Thursday, November 19, 2026

Dutch Whooligans in Luxembourg Woods


How a Dutch-Flemish boys' club staged a Hitler birthday party, and then forgot they had been there

 

R.M. Westerink; November 2026 


 

A campfire in the Ardennes

April 2026. A log cabin in a Luxembourg forest, not far from Wiltz. Around twenty men from the Netherlands and Flanders gather around a fire. They raise their right arms. They throw books by Jewish authors into the flames. They set fire to a large symbol of their own little club. Then somebody at the campfire talks about hunting down politicians.

The occasion? Adolf Hitler's birthday. A man dead for eighty-one years, celebrated like a favourite uncle.

What they did not know: the trees had eyes. Journalists from the Dutch programme Zembla and the Flemish programme Pano had hidden cameras and microphones around the cabin. On 18 November the whole world got to see the party.

In my blog about Whooligans: the White Hooligans defending whiteness by breaking the rules of civil life, we looked at MAGA, their largest and loudest chapter. Now a Dutch Whooligan splinter has come into view, proof that this is no American monopoly. Filmed in high definition, with a campfire soundtrack.

Whooliganism, pocket edition

The DNA is the same. The size is not.

Look at the Whooliganism checklist from the first article.
Anxiety that points outward: check.
Contempt for civic norms: check, a book burning is about as clear as it gets.
Tolerance for violence: check, they literally built a cage for it.
Lies when it serves the tribe: wait for the next section.

Even the format is imported. The cage-fighting "Active Clubs" that host these evenings are a franchise of an American model, inspired by the Rise Above Movement, a Californian street-fighting group whose co-founder ended up facing federal riot charges. Dutch Whooligans did not invent their own hobby. They bought the American starter kit.

But here the comparison stops, and it should stop loudly. MAGA is a mass movement that captured a party, a presidency and tens of millions of votes. The Dutch-Flemish chapter fits in one log cabin. Twenty men in a forest. A few dozen spectators in a tent. A village hall cellar.

That matters. In America the Whooligans got the keys to the building. In the Low Countries they are still throwing stones at the windows from the bushes. They are not the vanguard of a silent majority. They are an exceptional minority, and the Civil Majority should describe them exactly that way: small, isolated and slightly ridiculous.

The boys' club

Strip away the symbols and look at what these men actually do with their weekends.

1. They play fight. In a tent on a field in Zuidwolde, Drenthe. In the cellar of a village hall in Finsterwolde, Groningen. In the garden of a villa in Oeffelt, Brabant. Fighters in balaclavas, as if the village bakery might recognise them.

2. They play dress-up. Salutes, symbols, the costume box of 1933. It is historical re-enactment for men who skipped the history lessons.

3. They throw a birthday party. For a dead dictator. With a bonfire. And books, because nothing says "strong and superior" like being afraid of paper.

This is not a political movement. It is a schoolyard with a mortgage. The boys who once drew swastikas in the back of their maths notebook have grown up, bought land and found each other in private chat groups.

And look who they are. Not the lost, unemployed young man the Whooligans like to present as the victim of globalisation. Among the people Zembla identified: a maths teacher, a dentist, a nursing lecturer and a psychiatrist who patched up the fighters. Educated, employed, grown up. They had every chance to know better. That is what makes the juvenile behaviour so striking: it is a choice, not a fate.

And there were children present. Drone footage showed kids at the Brabant fight night. One spectator left the tent carrying a baby. Nothing builds a better future for the white race than taking an infant to a Hitler-saluting cage fight.

"I didn't know what it was about"

Every hooligan knows the line. It wasn't me. I was just standing there. Somebody else started it. The Whooligans in the woods have their own version, and once the cameras appeared, the excuses came out in a familiar order.

•  The accidental guest. The FvD group leader in the Den Bosch city council was filmed at the Brabant fight night. His explanation: an acquaintance invited him without saying what kind of event it was, and he left almost as soon as he understood a fight was planned. He just happened to wander into a neo-Nazi cage fight. With a baby.

•  The naive host. The dentist whose garden hosted the fights says he only lent his land as a favour to a friend, calls himself naive, and says he was there just to keep an eye on things. Keeping an eye on a Hitler salute is a strange form of supervision.

•  The disappearing evening. The maths teacher whose field hosted an earlier fight night first denied that the gathering took place at all. Then he said he knew nothing about it. Then he stopped answering questions. Three positions in quick succession: a personal record.

•  The party that never knew. FvD's leader in parliament first told the NOS that young members should be free to explore widely and that attending such gatherings was not a problem. Later he said he had not understood how serious it was.

Note the pattern. Nobody says I believe this. Nobody says I was wrong. Everyone says I didn't know. This is the fourth Whooligan trait in action: lies when they serve the tribe. In the cabin they shout. In daylight they whisper.

And here is the plain truth. You do not stumble into a cage fight in a village hall cellar by accident. You do not drive to a Luxembourg forest for Hitler's birthday by mistake. Grown men know where they are going. That is precisely why the fighters wore balaclavas.

The bill arrives

Within a day of the broadcast, the adult world sent its invoice.

•  Forum voor Democratie expelled two members: the Den Bosch group leader and a member of its youth wing who, according to Zembla, took part in a cage fight and joined the book burning in Luxembourg.

•  The Den Bosch group leader gave up his council seat at the party's request.

•  The maths teacher was suspended with immediate effect by his school in Meppel. Whether he will be dismissed has not yet been decided.

Notice who acted. Not a court, not the secret service, not a special law. A party board that suddenly needed distance. A school that had to face parents the next morning. Ordinary institutions, doing ordinary things, with remarkable speed.

This is what the Whooligans never understand about the Civil Majority. You may hold your views in a democracy. You may even shout them. But the moment you take them out of the woods and into a classroom, a council chamber or a hospital, you meet people who have to live with you. Freedom of speech protects you from the state. It does not protect you from your employer, your party or your neighbours.

The tragedy, if we want to call it that, is entirely self-inflicted. A teaching job traded for a campfire. A political career traded for an evening in a tent. Weak excuses are what is left when the costume comes off.

Juvenile is not the same as harmless

Laugh at them, by all means. But do not mistake ridicule for reassurance. Boys' clubs can still break bones.

•   One attendee at the Drenthe fight night was later arrested after the Dutch security service AIVD warned prosecutors he might be planning an attack. The court found the attack plot unproven, but convicted him for possessing weapons and ammunition.

•   Three Swedish guests at the same event were later sent to prison, for up to four years, for assaulting migrants in Stockholm.

•   German prosecutors are investigating members of Der Dritte Weg who attended the Dutch events.

•   And at the Luxembourg campfire, a member was recorded calling for politicians to be hunted down. A German extremism expert told Zembla that such statements deserve the attention of security and justice authorities.

The cage is a training ground. The forest is a bonding ritual. The real danger is not that twenty men will take over the Netherlands. It is that one of them will try something on his own, convinced that the tent was cheering for him.

There is a second danger, quieter and more American: the bridge into respectable politics. According to Zembla, the leader of the Luxembourg group attended a Christmas gala of FvD's youth wing and afterwards announced a "self-defence" foundation with them, designed to look generally nationalist rather than openly Nazi. An infiltrator described the aim as a seemingly moderate front. FvD says it never cooperated with the group, and the group's leader now says the foundation never happened and the group has been dissolved.

Take the denials at face value if you like. The intent is still instructive. This is exactly how MAGA grew: the fringe does not need to win elections. It only needs a door left open by people who do. In the United States, that door was opened wide. In the Netherlands, for now, it slammed shut within a day. Keep it that way.

Guardrails for the woods

The Civil Majority has three jobs here, and none of them is panic.

1. Size them correctly. Do not inflate twenty men into a movement. That is the publicity they crave. Call them what they are: a fringe hobby club with a Hitler fetish and a cage.

2. Enforce the rules, boringly. Weapons laws, incitement laws, assault laws. No special drama, no martyrdom. Just consequences, delivered on time, like a parking fine.

3. Guard the doors. Parties, youth wings, schools and professional bodies decide who gets a respectable stage. This week, they mostly chose well. The test is whether they still choose well when the cameras are gone.

Expect the counter-attack. Expect the claim that a "media cartel" wants blood. Expect the youth members to be recast as curious boys who were only exploring. Expect the word "witch-hunt". It has already started on the usual websites. Answer it with the footage. Nothing undermines a victim story like a recording of the victim saluting Hitler.

Final note

In America the Whooligans filled stadiums. In the Low Countries they fill a log cabin. That difference is not luck. It is the result of institutions that still say no, parties that still expel, schools that still suspend and journalists who still hide cameras in the trees.

The Whooligans in the woods will keep breeding their little rituals: the fire, the salute, the cage, the excuse. The Civil Majority must keep breeding something duller and stronger: attention, accountability and a straight face when someone says "I didn't know what it was about."

To the men around the campfire: you knew. You drove there. You raised your arm.

Grow up.

 

Sources

•       The latest rising of Whooligans: MAGA (Europe is Us)

•       Geheime beelden onthullen connecties tussen neonazi-netwerk en FVD (Zembla, BNNVARA)

•       Van 'fight nights' tot Hitlerviering (VRT NWS Pano)

•       FVD royeert twee leden na Zembla-uitzending (NOS)

•       FVD royeert leden na onthullingen over neonazi's, docent geschorst (HBP Media)

•       Hidden cameras reveal secret neo-Nazi meeting near Wiltz (RTL Today)

•       How a sailboat exposed a Dutch cell of the Active Club movement (Bellingcat, on the American roots of Active Clubs)

 

Tuesday, November 17, 2026

Als iedereen een goede poorter was

 



R.M. Westerink; November 2026 


 

Elke Nederlandse zeventienjarige krijgt een brief over de dienstplicht. Die plicht bestaat nog op papier, al is sinds 1997 niemand meer opgeroepen. Sinds september 2025 zit er bovendien een verzoek bij om een online vragenlijst van Defensie in te vullen.

Voor veel jongeren is dat de eerste keer dat de overheid hun iets vraagt. Het is een vreemd stil moment: geen ceremonie, geen gesprek, geen idee wat de samenleving van hen vraagt, of wat zij ervoor terugkrijgen.

Dat moment verdient meer. En een oud Nederlands woord kan helpen om het te vullen: poorter.

Waarom nu

Onze tijd geeft voldoende aanleiding om verbondenheid, saamhorigheid en maatschappelijke verantwoordelijkheid doelbewuster te stimuleren. Er is weer oorlog in Europa. Het vertrouwen in instituties is broos. Veel mensen leven naast elkaar zonder elkaar echt te ontmoeten.

Dat vraagt om een manier van insluiten die voor iedereen geldt. Niet een programma voor probleemgevallen, maar een uitnodiging aan elke jongere om er volwaardig bij te horen. Jongeren hebben daarbij voorrang, omdat het gevoel ergens bij te horen vroeg wordt gevormd.

Wie iedereen uitnodigt, bereikt ook degenen die het hardst een plek nodig hebben. Te veel jongens raken de aansluiting kwijt op school, op het werk of in hun buurt. Een deel van hen komt in beeld bij criminele netwerken, die via sociale media jongeren werven voor drugshandel of online fraude.

Wat deze jongens missen is zelden talent. Het is een plek waar ze nodig zijn, een gezamenlijk doel en iemand die ziet dat ze er zijn. Criminelen bieden dat maar al te graag. De samenleving moet het beter bieden.

Inzet voor een groter belang

Gezamenlijke inzet voor een groter belang is een van de oudste manieren om je nodig te voelen. Wie samen iets zwaars heeft gedragen, blijft naar elkaar omkijken. Die inzet kan veel vormen hebben: vrijwilligerswerk in de buurt, mantelzorg, een rol bij de brandweer of in de sport, en ook een diensttijd.

Voor die laatste vorm zijn de bouwstenen er al:

  • Maatschappelijke diensttijd. Meer dan 100.000 jongeren deden al mee. Het programma rust op drie pijlers: iets doen voor een ander, ontmoeten buiten je eigen kring en talent ontwikkelen.
  • Militaire diensttijd. Defensie biedt een vrijwillig dienjaar. In 2025 stroomden 1.097 jongeren in; voor 2026 is het voornemen 1.500.

Wat ontbreekt, is niet de gelegenheid maar de erkenning. Wie zich inzet, krijgt hooguit een certificaat. De overheid merkt het nauwelijks op, de eigen omgeving nog minder. Ondertussen staat de financiering van de maatschappelijke diensttijd politiek onder druk. Wie wil dat meer jongeren zich inzetten, moet die inzet zichtbaar maken.

Een eigentijds poorterschap

In middeleeuwse Nederlandse steden was een poorter een volwaardig stadsburger: letterlijk iemand van binnen de poort. Poorters hadden rechten, zoals de vrijheid om handel te drijven en de bescherming van de stad. Ze hadden ook plichten: de wallen helpen bewaken, de vrede bewaren, hun deel bijdragen. Poorter kon je worden, en je kon het ook weer verliezen.

De kern van het poorterschap was niet een bepaalde taak, maar een verbintenis: ik hoor bij deze stad, en ik sta ervoor in. Dat idee verdient een eigentijdse vorm:

  1. Toetreding. Op zijn of haar achttiende verjaardag ontvangt elke jongere een persoonlijke uitnodiging om poorter te worden. Wie die aanneemt, wordt geïnstalleerd in een openbare plechtigheid in het stadhuis, met familie en buren erbij.
  2. Het poortersprotocol. Bij de installatie wordt het commitment vastgelegd: een belofte en een korte beschrijving van rechten en verantwoordelijkheden. Hoe iemand dat commitment invult, verschilt per persoon. Het kan via een diensttijd, militair of maatschappelijk, maar ook via structureel vrijwilligerswerk, zorg voor anderen of een rol in de eigen buurt.
  3. Ontwikkeling. Poorter zijn is geen eenmalig moment. Poorters kunnen doorgroeien: mentor worden voor nieuwe poorters, een leidende rol op zich nemen, of worden ingezet in tijden van crisis.
  4. Bijzondere erkenning. De overheid en de stad maken de bijdrage zichtbaar: met een titel, met ceremonies op betekenisvolle momenten, en met praktische voordelen. [Concretiseren welke, bijv. voorrang bij opleidingen of korting op studieschuld.]
  5. Consequenties. Een belofte betekent pas iets als het breken ervan gevolgen heeft. Wie de verantwoordelijkheden uit het protocol ernstig schendt, kan de titel en de bijbehorende voordelen verliezen, maar nooit zijn of haar grondrechten.

Dat laatste is essentieel. Het poorterschap komt bovenop het gewone staatsburgerschap en vervangt het nooit.

Niet nieuw, wel anders

Het idee om burgerschap een moment en een gezicht te geven, is niet nieuw. Rond 2014 werd een burgereed voor alle Nederlanders van 18 jaar uitgewerkt, met een verplichte ceremonie en een boete voor wie wegbleef. Het kabinet-Balkenende IV wilde een Handvest Verantwoordelijk Burgerschap, maar dat verdween na veel discussie uit beeld. En in Groot-Brittannië werd de National Citizen Service, ooit gepresenteerd als een niet-militaire dienstplicht, in 2025 gesloten omdat het programma te duur was en te weinig jongeren bereikte.

Het poorterschap leert van die lessen. Het is geen verplichting maar een uitnodiging. Het is geen duur nieuw programma, maar erkenning van inzet die vaak al bestaat. En het is geen tweederangs burgerschap, maar iets wat bovenop het gewone burgerschap komt.

Bovendien bestaat er al een voorbeeld dichtbij. Nieuwe Nederlanders leggen bij hun naturalisatie een verklaring van verbondenheid af, in een plechtige ceremonie. Wie hier geboren is, krijgt zo'n moment nooit. Ook dat is een reden om het poorterschap voor iedereen open te stellen. Enkele gemeenten, zoals Edam-Volendam en Hoorn, ontvangen hun achttienjarigen al op het stadhuis. Het begin is er dus al.

Terechte bezwaren

Dit idee roept tegenspraak op, en dat hoort ook.

  • "Burgerschap hoef je niet te verdienen." Mee eens. Daarom gaat dit niet over burgerschap zelf, maar over erkenning voor wat mensen er vrijwillig aan toevoegen.
  • "Dan worden vooral de jongeren beloond die het al goed doen." Dat risico is reëel. Daarom moet het ontwerp juist andersom werken: persoonlijke benadering van jongeren die zich uit zichzelf nooit zouden melden, en vormen van inzet die passen bij mbo'ers en werkende jongeren, niet alleen bij studenten.
  • "Waarom extra aandacht voor jongens?" Iedereen wordt uitgenodigd. Maar een aanpak die juist de groep mist die het snelst afglijdt, schiet zijn belangrijkste doel voorbij.
  • "Zo bepaalt de overheid hoe mensen moeten leven." De overheid vraagt nu al iets van zeventienjarigen. De vraag is of ze dat zwijgend doet, of met een aanbod en een uitgestoken hand.
  • "Waarom voeren we de dienstplicht niet gewoon weer in?" Het kabinet verkent een opkomstplicht naar Zweeds model. Het poorterschap kiest een andere route: uitnodiging en erkenning in plaats van straf bij weigering.

Binnen de poort

Als iedereen een goede poorter was, zag onze stad er anders uit. Buren zouden elkaar kennen. Jongens die nu afdwalen naar de snelle euro van de drugshandel of de online fraude, zouden een plek hebben waar ze verwacht worden. En inzet voor het algemeen belang zou gezien en gewaardeerd worden, in plaats van stilzwijgend verondersteld.

Daarvoor hoeven we niet te wachten op een betere generatie. De poorters zijn er al. Velen van hen zijn alleen nog nooit gevraagd.

Onze stad heeft dringend poorters nodig. Laten we ze vinden, installeren en begeleiden, te beginnen op hun achttiende verjaardag.


Bronnen

Friday, November 13, 2026

Europe Begins to Organize Its Power

 


The Dublin agreement deserves a welcome
— and a clear test of what it can deliver.


R.M. Westerink; November 13, 2026 


Europe has spent too long insisting that it must have a voice while struggling to agree who should speak. The decision in Dublin to organize a European negotiating team therefore deserves recognition.

Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Poland, together with EU institutions, will form Europe’s team for Ukraine peace talks. This is a meaningful step towards Europe organizing its power. Whether it becomes an effective instrument depends on the mandate, cohesion and resources behind it.[1]

For those who would prefer stronger leadership by the European Commission and its High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaja Kallas, the arrangement may feel incomplete. But supporting this development and seeking stronger European institutions are compatible ambitions. The immediate task is to make the delegation work for Europe as a whole.

Bringing Europe’s strengths together

The arrangement offers a practical basis for influence because it brings national military capabilities and EU institutions into the same framework.

A durable settlement will require more than diplomatic wording. It will raise questions about military assistance, security guarantees, sanctions, financing, reconstruction and Ukraine’s European future. No single European capital can credibly manage that entire agenda. A delegation connecting governments’ capabilities with the Union’s collective instruments has a better chance.

Including Britain is particularly sensible. European security extends beyond EU membership, and Britain’s military and diplomatic capabilities belong in any serious effort to secure the continent. Brexit should not prevent Europeans from organizing around their shared security interests.

The opportunity is substantial: Europe can begin to connect what it says at the negotiating table with what it can actually deliver.

A delegation must represent a common position

A group of powerful countries does not automatically constitute a European voice.

Without a shared mandate, the delegation could reproduce Europe’s divisions inside a smaller room. Separate national priorities could produce competing messages, while governments outside the group might reasonably question whose interests were being represented.

The delegation must therefore derive its authority from an agreed European position. Its members need sufficient discretion to negotiate, alongside clear limits on what they can concede or promise.

Smaller countries must have confidence that their security will not become a bargaining instrument. Ukraine must retain control over decisions concerning its own future. And neither Moscow nor Washington should be able to obtain different European answers by approaching different capitals.

Europe’s seat at the table becomes valuable when it carries a position that its members can sustain.

Four tests of seriousness

The delegation should be judged against four practical tests.

First, a common mandate and agreed limits on concessions.
Europeans must establish what they seek, what remains negotiable and which principles cannot be traded away. Ambiguity within the delegation would become an advantage for its counterparts.

Second, a clear spokesperson and a procedure for resolving disagreements.
A team can draw on several sources of authority, but negotiations require an intelligible voice. Internal differences need a route to resolution before they become competing public positions.

Third, accountability to the wider EU membership.
Regular consultation and reporting are essential to maintain trust. Countries outside the room must remain participants in shaping the position represented inside it.

Fourth, credible commitments on military support and security.
European influence depends partly on whether Ukraine can continue to resist aggression and whether Europeans can sustain their commitments. Diplomatic ambition must be backed by resources and decisions.

These tests would turn a useful organizational compromise into a serious instrument of European policy.

The institutions must help it succeed

The Commission, European Council and Kallas have essential roles in making this arrangement coherent.

The Commission must connect negotiations to the Union’s economic and financial instruments. The European Council must maintain agreement among governments. Kallas should help bring diplomatic continuity, foreign policy coordination and the perspective of the wider Union into the delegation’s work.

The Dublin formula does not, by itself, demonstrate that disagreements over her personal role have been conclusively resolved. Leaving those relationships unclear would invite renewed institutional competition.

Europe needs an explicit division of responsibilities that allows its representatives to reinforce one another. The negotiating team should strengthen the Union’s capacity to act collectively and give all member states confidence in its direction.

Merz’s opportunity: make collective action possible

Friedrich Merz has an opportunity to exercise European leadership through this process.

His Dublin remarks supported established European negotiating formats and urged leaders to settle representation behind closed doors.[2] That suggests a pragmatic focus on getting an effective team into place. It does not establish that he engineered the agreement.

The more consequential test lies ahead. Germany can help build coalitions, connect diplomatic commitments to material support and sustain confidence across Europe.

Merz would demonstrate leadership by using Germany’s weight to make common action possible. That requires listening to smaller states, working closely with European institutions and helping ensure that agreed commitments are fulfilled.

Germany’s influence can become a European asset when it increases Europe’s collective capacity.

Costa has stated the foundation

António Costa’s Dublin statement provides a clear foundation: Ukraine must remain free to choose its alliances; Europe’s security cannot be decided without Europeans; and sovereign equality, territorial integrity and the rejection of force must guide negotiations.[3]

Those principles matter because the talks concern more than the terms for ending a war. They also concern whether military aggression can secure lasting authority over another country’s choices.

Europe should enter negotiations prepared to pursue peace while defending the conditions that make peace sustainable.

Dublin deserves a welcome. Europe has taken a practical step towards organizing its power. Its leaders must now give the delegation the common purpose, authority and resources needed to exercise it.

References

  1. Reuters, “EU settles on five-nation group to speak for Europe at Ukraine peace talks,” 13 November 2026.

  2. German Federal Government, Chancellor Merz’s press statement in Dublin, 12 November 2026.

  3. European Council, President Costa’s remarks following the European Political Community meeting, 12 November 2026.

Sunday, November 8, 2026

The Latest Rising of the Whooligans - MAGA, set back by the Civil Majority

 


R.M. Westerink, Nov 8, 2026


The night the wave came in

On 3 November 2026, America answered a question Donald Trump had asked it himself. He was not on the ballot, he said afterwards. But at his rallies he had told voters to act as if he were. They did.

Democrats flipped seven Senate seats: Kansas, Iowa, Texas, Ohio, Maine, North Carolina and South Carolina. They are on course for their largest House majority since 2008. More than 124 million Americans voted, a midterm record. Texas sent a Democrat to the Senate for the first time since 1988. Kansas did so for the first time since 1932.

This was not a narrow escape. It was a rebuke. And it was delivered to a movement I call by its proper name: the Whooligans.

Who are the Whooligans?

The name is built from what drives them: White, Hooligan. White, because whiteness is the identity they defend. Hooligan, because the defence comes with a willingness to break the rules of civil life.

The Whooligan is moved by anxiety, and the anxiety always points outward:

  • Anxiety about the others: other faces, other religions, other cultures, other languages in the supermarket.
  • Anxiety about money: that the taxes he pays will benefit people who are not his own.
  • Anxiety about decline: that his country, his town, his kind are losing their economic edge.

Fear alone does not make a Whooligan. Everyone fears something.

The Whooligan is the one who answers fear by throwing away civility.

He rejects the basic habits taught in schools and universities: respect for facts, for opponents, for rules that bind the winners too. He adopts lies when lies serve the tribe. He tolerates, excuses or applauds violence against other groups when it seems to serve Whooligan interests.

Let me be clear about the White part, because it will be challenged.
I do not mean that white people are Whooligans. Most are not, and the 2026 vote proves it: Kansas, Iowa and Maine do not elect Democrats without millions of white voters. I mean that the Whooligan movement is organised around whiteness. It is a political identity, built over centuries and defended on purpose. That is history, not biology.

The long shadow

Whooliganism is not new in America. It was there at the founding, in the gap between "all men are created equal" and the men who wrote it while owning other men. I traced that history in The Long Shadow of Old Conservatism. The pattern repeats with every generation:

1.       The Constitution's promise expands to include new people.

2.       The Whooligans rise against it.

3.       The promise slowly wins.

4.       New Whooligans find new targets.

After the Civil War, they were the Redeemers and the White League, restoring white rule in the South by terror. In the 1850s and again around 1900, they were the nativists, warning that Irish Catholics, Italians and Jews would overrun the country. In the 1950s and 60s, they were Massive Resistance, closing schools rather than integrating them.

Today they wear red caps. They chant about being "replaced." They stormed the Capitol on 6 January 2021. Their programme has think tanks now, the Heritage Foundation's Project 2025 among them, and a president who signs it into policy.

The costume changes. The anxiety and the tribe do not.

The European cousins

Europe has no right to feel superior. Whooliganism grows wherever white majorities feel their monopoly slipping.

  • Britain: Enoch Powell's "Rivers of Blood" speech in 1968, the National Front, and today Reform UK.
  • France: the Front National, founded in 1972 with veterans of the far right, now the Rassemblement National. France also gave the movement its favourite myth, the "Great Replacement."
  • Germany: the country that knows best where this road ends, and still the AfD.
  • The Netherlands: Geert Wilders' PVV, which won in 2023, brought a government down in 2025, and then lost ground.

The pattern is the same. Opportunist politicians and media feed on Whooligan anxiety, because anxiety turns out voters and sells clicks. Then the opportunists ride the wave as far as it goes.

But there is a second pattern too. Civility keeps coming back. It came back in the Dutch vote of 2025. It came back in America on 3 November. It creeps in through schools, mixed marriages, shared workplaces, and grandchildren who look different from their grandparents. The Whooligans feel it closing in. That is precisely what frightens them.

Why the opportunists left

The Whooligan core never wins alone. It is too small. It needs a much larger ring of fellow travellers: voters who are not Whooligans themselves but who turn a blind eye to the lies and the violence, as long as the deal pays.

In 2026, the deal stopped paying. Unilateral tariffs drove up prices. A war in the Middle East, which Trump had promised to avoid, sent fuel costs soaring. Meanwhile the president pursued his own business interests and his Washington renovation projects.

The fellow travellers did not suddenly discover civility. They discovered their bank balance. That should humble us. They tolerated the cruelty for years. They left when it reached their own wallets.

Still, they left. And this is the hopeful lesson: the opportunist ring is not loyal to the tribe. It can be won back by a politics that delivers. Kansas, Texas and South Carolina just showed how.

Why the core won't soften

Do not expect the Whooligans to draw the lesson. Their anxiety was the engine of the movement. Defeat only feeds it.

There were signs of civility on election night. Trump, who still denies losing in 2020, did not dispute these results. Tom Tiffany, who objected to certifying the 2020 election, conceded the Wisconsin governor's race. Those concessions matter. They show that the norms still bite, even on those who mocked them.

But the core will hear a different story. Fewer allies, more enemies, a tribe under siege. Within days, Trump was sharing a red cap with "VETO" stencilled on it in MAGA style. Expect two years of rule by veto and executive order. Expect harder voices around the president, not softer ones. Expect the movement to fall back on the places where the fellow travellers have deserted it, and where only the true believers remain.

A cornered tribe is not a tamed one. The next two years may be louder and uglier than the last two.

Guardrails: what recovery requires

The latest rising of the Whooligans has been struck back. It has not been struck down. Whooliganism will outlive this defeat, as it outlived Reconstruction, the civil rights era and every reform since. The question is not how to make it vanish. It is how to keep it from ever again capturing the state.

That takes guardrails:

  • Restore the institutions. Courts, civil service, statistics agencies and inspectors general need protection from purges and political loyalty tests.
  • Restore the language. Public officials who lie, threaten or dehumanise should pay a political price, every time, from every side.
  • Deliver for the fellow travellers. Lower costs, secure jobs and fair taxes take away the anxiety that Whooligans feed on.
  • Teach civility again. Schools and universities are where civil habits are learned. That is exactly why Whooligans attack them.

Final Note

One final note. Many Trump voters will say they voted on prices, borders or distrust of elites, not MAGA, and some of them mean it. Hillary Clinton's "deplorables" remark in 2016 showed what happens when the civil camp sneers. The goal is not to humiliate the fellow travellers. It is to give them a better deal than the tribe can offer.

The Whooligans will keep breeding fear.
The Civil Majority must keep breeding something stronger: institutions that hold, and a public language worthy of a free and civil country.


Sources

 

Thursday, November 5, 2026

The GOP Saw it Coming - They Know Who to Blame - But Who Can Lead GOP Out?

 



R.M. Westerink; November 2026 


Republicans knew what voters were worried about.
Now the party needs a leader willing to act on it.


On Tuesday, Democrats won both houses of Congress.
In Texas, James Talarico defeated Ken Paxton. In Ohio, Sherrod Brown won the Senate seat JD Vance used to hold. Donald Trump’s initial explanation was that he himself hadn’t been on the ballot. But in races like these, voters had a chance to pass judgment on his presidency. They took it. [1]

Republicans saw trouble coming. A year ago, after a bad election night for his party, Vance said Republicans would ultimately be judged on whether they made a decent life affordable. This week, Trump himself acknowledged that he knew the Iran war would affect the midterms. Nobody had to predict a Democratic Senate win in Texas to understand the risk. The vice president had spelled out the test, and the president knew one of his biggest decisions could turn against him. [2, 3]


Vance says what went wrong

On Wednesday, JD Vance put the Iran war at the center of his explanation for the defeat. He also pointed to something Republicans should find especially troubling. Winning back people who deliberately voted against them now, takes a reason for them to change their minds. [3, 4]

Vance’s account also points a question to himself. He was part of the administration whose decisions he is now asking Republicans to reckon with. His warning on affordability was on the record a year ago. What would he have done differently with that warning in mind? And where is he prepared to push for a change while he is still vice president?

Trump owns the decision to launch the war and still defends it.
Republican leaders have their own choices to answer for. They had a president of their own party and majorities in both chambers. What did they use that power for? Where did they press the White House to change course? The party can start answering those questions now, while the decisions are still fresh and the people who made them are still in office. [3, 5]


DeSantis has another point

Florida Governor Ron DeSantis was already criticizing the political cost of the war and Republicans’ handling of gas prices before the results came in. Afterwards, he called the election a rebuke to both the president and Congress. He argued that some Republican voters stayed home because they were frustrated by how little their party had got done in Washington. He pointed to Florida, where Republicans held on in close races, as evidence that the national result had been avoidable. [6]

DeSantis gives Republicans a different diagnosis to argue over. Vance points to voters who switched sides. DeSantis points to voters who stayed home and to a Congress that gave them too little reason to turn up. Both things can happen in the same election. And some of what DeSantis wants from Congress, such as putting Trump’s immigration orders into law, would carry parts of the Trump agenda forward. That tells us something about the contest taking shape.

Republicans will have to decide which parts of Trump’s program they want to keep and which they are prepared to abandon. [4, 6, 7]


But what about Style?

Did Trump make America great again by lying to the public, pitting Americans against one another, levelling baseless accusations at opponents, taking false claims to court, appealing to white grievance, and treating the law and Congress with contempt?

That was Trump’s style of governing. Republicans know whose name is on it.


What would Republicans fit better?

The party needs new clothes.
Start with the people they have to fit. Take a worker who voted Republican in 2024 and now has less room in the household budget, or worries about what happens if the biggest employer in town shuts its doors. What can that worker expect from a Republican government? How would GOP make it easier to find another job nearby, get training without giving up a pay cheque, or keep health coverage between jobs? A would-be leader should be able to name something they would do and say how they would get it done.
Decently Dressed ...


Who would fit?

The contest for 2028 will give Republicans time to compare personalities.
The party has an urgent choice to make while Trump is still in office. When the president pursues a policy that makes life harder for the people Republicans say they represent, who in the party will say so in public and use the power they already have, to change it?

That is where we look for the next Republican leader.


References

1. Reuters, Democrats capture Congress in sweeping setback for Trump

2. Fox News, Vance’s affordability warning in November 2025

3. Associated Press, Vance’s break with Trump over the Iran war

4. The Washington Post, Vance on the Iran war and cost of living

5. Reuters, Republicans call for Trump to change course

6. The Wall Street Journal, DeSantis challenges fellow Republicans

7. RealClearPolitics, DeSantis on codifying Trump’s immigration orders

Wednesday, November 4, 2026

Democrats Won. What Now for the GOP?

 



Republicans face a choice over leadership, policy and their relationship
with Donald Trump. Those are three different questions.


R.M. Westerink; November 2026 


Democrats have won control of both the House and Senate.
For Republicans, the defeat opens a struggle over what went wrong—and what must change before 2028. The first press assessments point to weakened presidential authority, renewed arguments over candidate selection and an accelerating contest to succeed Trump. [1]

But electoral punishment does not come with instructions.
Republicans can draw very different lessons from the same defeat. Each points towards a different future.

1. Keep Trumpism, change the messenger

The least disruptive response would be to preserve the movement’s central commitments while finding a leader who promises greater discipline and competence.

That successor could retain restrictive immigration policies, economic nationalism and combative cultural politics, while offering fewer distractions and more predictable government. JD Vance would be an obvious contender for this direction, although the succession remains open. [2]

The argument would be straightforward: the agenda was right; its execution lost voters.

Its weakness is equally clear.
If voters rejected the consequences of policies—higher costs, tariffs or foreign conflict—a smoother presentation will not resolve their objections.

2. Change the policies that became liabilities

A second direction would involve substantive adjustment: reconsidering tariffs, rebuilding relations with allies, avoiding costly military commitments and concentrating on household finances.

This would allow Republicans to argue that they had listened without repudiating their entire political identity. Reuters’ reporting before the election already identified divisions over trade, intervention and the future of populism. [2]

But changing policy means confronting interests and convictions inside the party. A presidential hopeful might attract independent voters by making those changes, while losing the Republican primary needed to reach them.

3. Rebuild a GOP capable of saying no

The deepest response would address how the GOP makes decisions.

Republicans could restore greater independence to congressional leaders, defend oversight regardless of who occupies the White House, and select candidates for their ability to represent constituencies rather than demonstrate personal loyalty.

This would be a larger undertaking than replacing Trump. It would require politicians who accommodated his dominance to establish—and uphold—limits on the next leader.

Leadership challenges alone would not prove that such a reconstruction had begun. Removing a defeated congressional leader can satisfy demands for accountability while leaving the party’s habits intact.

4. Double down and fight the Democratic Congress

There is also a direction that requires little self-examination: blame weak candidates, hostile media and insufficient commitment, then turn the next two years into a confrontation with Democrats.

Trump’s initial response, blaming Republican candidates while denying that the result reflected his own standing, points towards that possibility. [3]

A Democratic Congress would provide a new opponent against which Republicans could mobilize. Investigations, spending disputes and blocked legislation could all become arguments that Democrats were obstructing recovery.

This approach might hold the movement together. Whether it could rebuild a national majority is another question.

The choice Republicans cannot avoid

These directions can overlap. A successor might offer Trumpism with better discipline, selective policy changes and promises of institutional restraint—all at once.

The difficult choices would emerge when those promises collide.

Would a Republican leader challenge a popular primary position to regain independent voters?
Would congressional Republicans constrain their own president?
Would the party accept evidence that a cherished policy had failed?

The central problem is that the coalition needed to win a Republican nomination may differ from the coalition needed to govern America. AP’s analysis identified precisely that tension in the emerging succession contest. [4]

Democrats should therefore avoid assuming that this defeat guarantees a lasting realignment. Their own performance will help determine how quickly Republicans recover.

For the GOP, however, recovery begins with a diagnosis.
Does it need a new messenger, different policies, or a different way of exercising power? Until Republicans answer that question, the struggle to succeed Trump will also be a struggle over what his party becomes.


References

[1] Reuters, “Democrats seize Congress in sweeping midterm repudiation of Trump,” 4 November 2026.
[2] Reuters, “As Trump takes center stage in Dallas, Republicans debate a future without him,” 9 September 2026.
[3] Roll Call, “Trump made midterms about himself, and voters rejected him,” 4 November 2026.
[4] Associated Press, “Trump’s solution to Republicans’ midterm troubles is more Trump,” October 2026.

 


Wednesday, October 28, 2026

From Welcomers to Europeans

 



R.M. Westerink; October 2026 


Europe is receiving fewer asylum seekers than at any time in the past five years.
Irregular border crossings are down roughly 90 percent from the 2015 peak. And yet anti-immigration parties have never been stronger. In Saxony-Anhalt, the AfD has just won a state election.

Immigration is shrinking. The politics of immigration is growing. Something has come loose.

The Italian think tank ISPI puts it plainly: European migration policy "increasingly appears to operate independently of migration trends themselves." The debate has become a machine that keeps running whether or not there is anything to feed it.

This essay is about that machine: how it works, how it ran its course in the United States, why it is still running here, and what it costs us. It is written for the Welcomers among us, and it carries an uncomfortable message.

The short version: Europe’s Welcomers have fixed half of their blind spot. The other half keeps the machine running. And while it runs, Europe is losing time it does not have.

How the machine works

The machine needs only two things. The first is a real, practical problem that people experience and that those in charge do not solve. The second is a way of talking about that problem that makes it impossible to raise without being called a bigot. Put the two together and you get a field of unanswered grievance. Someone will always step in to claim it.

Call the two camps what they are.
The Welcomers see receiving refugees as a moral identity and a duty.
The Gatekeepers see controlled, limited and orderly immigration as the precondition of a functioning state.

Both camps have the same bad habit: they judge motives instead of arguments. To Welcomers, Gatekeepers are xenophobes. To Gatekeepers, Welcomers are naïve idealists, or worse. Each side has its alibi for not listening. This essay is about the Welcomers’ version, because that is the one Welcomers can fix.

America: the machine at full power

Until around 2020, the American debate was mostly a quarrel about motives. "Kids in cages" on one side, "open borders" on the other. Then the numbers arrived. Between 2021 and 2025, U.S. border authorities recorded more than 8 million encounters at the southern border. Shelters filled up. Asylum courts fell years behind. Cities far from the border, like New York and Chicago, struggled to house the new arrivals.

This is where both Welcomer blind spots showed.

The numbers blind spot. The asylum system had a capacity, and the inflow exceeded it. For too long, many Welcomers treated that as a detail, or even as a reason to loosen the rules further. A moral stance turned into an operational failure that everyone could see.

The alibi blind spot. Because resistance to immigration had been defined as a moral failing, Welcomers had no language left for the practical problem. Admitting it felt like giving in to xenophobia. "They are bigots" became a reason not to look.

The Biden administration did change course, eventually.
It restricted asylum above a daily threshold, backed a bipartisan border bill and expanded legal routes. But the turn came late. By 2024, immigration was Trump’s strongest issue and Harris’s weakest. Trump did not invent his immigration theme. The Welcomers handed him the material: a crisis they would not measure and a grievance they would not let be spoken.

What happened next is instructive, though not in a comfortable way. Crossings fell to historic lows. Enforcement under Trump went too far for many Americans. And public support for immigration rebounded, to 79 percent.

It would be convenient to read this as proof that Welcomers who learn their lesson can switch the machine off. The American story does not prove that. It proves something more modest, and still important, just that the machine cán stop. When the practical problem disappears from people’s daily lives, the grievance loses its power and opinion swings back.

Europe: the numbers fell, the machine kept running

Now look at Europe.
Here, the practical problem has largely shrunk. Asylum applications and irregular crossings are falling year after year. By the American logic, the machine should be slowing down. It is not. Governments are still competing on strictness, outsourcing asylum procedures and building processing centers in Albania, while arrivals keep falling.

Two things keep it running.

Twenty-seven arenas instead of one. In the United States, one federal government owned the problem and could be judged on it. When the numbers fell, everyone could see it. Europe has twenty-seven national arenas, each with its own elections and its own Gatekeeper parties. Brussels manages the rules, but nobody owns the result. Falling numbers at European level do not register as a success anywhere in particular.

The EU’s Migration and Asylum Pact was presented as the answer to the far right. The far right was not impressed. Anti-immigration parties grew from 18 percent of the European Parliament in 2019 to 26 percent in 2024, and Poland’s prime minister threatened not to implement the pact at all. In Europe, the grievance does not get resolved. It moves around.

The alibi survives. European Welcomers have learned the first lesson. Nearly every mainstream party now accepts that migration must be limited and controlled. In the Netherlands, GroenLinks-PvdA campaigns for "effective and humane" asylum policy.

But the second lesson has not landed. When AfD voters, Rassemblement National voters, or residents of a village with a new asylum center voice their worries, the reflex is still to explain those worries away: as prejudice, as manipulation, as fear stoked by others.
The numbers blind spot has been cured. The alibi has not.

That is the real difference with America. There, once the numbers fell the machine ran dry. In Europe, our fragmented politics keeps the grievance in circulation without needing the numbers.
What keeps it alive is the gap the alibi leaves: concerns that are heard but never answered.

That gap is the one part of the machine the Welcomers control. It is also the one part they have not yet repaired.

Fighting the last war

The issue matters far beyond migration, because migration is not the question that decides Europe’s future:

•        Defense: rearmament, Ukraine, the eastern flank, credible deterrence.

•        Economic power: competitiveness, technology, energy.

•        Unity: whether Europe can act as one when it has to.

Each of these requires exactly what the migration debate keeps using up: political attention, trust between member states, and voters who believe Europe works for them.

Look at what migration does to European politics today. It crowds summit agendas. It sets member states against each other: frontline states against destination states, east against west. It has brought back border checks inside the Schengen area, one of the most tangible things Europe ever gave its citizens. And election after election, it pushes voters toward parties that distrust the very European cooperation on which defense and economic strength depend.

A wedge, Europe keeps driving into itself. Every election fought over migrants rather than over Europe’s place in the world is an election in which the questions that will decide our future go unasked and unanswered.
Welcomers who keep migration at the center of their identity are fighting the last war. Without meaning to, they help keep the wedge in place.

From Welcomers to Europeans

This is what the title means. It is not a call to give up humanitarian principle. It asks Welcomers to move their identity: away from a single issue, and toward the European agenda on which a humane migration policy itself depends. Two commitments follow.

Europe first. A humane migration policy can only be built by a Europe that exists as a political actor. Defense, economic strength and unity are where Europe’s future will be decided. Migration should become what it can be: a well-run, shared and largely technical file, like fisheries or customs. Something Europe handles, not something Europe fights about.

Closing the alibi gap. The American lesson cuts both ways. Support for a generous policy returns when people believe the system is under control. And that trust is built in the street, not in Brussels.
Housing shortages, full classrooms, disorder in public spaces, the sense that rules apply to some and not to others: these are not prejudices to be deconstructed but governance problems to be solved.

Picture a town where a new reception center is announced.
In one version, residents who raise concerns at the town meeting are told they are being manipulated.
In the other, they leave with a named contact person, an extra teacher for the local school paid from a European fund, and a date on which the municipality will report back. Only the second version builds the trust that Europe needs for everything else.

The two commitments fit together: calm and technical at European level, visible and practical at street level. The solidarity mechanisms of the Migration Pact are a start. They should grow into a standing, funded instrument that makes "Europe protects" something people can see in their own village, and not just at the border.

One discipline belongs to both commitments: stop disqualifying the other side.
The Welcomer reflex of seeing every restrictionist as morally suspect mirrors the Gatekeeper reflex of seeing every humanitarian as a traitor. Both are alibis. Both make problems undiscussable and opponents unreachable. A politics that wants to remove the wedge has to stop speaking its language.

The wedge only works on a divided Europe

The United States showed that the machine can stop. It stopped when the practical problem went away. Europe has the falling numbers, yet the machine keeps running. Our fragmented politics keeps the grievance in circulation, and the Welcomers’ alibi keeps it unanswered.
The numbers will not save us this time. Closing the alibi gap might.

Meanwhile, the questions that really matter have little to do with migration.
Europe’s ability to defend itself, to compete and to act as one is being decided now. Every round of Welcomers against Gatekeepers uses up attention, trust and unity that this agenda cannot spare.

From Welcomers to Europeans means this. Keep the humane conviction. Drop the single-issue identity. Make Europe’s future the first priority, and earn the mandate for it by taking seriously what people experience where they live.

The wedge only works on a divided Europe.
Our closing task as Welcomers is to make ourselves, as a separate identity, unnecessary.

Sources

Nieuws.nl: EU heeft opnieuw minder asielverzoeken dan jaar ervoor

BNR: Aantal asielaanvragen in Europese Unie op laagste niveau in vijf jaar

Reformatorisch Dagblad: Aantal asielaanvragen in EU eerste helft 2026 verder omlaag

ISPI: Europe’s Migration Policy: Have We Entered a Permanent State of Crisis?

Deutsche Welle: Refugees and migration: Is Europe closing its doors?

GZERO Media: Europe’s anti-immigration parties are surging as immigration numbers fall

he Local: Migration to Europe is falling, so why are countries pushing on with crackdown?

GlobalEurope Journal: European Union Migration Policy in Times of Geopolitical Upheaval

Democracy Journal: The Democrats and Immigration

NOTUS: Democrats Wonder Whether the Lesson of 2024 Is to Shift Further to the Right on Border Security

Brookings: How 2026’s divisive immigration politics could lead to a solution down the road

Third Way: Memo to Democrats on Immigration: To Turbocharge Generosity, Get Order Right

Al Jazeera: How have Democrats’ policies shifted since the last major US election?