instruments are not armies.
They are legitimacy, markets, diplomacy, institutions, reconstruction capacity and international partnerships. These tools are often underestimated because they operate slowly. Yet they can influence the fundamental calculation facing political movements.

If a Palestinian movement can achieve more through political recognition than through rockets, the attraction of rockets declines.

If Israeli security can be strengthened through regional guarantees rather than permanent control, the attraction of permanent control declines.

If regional actors can gain influence through diplomacy rather than confrontation, the attraction of confrontation declines.

The objective is not to eliminate conflict overnight. The objective is to change incentives.

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The Role Europe Has Not Yet Claimed

Europe frequently speaks of peace. Less frequently does it speak of its own responsibility in making peace possible.

Part of the modern Middle East emerged through decisions in which European powers played significant roles. Europe cannot change that history. But it can influence what follows.

Its most important contribution may therefore not be another statement, another condemnation or another appeal for restraint. Its most important contribution may be helping create a political road that is stronger than violence.

A road that allows Palestinians to pursue self-determination without permanent armed resistance.
A road that allows Israelis to pursue security without permanent domination.
A road that allows regional actors to support political progress rather than military confrontation.

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Looking Ahead

If Europe accepts this role, a practical question follows.

How can political leverage be made more powerful than military leverage?

How can Europe, together with regional and international partners, help create incentives strong enough to move actors away from conflict and toward coexistence?

These questions point beyond principles. They point toward initiative.

And that may be Europe’s next task.

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References

[1] A European Declaration for Middle East Stability
https://europe-is-us.blogspot.com/2026/06/a-european-declaration-for-middle-east.html

[2] EPS-001 - European Position Statement - Iran and Middle East Stability
https://europe-is-us.blogspot.com/2026/06/eps-001-european-position-statement.html

[3] EPS-002 - European Position Statement - Israeli Settlement Expansion
https://europe-is-us.blogspot.com/2026/06/eps-001-european-position-statement_0564720085.html

[4] EPS-003 - Hamas Armed Resistance
https://europe-is-us.blogspot.com/2026/06/eps-003-hamas-armed-resistance.html

[5] The Road Not Taken in 1948
Completing What Was Left Unfinished
https://europe-is-us.blogspot.com/2026/06/the-road-not-taken-in-1948.html