Monday, October 5, 2026

Can the Cycles of Conflict be Broken – Reconciliation

 


What Real Peace would Take - A Reality and Honesty Check
Israel and Palestine

 

R.M. Westerink; August 2026 


Bottom line

1.  An agreement between leaders (Layer 1) holds only if the populations carry it (Layer 2). Without that, the first crisis or power vacuum brings it down.

2.  Every conflict narrative here is addressed to three audiences at once: the group's own public, the other group, and third parties (US, Europe, Arab states, UN, courts, media). A move at one address ripples to the other two. Thinking in terms of "two stories" misses this.

3.  The decisive instrument is the recognition declaration, the one act that can be made credibly at all three addresses. Proposed sequence: West, then Israel, then Palestinians, with each step valuable on its own so the chain survives a break.

4.  If every party keeps its current role (exclusive victim, exclusive rightful claimant, partisan judge), the balance of sorrows compounds and the cost of recognition rises with each generation.

5.  Full declarations are unlikely in the near term. For use as benchmark and reality check.


1. Why agreements alone are not enough

A peace settlement has two layers.
Layer 1 is agreements between groups and their leaders: treaties, borders, security arrangements.
Layer 2 is what ordinary people in those groups believe: how they read history and what they accept as justice. The literature on protracted conflict is consistent on this point. Reconciliation requires a change in the society's conflict ethos (its shared beliefs about its own goals, the adversary, its own group and the nature of peace; Bar-Tal), and peace without a change in attitudes and structures stays unstable (Galtung's negative versus positive peace).
A signed agreement on top of an unchanged ethos pauses the war; it does not end it.


2. Every narrative has three addresses

Each side's account of the conflict does three jobs at the same time. The failure modes below are where processes most often break.

Address

What the narrative does there

What goes wrong

Lever

Own public

Holds identity together; justifies sacrifices already made.

Any concession reads as betrayal. Untreated trauma becomes the recruiting pool for the next escalation.

Let the group's own suffering stay seen and commemorated. Trauma care. Credible hope that situations can change.

The other group

Accusation plus a demand for recognition: "you must know what was done to us."

Recognition offered only where it is easy is not recognition. Dehumanization prepares the next round.

Recognition that answers the other side's grievance without withdrawing one's own account. Equal-status contact.

Third parties

Legitimacy claim: post our suffering to the international ledger.

Each external validation (resolution, ruling, prize) is harvested at home as proof of being right and feeds the hard core. Facilitators get absorbed into one side's story.

Affirm both narratives instead of crowning one. Facilitator as symmetric witness. Coordinated external narrative truce.

Third parties are never blank slates: 
Germany carries its own history as moral capital toward Israel, the US its alliance, postcolonial States their liberation narratives.

Silence and judgment by outsiders are both positions in the story. This is why the external address is not a side issue; after the failure of Camp David in 2000, the fight over who refused what was waged mainly before American and international audiences.


3. Six success factors for lasting peace

Factor

What it requires

Instruments

Observable test

1. Recognition architecture in three directions

Intra: own suffering may be seen and remembered.
Inter: recognition that answers the other side's grievance.
External: third parties affirm both stories.

Declarations (Section 4); memorials; claims and fact-finding commissions; a positive-peace ethos in schools, media and commemoration.

Can each side retell the other's story without experiencing it as capitulation?

2. Facilitator as narratively symmetric witness

Judge of the process, not of history. Procedural justice: voice, neutrality, respect, trustworthy motives.

Kelman-style problem-solving workshops (closed setting, no audience to play to).

Do both sides trust the facilitator as process holder?

3. Sacred cores off the price axis

Return, land, holy sites, existential security cannot be bought; attempts to do so harden positions.

Map each side's cores; moral reframing and symbolic recognition.

Is each core reframed rather than bought?

4. Trauma and hope infrastructure

Mental health care at scale; messaging that groups and conflicts can change (hope raises willingness to compromise).

Care programs in Gaza and Israeli border communities; veterans and survivors support.

Are war generations treated, or recruited?

5. Equal-status structures

Contact works as a lever only under structural equality; otherwise meetings reproduce the hierarchy.

Institutionally backed joint programs with equal standing.

Do joint programs reproduce or reduce hierarchy?

6. External narrative truce

Donors, media and courts coordinate how they address the narratives. Only partly feasible, but without it the adjudication fight keeps feeding hardening.

Donor conditions; consistent standards; avoiding one-sided prizes and resolutions.

Is external validation still harvested as proof at home?


4. Declarations: the central instrument

A declaration turns abstract recognition into a concrete spoken commitment, and it is the one instrument that can be calibrated for all three addresses. Drafts for each step exist in the companion documents. The design requirements are the same throughout:

•      Concrete: what happened, how much, what followed. A grandmother must recognize her own experience in the text.

•      No "but": justifications written into the same sentence cancel the recognition. Security concerns belong in a separate, simultaneous statement.

•      Own role only: each speaker addresses what its own side did, not what the other did.

•      Moral, not legal: recognizing wrong is not conceding a legal claim or the legitimacy of the state.

•      Right speaker, right place: heads of government, in both languages, before the audience that most needs to hear it.

•      Followed by a deed: a fund, a memorial, textbook revisions, an end to payments to perpetrators. Words without a deed are read as rhetoric.

•      A defined end point for the claims covered, so the liability does not grow without limit.

 

Proposed sequence.
Each step lowers the cost of the next, and removes the paralyzing question of who goes first.

Step

Speaker

Core content

Main audience

Main obstacle

1

EU/UK and US (simultaneously)

Own role in the origins (Mandate and Balfour, Holocaust, refused refuge, restrictive US immigration) and in the continuation (arms, vetoes, unequal standard). Both narratives affirmed. Material fund. End point for covered claims.

Third parties; Israelis and Palestinians

US administration unlikely near term; EU does not speak with one voice.

2

Israel

Specific acknowledgment of the 1948 dispossession, life under occupation since 1967, and civilian harm in the Gaza war. No "but." Moral, not legal.

Palestinians; Israeli public

Taboo around Nakba; coalition politics; fear that recognition erodes legitimacy.

3

Palestinians (joint leadership)

October 7 and attacks on civilians named and condemned. End glorification of perpetrators and payments. Recognition of the Jewish people's historic bond and right to live in security.

Israeli public

Divided leadership; Hamas; public opinion; the feeling of asymmetry.

 

Why West first: a Western declaration spreads part of the ledger across several debtors, so Israel is not the sole debtor, which is the main source of defensiveness. It must cover both narratives, or it will be read as delegitimization by one side and as erasure by the other.
Test for every declaration: can it be told at all three addresses without identity loss?


5. The hardening loop and where to interrupt it

The central dynamic is a self-reinforcing cycle: external validation, then growth of the internal hard core, then less room for concessions, then desperation and escalation, then more suffering, then more external validation. A process that does not break this loop changes nothing structural. Four points of intervention:

•      Break validation: an external narrative truce and symmetric affirmation by outsiders.

•      Shift the ledger: Western declarations and fund, so concession no longer reads as defeat at home.

•      Shrink the hard core: trauma and hope infrastructure, so grievance is not converted into recruits.

•      Protect the process: By a facilitator who stays symmetric. A facilitator who adopts one side's frame ("deradicalization" or "security first" versus "occupation first") becomes a character in the other side's story and is no longer usable.


6. What is at stake if each party holds its role

The logic is symmetric, the content is not.
Scale of loss and power are very unequal, and each side accrues liability in different ways: through harm done and through recognition withheld.
The term Erbschuld means inherited accountability for consequences, not inherited guilt; each generation re-incurs it as long as recognition and settlement are deferred.

Actor

Role it tends to hold

If it holds the role

Move that breaks the pattern

Israel

Victim of October 7 and decades of terror; security first; recognition feared as loss of legitimacy.

Occupation and settlement growth keep adding to the other side's ledger; the demand for recognition grows heavier each generation; isolation and a hard core on both sides.

Specific acknowledgment of the Palestinian experience without conceding legitimacy; deeds that make it credible.

Palestinians

Dispossessed and occupied; resistance as legitimate; recognizing Israeli victimhood feared as erasing their own.

Attacks on civilians keep confirming the other side's fear and justify hard-line policy; leadership split persists; untreated trauma feeds recruitment.

Unambiguous condemnation of attacks on civilians and recognition of Jewish historic ties, backed by action against glorification and payments.

West (US, EU, UK)

Partisan adjudicator: shield for one side, selective critic of the other.

Facilitator capture: trusted by neither side as a process holder; each outside validation feeds the hard core.

Own-role declarations; equal standards on arms and settlements; a fund that spreads the cost.

Regional states, UN, courts, media

Selective validation; instrumentalizing the cause.

The adjudication fight escalates: more claims, more selective validation, more hardening.

Coordinated, symmetric treatment of both narratives; Arab states acknowledging their own roles (1948 war, treatment of refugees and of Jews who left).

The compounding cost.
Failure of Layer 2 is demonstrably more expensive than prevention.
Without recognition, narratives harden into doctrine, dehumanization becomes normal and makes the next escalation psychologically possible, the logic of the "devoted actor" (moral rather than instrumental rationality) displaces compromise, and untreated trauma supplies the fighters and hardliners of the next round.
Skipping Layer 2 does not postpone the payment; it raises the interest.


7. If full declarations are not feasible. And they will not

Our own assessment is that full declarations from either side are fundamentally unlikely in the near term. The asymmetry, and the unresolved question of recognizing a right that arose from large-scale immigration, make them politically very costly. Even where maintaining the conflict is even more costly and even with an Erbschuld consequence on coming Generations.
What the current approach however may contribute is serve as an honesty benchmark for all.


8. Caveats and evidence base

  • The three-address model (intra, inter, external) is a synthesis of the research literature, not an empirically tested theory. The external layer is the least developed: its mechanisms rest on well-supported theory but few direct effect measurements.
  • The declaration texts are constructs following the logic, not predictions or proposals that any party would accept. Historical details should be checked by historians from both sides.
  • Figures and facts from earlier sections of this analysis are rounded orders of magnitude and not all were re-verified for this summary.

Appendix: The Four Declarations

The criteria a recognition declaration should satisfy are mentioned in Chapter 4.
Here we focus on the essential texts without trying to propose any follow-up deeds.
Status of the drafts: these are constructs stemming from the logic of the Conflict Situation, not predictions and not as texts any party has agreed to.
Historical details were drafted from general knowledge.

Four Declarations

A. United States

Role addressed: continuation of the conflict (arms, diplomatic cover, unequal standard), plus the historical refusal of refuge.
Primary audience: Israelis and Palestinians.

"We speak as Americans, about the role our country has played.

In the 1930s and 1940s we closed our doors to Jewish refugees who asked us for help. That is part of the history that led to the founding of Israel. We acknowledge it.

Since 1948 we have recognized and supported Israel, and we have become its most important ally. We have supplied weapons, given billions in aid, and used our veto in the United Nations to prevent decisions. In doing so we have not always applied the same standard to Israeli policy that we applied to others. We have tolerated settlements that we ourselves often called an obstacle. We have led peace negotiations without securing results, and in doing so we gave Palestinians the impression that we were not an honest broker.

In the war that began in 2023, tens of thousands of Palestinians were killed in Gaza, with weapons that came from our country. We acknowledge the suffering of those families and our responsibility for our contribution. We also acknowledge that Israelis were attacked on October 7 in a way that nobody may justify, and that we promised Israel we would protect it.

We do not say that our support for Israel was a mistake. We say that friendship demands honesty, and that we owe Palestinians and Israelis the same care."

B. European Union and United Kingdom

Role addressed: origins of the conflict (Mandate and Balfour, persecution leading to the Holocaust, refused refuge, partition of the region), and inconsistency since.
Primary audience: Palestinians and the Arab world (as former colonial power), Israelis.

"We speak as Europeans, about what happened in and from Europe.

For centuries Europe persecuted, excluded and murdered Jews. The Holocaust was conceived and carried out on European soil, with the cooperation of many European countries and populations. When Jews asked for help in the 1930s, we too often refused them entry. After 1945 we did not do enough to protect the survivors and to let them return to their homes. We acknowledge that guilt.

Europe also let its Jewish question be solved partly outside Europe, in a land that was already inhabited. In 1917 the United Kingdom promised a national home for the Jewish people, then governed the land as the Mandate power, suppressed the Arab revolt of 1936-39 with force, restricted Jewish immigration in 1939 at the moment the need was greatest, and left in 1948 without a workable solution. European powers divided the region without consulting its inhabitants. As a result, Palestinians paid a price for a problem Europe had created. We acknowledge that wrong too.

Since then we have defended the rights of both peoples in words, but have been inconsistent in deeds. We called settlements illegal and yet traded with them. We financed Palestinian institutions and demanded too little accountability. We supplied weapons without fully weighing the consequences. We allowed antisemitism in Europe to grow again, and the treatment of Palestinians and Muslims in Europe deserves equal attention.

We take responsibility for our share. We do not say who must follow us. We say only what is ours."

C. Israel

Role addressed: the 1948 dispossession, life under Israeli authority since 1967, and civilian harm in the Gaza war.
Primary audience: Palestinians; the Israeli public.

"We stand here to say what has not been said for too long.

In 1948 about 750,000 Palestinians lost their homes. More than four hundred villages disappeared. Many fled, many were expelled, and nobody was allowed to return. Their children and grandchildren still live in camps and in exile. That was a wrong, and we acknowledge it as a wrong.

Since 1967 millions of Palestinians have lived under our authority, without the rights we take for granted for ourselves. We demolished homes, took land, restricted movement, and let generations grow up with checkpoints and humiliation. That too was and is a wrong.

In the war that began on October 7, 2023, tens of thousands of men, women and children were killed in Gaza, and almost an entire population lost its home. We acknowledge the suffering of every Palestinian who lost someone, and we take responsibility for what our government and our army did in it.

We recognize that the Palestinian people is a people, with its own history, its own loss and its own right to live in dignity.

We do not ask the families for forgiveness as a condition, but as a hope. What we say today is not a demand. It is a debt we no longer deny."

D. Palestinians

Role addressed: October 7, 2023, and earlier attacks on civilians; glorification of violence; the Jewish people's historic bond with the land and right to live in security.
Primary audience: the Israeli public.
Speaker note: ideally the joint Palestinian leadership, addressing Israelis in Hebrew and Arabic.

"We address ourselves to the people of Israel.

On October 7, 2023, about 1,200 men, women and children were killed in their homes, in the streets and at a festival. About 250 people were taken away. Sexual violence was committed. They were civilians, and it was murder. We condemn it without reservation. No injustice exists that justifies this.

That violence did not come out of nowhere. For years Israelis were killed on buses, in restaurants and in markets, and rockets were fired at cities. That too was murder, and for that too we take responsibility. We have for too long honored violence, congratulated perpetrators and paid their families. That ends.

We recognize that the Jewish people has an ancient history in this land, that it was persecuted for centuries, and that six million were murdered. This land is also your home. You have the right to live here in security and dignity, without fear for your children.

We acknowledge the pain of every family that lost someone, and of the hostages and their loved ones. We do not ask you to forget. We ask you to know that we see what was done to you.

We do not say this as an exchange. We say it because it is true."

Notes on the drafts: figures are rounded (about 750,000 displaced in 1948, more than 400 villages, about 1,200 killed and about 250 taken hostage on October 7). Each text addresses only its own speaker's role; none makes statements about borders, Jerusalem, the Palestinian right of return, or legal qualifications such as genocide, which belong to the settlement and to the courts

 

Sources

·        Bar-Tal, D. (2000). From Intractable Conflict through Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation: Psychological Analysis. Political Psychology — Wiley

·        Bar-Tal, D. The Ethos of Conflict; Psychological Dynamics of Intractable Conflicts — Beyond Intractability: ethos · Beyond Intractability: dynamics

·        Galtung, J. Peace, Positive and Negative — Wiley

·        Mitzen, J. / ontologische zekerheid in het Israëlisch-Palestijnse conflict. Ontological Insecurity: A Case Study on Israeli-Palestinian Conflict in Jerusalem — E-International Relations

·        Ontological security and foreign policy in West Asia after the Abraham Accords — ScienceDirect

·        Jaspers, K. The Question of German Guilt — JSTOR; zie ook Metaphysical Guilt: Jaspers, Honneth, and the Problem of Dehumanisation — SciELO

·        Pham, P. N., Weinstein, H. M. & Longman, T. Trauma and PTSD Symptoms in Rwanda: Implications for Attitudes Toward Justice and Reconciliation — in: Mental Health Consequences of War, PMC; PTSD, trauma, and reconciliation in South Sudan (2017) — PubMed

·        Shnabel, N., Nadler, A. e.a. (2009). Promoting Reconciliation Through the Satisfaction of the Emotional Needs of Victimized and Perpetrating Group Members: The Needs-Based Model of Reconciliation — SAGE

·        Halperin, E., Russell, A. G., Dweck, C. S. & Gross, J. J. (2011). Anger, Hatred, and the Quest for Peace — SAGE

·        Cohen-Chen, S., Crisp, R. J. & Halperin, E. (2015). Perceptions of a Changing World Induce Hope and Promote Peace in Intractable Conflicts — SAGE

·        Staub, E. (2006). Reconciliation after Genocide, Mass Killing, or Intractable Conflict — Wiley

·        Haslam, N. e.a. Intergroup Conflict and Dehumanization — in: The Cambridge Handbook of Moral Psychology — Cambridge; Effective ways for reducing dehumanization (2023) — ScienceDirect

·        Pettigrew, T. F. & Tropp, L. R. (2006). A Meta-Analytic Test of Intergroup Contact Theory — PDF, Wharton

·        Lazarus, N. Twenty Years of Israeli-Palestinian Peace Education: A Research Retrospective — Palestine-Israel Journal

·        Shnabel, N., Halabi, S. & Noor, M. (2013). Overcoming Competitive Victimhood and Facilitating Forgiveness — ResearchGate

·        Noor, M., Brown, R. e.a. (2008). On Positive Psychological Outcomes: What Helps Groups with a History of Conflict to Forgive and Reconcile? — SAGE

·        Atran, S. (2016). The Devoted Actor: Unconditional Commitment and Intractable Conflict across Cultures — Current Anthropology

·        Ross, L. & Stillinger, C. Reactive Devaluation — overzicht

·        What Makes Parties Trust Mediators? Negotiation Journal — MIT Press

·        Beyond Intractability. Essay over neutraliteit van derden — link

·        Lind, E. A., Tyler, T. R. & Huo, Y. J. (1997). Procedural Justice in Dyadic Conflict — PDF, UCLA

·        Dumont, K. B. & Waldzus, S. (2017). Reparation Demands and Collective Guilt Assignment of Born-Free Black South Africans — SAGE

·        Kelman, H. C. Interactive Problem-Solving; Informal Mediation by the Scholar/Practitioner — Beyond Intractability: interactive · Beyond Intractability: scholar/practitioner

·        Israeli–Palestinian conflict (context van de post-Camp David-narratief) — Wikipedia

·        Holocaust Collective Memory in the Context of the Palestinian–Israeli Conflict — Springer; Collective Memory of Trauma: The Otherization of Suffering — eScholarship