Germany's Economic Problem Is Europe's Problem

Europe's largest industrial economy is growing again. 
But the weaknesses underneath - energy, investment, productivity, demographics and global competition - have not disappeared.

Management Summary

Germany's economy is recovering, but its underlying competitiveness problem remains unresolved. The industrial model that benefited from relatively cheap Russian energy, expanding global trade and strong Chinese demand now faces higher energy costs, weaker investment and productivity, demographic pressure, and a China that is simultaneously customer, supplier and increasingly powerful competitor. Some weaknesses are external; others - infrastructure, bureaucracy, skills, investment and reform capacity - are domestic.

Germany matters because many of these are European problems in concentrated form. Europe needs greater scale through a deeper Single Market, better mobilisation of European savings for investment, more affordable energy, stronger innovation, and a disciplined China policy: compete where Europe can compete, protect where competition is distorted, and reduce dependencies where they create strategic vulnerability.
The EU increasingly understands the diagnosis; implementation speed is becoming the decisive test. Ultimately, Europe's welfare, climate, defence and strategic ambitions depend on the same productive economic foundation.

Germany has an economic problem. The more difficult question is what kind of problem it is.

Nikolas Stihl, chairman of the supervisory and advisory boards of German manufacturer STIHL, recently offered a stark diagnosis. German industrial production, he wrote in Euronews, has fallen by about 15% over eight years; around 15,000 industrial jobs are currently being lost each month; and private net investment has fallen close to zero. Only a competitive economy, he argues, can ultimately sustain Germany's prosperity and welfare state. [1]

Stihl writes as an industrialist, and some of his proposed remedies - longer working hours, lower labour costs and social-security reform - are consequently part of a political debate. But the underlying concern is harder to dismiss.

The IMF, OECD, European Commission and Germany's Council of Economic Experts all identify structural weaknesses alongside the external shocks Germany has suffered. Seven years of weak growth, the German Council argues, cannot be explained as a normal economic downturn. [2][3]

The implications extend beyond Germany. They raise a larger European question:
Can Europe generate the economic strength required to preserve prosperity and its social model while simultaneously financing the energy transition, technological renewal, defence and greater strategic independence?

Part I - Germany: What Happened?

For decades, the German model worked extraordinarily well. A skilled workforce, world-class engineering, specialised Mittelstand companies and industrial champions produced cars, chemicals, machinery and sophisticated capital goods for global markets.

Several favourable conditions reinforced those strengths: relatively inexpensive Russian energy, expanding world trade, the European Single Market and enormous demand from industrialising China.

Several of those conditions have now changed at the same time.

Energy became more expensive

Russia's invasion of Ukraine abruptly ended Germany's dependence on cheap Russian pipeline gas. Energy-intensive industries such as chemicals, metals, glass and paper were particularly exposed.

Ending that strategic dependence was necessary, but necessity does not eliminate economic cost. German industry has had to adapt to a different energy environment while simultaneously financing decarbonisation.

Yet energy cannot explain everything. Germany's economic weaknesses predate the Ukraine shock. The OECD points to weak investment, declining business dynamism, slow productivity growth and growing shortages of skilled labour. [4]

China changed from customer to competitor

Perhaps the most important transformation has occurred in Germany's relationship with China.

For years, China's industrialisation created enormous demand for German cars, machinery, chemicals and industrial technology. China remains a major market, but Chinese companies increasingly manufacture the sophisticated products Germany once specialised in exporting - from electric vehicles and batteries to machinery and clean technologies. [5]

The shift is already visible in trade.
In the first five months of 2026, German machinery exports to China fell 17.5% year-on-year and motor-vehicle and parts exports 26.1%. Meanwhile, China supplied more than 86% of Germany's imported photovoltaic modules. [6]

China has become customer, supplier and competitor simultaneously.
That is a much more difficult economic relationship to manage.

Some problems are made in Germany

It would nevertheless be misleading to blame Germany's difficulties principally on Russia, China or American trade policy.

Germany has accumulated domestic problems: inadequate investment, ageing infrastructure, slow digitalisation, cumbersome planning and permitting, administrative burdens, demographic ageing and shortages of skilled workers.
The OECD and IMF consequently emphasise structural reform alongside additional investment. [3][4]

That distinction is important. External pressures can be negotiated with, diversified away from or defended against. A competitiveness problem generated at home ultimately has to be repaired at home.

Recovery is not yet renewal

But the diagnosis should not be exaggerated. Germany is not in economic collapse.

After GDP contracted in 2023 and 2024, the economy returned to slight growth in 2025. Growth strengthened during the first half of 2026, and recent forecasts have become more optimistic, helped by stronger exports and substantial government expenditure on infrastructure, climate measures and defence. [7][8]

Where government spending helps stimulate demand and modernise infrastructure, private investment, productivity and industrial competitiveness do not show to have recovered.

Germany therefore presents a mixed picture: growth is returning and its industrial base retains enormous strengths, but the country has not yet demonstrated that its economic model has successfully adapted to the world that replaced the one in which it prospered.

Part II - Why Germany's Problem Becomes Europe's Problem

Germany sits at the centre of European production networks. Its factories depend on components produced elsewhere in Europe; German machinery equips European industry; German demand supports neighbouring economies; and German fiscal resources increasingly matter for European defence.

But the deeper reason Germany matters for Europe is that many of its problems are European problems in concentrated form.

Europe as a whole faces slow productivity growth, relatively high energy costs, insufficient investment in new technologies, fragmented capital markets, demographic pressure and increasingly intense competition from the United States and China.

Mario Draghi's competitiveness report captured the challenge in three broad tasks:
Close the innovation gap, combine decarbonisation with competitiveness, and reduce dangerous external dependencies. [9]

Germany is therefore not simply a national economy Europe needs to rescue. It is a warning about what Europe itself needs to repair.

Scale, capital and competitiveness

Europe possesses an economic advantage Germany alone cannot create: continental scale.

The Single Market gives European companies access to roughly 450 million people, but national differences in services, regulation, finance and administration still prevent it from functioning as seamlessly as the American or Chinese home markets.

Completing that market matters particularly for innovative companies. Europe is good at creating them but less successful at enabling them to grow rapidly into global businesses.

Europe also has capital. European households hold around EUR10 trillion in savings, yet European companies - particularly innovative and rapidly growing ones - have greater difficulty accessing risk capital than their American counterparts. [9]

Hence the EU's effort to create a Savings and Investments Union: mobilising more European savings for productive European investment.

Europe will need it.
Electricity grids, renewable energy, AI, semiconductors, defence production, industrial decarbonisation and infrastructure all require enormous investment.

China: protect without retreating behind walls

Europe must also reconsider how it deals with China.

Economic separation is neither realistic nor desirable. China remains an important market, supplier and trading partner. And where Chinese companies simply produce better or cheaper products, protectionism can preserve inefficiency rather than competitiveness.

But openness does not require economic naivety.

Where competition is materially distorted by state subsidies, protected domestic markets or other non-market advantages, Europe has legitimate reasons to defend a level playing field. The EU has already done so through measures including countervailing duties on Chinese electric vehicles.

Europe also needs to distinguish ordinary economic interdependence from dangerous strategic dependence. The experience with Russian gas demonstrated what can happen when efficiency produces excessive reliance on one external power. China's dominance in several critical supply chains creates a different version of the same strategic question.

Compete where Europe can compete. Protect where competition is distorted. Reduce dependencies where they create strategic vulnerability.

Protection alone, however, cannot restore competitiveness. Tariffs around an industry that remains expensive, fragmented or technologically behind merely protect weakness.

European protection must complement European renewal, not substitute for it.

Europe increasingly knows what it needs to do

There is an important difference between today's situation and that of several years ago: Europe increasingly understands the problem.

The Draghi report has been followed by the EU's Competitiveness Compass, Clean Industrial Deal, Affordable Energy Action Plan, Savings and Investments Union, regulatory simplification and renewed attempts to deepen the Single Market. The One Europe, One Market roadmap now sets the end of 2027 as a deadline for agreement on a range of measures. [9][10][11]

The EU's own 2026 competitiveness assessment nevertheless remains sobering. Investment and venture capital remain inadequate, energy costs high and strategic dependencies substantial. [12]

The question is therefore becoming less: Does Europe understand its competitiveness problem?
And increasingly: Can Europe implement the necessary changes quickly enough?

Some answers must come from Brussels:
Completing the Single Market, integrating capital markets, building cross-border energy infrastructure and providing trade defence all require European action.

Others remain national. Germany itself must address infrastructure, education, taxation, labour supply, pensions, administrative capacity and the conditions for private investment.

The productive foundation of European power

This brings us back to Stihl's warning.

One does not have to accept his particular prescriptions to recognise the relationship between competitiveness, prosperity and the welfare state.

For Europe, that relationship is now broader.
Europe wants to preserve its social model. It wants to complete the energy transition. It needs modern infrastructure and technological capacity. It must spend considerably more on defence. And it increasingly wants the ability to act independently when American, Chinese or Russian interests differ from its own.
All these ambitions ultimately make claims upon the same productive economy.

That is why Germany's economic problem is Europe's problem.

The choice should not be presented as competitiveness versus the European social model. Economic competitiveness is increasingly what makes that social model - together with Europe's climate, security and strategic ambitions - sustainable.

The challenge is therefore more demanding:
Europe must become productive enough to sustain all of them.

Germany is currently discovering how difficult that transition can be. Europe should regard its experience not simply as a German problem, but as a warning - and as another reason to accelerate an economic renewal that has become part of Europe's strategic independence.

References

[1] Nikolas Stihl, “Time for reforms - this is how we retain prosperity and the welfare state,” Euronews, 5 September 2026.
https://www.euronews.com/business/2026/09/05/boss-of-stihl-time-for-reforms-this-is-how-we-will-safe-prosperity-and-welfare-state

[2] German Council of Economic Experts, Spring Report 2026.
https://www.sachverstaendigenrat-wirtschaft.de/en/spring-report-2026.html

[3] International Monetary Fund, Germany Article IV Consultation, 2026.
https://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2026/02/11/pr26042-germany-imf-executive-board-concludes-2025-article-iv-consultation

[4] OECD, Germany Economic Snapshot.
https://www.oecd.org/en/topics/sub-issues/economic-surveys/germany-economic-snapshot.html

[5] Associated Press, September 2026, reporting on the intensifying Chinese competitive challenge to German manufacturers.

[6] German Federal Statistical Office (Destatis), Germany-China trade data, 2026.
https://www.destatis.de/DE/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/2026/07/PD26_255_51.html

[7] German Federal Statistical Office (Destatis), German GDP data.
https://www.destatis.de/EN/Press/2026/01/PE26_017_811.html

[8] Ifo Institute economic forecast, September 2026.

[9] European Commission, Draghi Report on EU Competitiveness and EU Competitiveness Compass.
https://commission.europa.eu/topics/competitiveness/draghi-report_en

[10] European Commission, Single Market.
https://commission.europa.eu/topics/single-market_en

[11] European Commission, One Europe, One Market roadmap.
https://commission.europa.eu/topics/competitiveness/one-europe-one-market-roadmap_en

[12] European Commission, Annual Single Market and Competitiveness Report 2026.
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A52026DC0046

 

 Europe’s Missing Role in the Middle East Is Beginning to Appear

R.M. Westerink; September 1, 2026 

When the leaders of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation recently condemned the US-Israeli war against Iran, their statement appeared to confirm a familiar geopolitical development. American influence is being challenged while China, Russia and Iran promote a more multipolar international order.[1]

There is substance to that interpretation. Iran has found within the SCO an institutional environment receptive to its criticism of Western military intervention, sanctions and political dominance.

Looking at the Middle East itself, however, reveals another development. Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, Egypt and the Gulf states are expanding their own diplomatic and security relationships. Pakistan has become an important diplomatic participant. Qatar and Oman continue to provide mediation channels across difficult regional divides.

These countries have different interests and alliances. What increasingly connects them is a desire for greater room to determine regional affairs themselves.

Between the established American pole and the increasingly visible SCO pole, a strategic middle is beginning to appear.

And Europe appears to be moving closer to it.

American Predominance Is Changing

The United States remains the Middle East’s most important external military power.
Its relationships with Israel and the Gulf states remain substantial, its military infrastructure is extensive, and American diplomacy continues to play a central role.

What is changing is the assumption that American leadership will remain the principal organising force of the regional order.

The recent conflict with Iran demonstrated the risks of dependence particularly clearly. Regional governments found themselves exposed to decisions taken in Washington, Tehran and Jerusalem while having limited influence over them.

Their response has increasingly been diversification.

Saudi Arabia has expanded its relationship with China while maintaining close relations with Washington. The UAE similarly works across geopolitical divisions. Türkiye remains a NATO member while pursuing an increasingly autonomous regional policy. Qatar and Oman maintain channels with Iran alongside strong Western relationships.

The United States therefore remains important, but regional states are creating more room to manoeuvre around it.

The SCO Offers Another Pole

The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation represents another direction in which the international system is developing.

China provides enormous economic weight.
Russia adds military and geopolitical power.
Iran has become increasingly integrated into this political environment.
Together with India, Pakistan and the Central Asian members, the SCO covers a substantial part of Eurasia.

Its political vocabulary increasingly emphasizes multipolarity, sovereignty, opposition to unilateral sanctions and reform of international institutions.

For Iran, this environment is attractive. The SCO condemnation of the US-Israeli attack allows Tehran to place its confrontation with Washington and Israel within a broader argument about international legitimacy and the future global order.[1]

The SCO nevertheless contains very different strategic interests. India maintains important relationships with the United States, Europe, Israel and the Gulf and pursues its own strategic autonomy.

Middle Eastern governments face a similar calculation. Greater distance from Washington does not automatically imply closer alignment with Beijing, Moscow and Tehran. For countries seeking room for independent action, exchanging one dominant relationship for another offers limited attraction.

This leaves space for a third development.

The Emerging Middle

Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, Egypt, the UAE, Qatar and Oman do not constitute a political bloc. Their policies towards Iran and Israel differ, as do their security interests.

Yet their recent behaviour increasingly reflects a common search for greater regional agency.

Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have strengthened their political and security cooperation. Their Makkah Agreement framework now includes a Strategic Political and Defence Committee and a permanent secretariat in Saudi Arabia; the three governments explicitly describe their cooperation in terms of “regional ownership”.[2]
Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Pakistan have also developed the R4 consultation mechanism, reaffirming continued coordination on peace, security and stability in the Middle East.[3]

Pakistan has played a mediation role between the United States and Iran, a role explicitly commended by the EU.[4] Qatar and Oman continue to perform specialised mediation roles because they retain communication channels across competing camps.

These arrangements do not yet form a new regional alliance. They resemble a network in which different states bring different capabilities.

Saudi Arabia contributes financial resources and growing Arab and Gulf political weight. Türkiye combines military capacity with relationships extending into NATO, Europe, Iran and the Gulf. Egypt remains one of the Arab world’s central political powers. Pakistan adds strategic capacity and connections into South Asia. Qatar and Oman provide unusual diplomatic access.

Different combinations can address different problems.

The emerging common denominator is strategic autonomy: greater capacity for regional countries to manage regional affairs while maintaining relationships with several outside powers.

Europe Appears to Have Noticed

Several months ago, in Europe Needs Its Own Middle East Strategy, it was argued that Europe could no longer simply outsource its Middle Eastern strategy to Washington.[A]

Developments since then suggest that Europe itself has been moving in that direction.

The European Commission has created a dedicated Directorate-General for the Middle East, North Africa and the Gulf (DG-MENA, headed by Dubravka Šuica ). Its stated purpose is to build partnerships based on mutual interest and bring together the EU’s technical and financial instruments.[5] Kaja Kallas’s formal responsibilities also include development of an EU Middle East Strategy.[6]

Relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council increasingly include regional security alongside their established economic dimension. In July, EU foreign ministers emphasized close coordination with Gulf partners and held an EU-GCC High-Level Forum on regional security and cooperation.[7]

European engagement with individual regional powers is also becoming more strategic.

EU relations with Pakistan have included explicit recognition of its mediation efforts between the United States and Iran.[4] One European meeting was particularly illustrative: Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan and Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar joined EU foreign ministers for discussions about the Middle East. Kallas described both countries as important because of their extensive diplomatic engagement across the region and asked what more could be done together.[8]

Saudi Arabia is becoming an increasingly important centre of regional political activity. India has substantial relationships with Europe, the Gulf, Israel, the United States and Iran while maintaining its own strategic independence. Bringing both into a European Middle East discussion reflects a diplomatic environment built around overlapping relationships rather than fixed blocs.

Individually, these developments can be seen as normal diplomatic activity. Together, they suggest that Europe is positioning itself within the changing regional landscape.

Building Strategic Friendships

This emerging environment may fit European capabilities and purposes unusually well.

Many of the countries seeking greater regional autonomy are themselves building multiple relationships. Saudi Arabia can cooperate with Europe, America and China. Türkiye combines NATO membership with an independent Middle Eastern role. India works closely with Europe and the Gulf without becoming part of a European alliance. Qatar and Oman combine strong Western relationships with diplomatic access to Iran.

Europe is developing relationships within this same network.

Its contribution is broader than traditional security guarantees. Europe brings economic scale, investment, trade, technology, reconstruction capacity, regulatory expertise and extensive diplomatic networks. It also maintains working relationships with almost every significant actor in the region.

This creates the possibility of strategic partnership without requiring exclusive alignment.

India reinforces that character. European and Indian participation alongside regionally owned initiatives would provide substantial external support while leaving Middle Eastern countries at the centre of their own developing architecture.

Europe’s Missing Role [B]

This gives a broader meaning to the idea that Europe needs its own Middle East strategy.

Greater European strategic autonomy allows Europe to develop relationships based on its own interests while supporting a Middle East in which regional countries themselves assume greater responsibility.

That role does not require Europe to reproduce American predominance or compete with China for regional leadership. It is closer to becoming a substantial external partner for countries seeking greater room to manage their own regional order.

The relationship can work precisely because those countries also value autonomy.
Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, Egypt, Qatar, Oman and the UAE increasingly maintain several strategic relationships simultaneously. Pakistan and India extend that network beyond the region.

Europe’s role within such an environment depends less on organising it than on becoming a useful and trusted participant.

An Order Taking Shape

The Middle East is not moving neatly from one geopolitical order to another.

American predominance is weakening while American power remains substantial. China, Russia and Iran are developing an increasingly visible alternative environment around the SCO. Between them, Middle Eastern powers are expanding their own diplomatic and security relationships.

This emerging middle remains diverse and loosely connected. Its countries will continue to disagree and will cooperate with Washington, Beijing and others whenever their interests require it. That flexibility may itself become an important characteristic of regional strategic autonomy.

Europe’s response is also still developing. DG MENA, the forthcoming EU Middle East Strategy, stronger EU-GCC security cooperation and increasingly strategic relationships with Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, Egypt, Pakistan, India and others do not yet amount to a single European doctrine.

But they reveal a direction.

When Europe Needs Its Own Middle East Strategy was written, Europe’s missing role was principally an argument about what Europe needed to develop.

Today, the picture is becoming more concrete. Middle Eastern powers are creating greater room to determine their own affairs, while Europe is building relationships with many of the countries driving that change.

Europe’s missing role in the Middle East may no longer be missing. It may simply still be taking shape.

References

[1] Mehr News Agency, “SCO leaders slam US-Israeli war of aggression against Iran,” 1 September 2026. https://en.mehrnews.com/news/247377/SCO-leaders-slam-US-Israeli-war-of-aggression-against-Iran

[2] Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Strategic Political and Defence Committee of the Makkah Agreement for Joint Defence, Joint Statement,” 31 August 2026. https://www.mfa.gov.tr/strategic-political-and-defence-committee-of-the-makkah-agreement-for-joint-defence--joint-statement--31-august-2026.en.mfa

[3] Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Joint Statement of the R4 Following the Fourth Consultative Meeting of the Foreign Ministers,” 21 June 2026. https://www.mfa.gov.tr/joint-statement-of-the-r4-following-the-fourth-consultative-meeting-of-the-foreign-ministers-21-june-2026.en.mfa

[4] European External Action Service, “Joint Press Communiqué: Eighth Round of the European Union-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue,” 1 June 2026. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/joint-press-communiqu%C3%A9-eighth-round-european-union-pakistan-strategic-dialogue-1-june-2026_en

[5] European Commission, “Middle East, North Africa and the Gulf — Directorate-General (DG MENA).” https://commission.europa.eu/about/departments-and-executive-agencies/middle-east-north-africa-and-gulf_en

[6] European Commission, “Kaja Kallas — High Representative/Vice-President: Responsibilities.” https://commission.europa.eu/about/organisation/college-commissioners/kaja-kallas_en

[7] Council of the European Union, “Foreign Affairs Council,” 13 July 2026. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/fac/2026/07/13/

[8] European External Action Service, “Informal meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers (Gymnich): Press conference by High Representative Kaja Kallas,” 28 May 2026. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/informal-meeting-foreign-affairs-ministers-gymnich-press-conference-high-representative-kaja-kallas_en

 

[A] Europe Needs Its Own Middle East Strategy. https://europe-is-us.blogspot.com/2026/06/europe-needs-its-own-middle-east.html

[B] Europe's Missing Role in the Middle East. https://europe-is-us.blogspot.com/2026/06/europes-missing-role-in-middle-east.html

The Maghreb Pressure Cooker: The Maghreb's Problems, Europe's Migration Challenge

 

The Maghreb Pressure Cooker

The Maghreb's Problems, Europe's Migration Challenge

R.M. Westerink; September 1, 2026 

At the end of July 2026: Ceuta.

Tens of thousands of people, overwhelmingly from Morocco, moved towards or crossed into the small Spanish enclave on the North African coast. Buses and trains filled with young people heading north. Others arrived by taxi or on foot. Some attempted to swim around the border barriers. Many believed that, suddenly, Europe had become accessible.

It had not.

Social media posts had circulated claims that the border was effectively open or that people reaching Spanish territory could no longer be immediately returned. Instagram, Facebook, TikTok and WhatsApp rapidly multiplied the message. Images of successful crossings reinforced it. Within a remarkably short time, an online perception of opportunity had become a physical movement of people. More than 70,000 ultimately crossed, according to Spanish authorities, and scores died in the attempt.[1][2]

The precise origins of the rumors remain disputed. What matters here is something else.

Social media did not create tens of thousands of people wanting to leave Morocco. It revealed how many were already prepared to move when they believed an opportunity had appeared.

Ceuta was therefore more than a border-control failure. It offered a glimpse inside the Maghreb pressure cooker.

Three Countries Under Pressure

Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia are very different countries.
Morocco has developed substantial manufacturing, tourism and export industries.
Algeria possesses enormous hydrocarbon resources.
Tunisia has a comparatively educated population and longstanding economic connections with Europe.

Yet they share structural problems, particularly employment for younger generations.

Algeria's overall unemployment rate was 12.7 percent in 2024, but youth unemployment reached 29.3 percent. Its economy also remains heavily dependent on hydrocarbons.[3]

Tunisia's situation is more difficult still. Youth unemployment reached 36.8 percent in 2025, while almost 30 percent of Tunisians aged 15–29 were neither employed nor in education or training in 2024.[4]

Morocco is economically more dynamic, with growth reaching 4.6 percent in 2025. But employment opportunities remain particularly problematic for young people.[5]

This is therefore not simply a story about poor and uneducated migrants. Across the Maghreb are young people who have invested in education but find that their economies cannot provide the jobs, income or social advancement they expected.

And immediately across the Mediterranean lies Europe.

Add Water

Another pressure is steadily intensifying: water.

North Africa has always been dry. Climate change is making that constraint more severe through higher temperatures, drought and changing rainfall.

Morocco provides a striking example. Renewable water availability declined from about 2,560 cubic meters per person annually in 1960 to around 620 by 2020. The World Bank has warned that Morocco could fall below 500 cubic meters by 2030—the threshold for absolute water scarcity.[6]

That does not mean drought automatically sends migrants towards Europe. The mechanism is more complex.

Water scarcity weakens agriculture and rural livelihoods. People move towards cities. Urban labour markets receive additional workers. Informal employment expands. For young people already struggling to establish an independent economic life, another reason to look elsewhere has been added.

Climate pressure therefore interacts with unemployment and regional inequality. It becomes an economic and social multiplier.

Europe Is Very Close

Geography transforms these domestic problems into a European challenge.

Europe is not a distant destination. At the Strait of Gibraltar, Spain and Morocco are separated by only kilometers of sea. Ceuta and Melilla place European territory physically on the African continent.

The psychological distance may be even smaller. Millions of North Africans already live in Europe. Family connections, smartphones and social media provide a continuous picture—sometimes realistic, sometimes decidedly not—of European life.

For a young person without stable employment, Europe can therefore become less a foreign continent than an alternative life strategy.

Ceuta demonstrated what can happen when that aspiration encounters a perceived opportunity.

The smartphone has effectively become part of the migration infrastructure. It transmits success stories and practical information, connects prospective migrants and can link them to smugglers. It can also spread false information faster than governments can correct it.

The pressure cooker was already heated. Social media briefly appeared to lift the lid.

The Maghreb Is Responding

It would nevertheless be misleading to present Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia as countries simply exporting their problems northward.

Algeria is attempting to diversify its hydrocarbon-dependent economy and strengthen private-sector investment.[3]
Morocco has invested heavily in infrastructure, industrial development, renewable energy and water security, including desalination, dams and irrigation modernization.[6]
Tunisia is pursuing employment programs while struggling with weak growth, fiscal constraints and high youth unemployment.[4]

Migration control itself has also become an important governmental function. Morocco works extensively with Spain and the EU on border management, anti-smuggling operations and returns.

This was demonstrated when another Ceuta mobilization was promoted on social media for 15 August. Moroccan authorities reinforced the area and intercepted people heading towards the border.[7]

Ceuta therefore illustrated two different things. The first mobilisation revealed the underlying pressure. The response to the next mobilisation showed that government action can contain its immediate expression.

Neither removes the pressure itself.

Europe Is Already Involved

Europe, meanwhile, is doing considerably more than building fences.

EU cooperation with Morocco for 2021–2025 amounted to approximately €1.15 billion, covering areas including green transition, education, social protection, investment and skills.[8] Migration cooperation adds border management, anti-smuggling measures and return arrangements.

The EU–Tunisia partnership signed in 2023 similarly combined economic stability, trade and investment, green energy and migration. A €105 million migration package included border management, anti-smuggling measures and voluntary returns.[9]

European and international programs also target employability among young people outside employment, education or training.[10]

Europe therefore already recognises that migration cannot be addressed exclusively at the border.

European politics, however, inevitably concentrates attention there.

Controlling the European End

Since June 2026, the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum has introduced common procedures for screening irregular arrivals, faster asylum and return procedures and clearer responsibility between member states.[11]

Europe is also strengthening returns. Only around 28 percent of people ordered to leave the EU were effectively returned in 2025. A new common European return regime is intended to improve that performance.[12]

This matters.

Asylum is a fundamental right for people requiring international protection. But unemployment, climate stress or the understandable desire for a better life do not by themselves constitute grounds for asylum.

Part of the Maghreb's socioeconomic migration problem arrives in Europe through an asylum system designed primarily to determine who requires protection from persecution.

Faster procedures and effective returns are therefore legitimate components of migration management.

But they remain downstream solutions.

Moving Upstream

The broader sequence starts much earlier.

Water scarcity and climate pressure weaken rural economies. Insufficient job creation leaves young people without convincing prospects. Europe offers a visible alternative. Migration networks and social media reduce the perceived distance. Irregular movement follows. Only then do European border controls, asylum procedures and return policies become relevant.

Most European political debate begins near the end of that chain.

The more difficult strategic question lies near its beginning:

Can Europe and the Maghreb reduce the number of people for whom irregular migration appears to be their most promising available life strategy?

That does not mean Europe should solve North Africa's problems. Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia remain responsible for their own economies, education systems, labour markets and governance.

But interests on both sides of the Mediterranean are not necessarily contradictory.

The Maghreb needs investment, productive employment, water security and credible opportunities for younger generations. Europe needs workers in particular sectors, while wanting fewer irregular arrivals and a functioning asylum and return system.

That provides room for a more explicit partnership.

Maghreb governments can improve economic conditions and vocational preparation, control irregular departures and cooperate on readmission. Europe can contribute investment, water and climate infrastructure, vocational development and controlled legal routes into European labour markets.

The beginnings already exist. EU Talent Partnerships with Morocco and Tunisia seek to connect training and legal mobility with European labour-market requirements.[13]

The strategic objective could therefore be remarkably simple:

Make staying more attractive.
Make legal migration realistically possible.
Make irregular migration less attractive.

The Lesson of Ceuta

Ceuta should not primarily be remembered for the extraordinary number of people who crossed a border in a few days.

Its deeper significance lies in how quickly they mobilised.

A rumour did not create North Africa's unemployment. Instagram did not create Morocco's water scarcity. TikTok did not create the economic differential between North Africa and Europe.

Social media connected those existing pressures to a suddenly perceived opportunity.

That makes Ceuta a warning.

Border controls may stop people. Faster asylum procedures may process them. Return agreements may send some of them home.

But none of these measures reduces the pressure building on the other side of the Mediterranean.

Europe's long-term migration strategy therefore cannot begin at Europe's border. It has to begin much further south.

References

[1] Associated Press, "Runaway online rumors sparked frantic rush by migrants to the Spanish territory of Ceuta," August 2026.

[2] Le Monde, "Ceuta crisis: The elusive search for the origins of the rumor that drew would-be migrants," 4 August 2026.

[3] World Bank, Algeria — Country Overview, 2026.

[4] International Labour Organization, Y-NEET in Tunisia, 3 February 2026.

[5] World Bank, Public Investment Powers Morocco's Strongest Growth in a Decade, 23 July 2026.

[6] World Bank, Morocco Country Climate and Development Report: Water Scarcity and Droughts.

[7] Reuters, "Morocco arrests 111 migrants headed for Spain's Ceuta in security crackdown," 14 August 2026.

[8] European Commission, Morocco — EU Bilateral Cooperation, 2026.

[9] European Commission, EU–Tunisia Memorandum of Understanding: Migration Support, 2023.

[10] International Labour Organization, EU and ILO to Improve the Employability of Youth NEETs in the MENA Region, 2024.

[11] European Commission, New Migration and Asylum Rules Enter into Application, 12 June 2026.

[12] European Commission, Commission Welcomes Political Agreement on the Return Regulation, 2 June 2026.

[13] European Commission, Talent Partnerships, updated 2025.

 

We hebben een Noodplan Immigratiemanagement nodig —
en Sterke Leiders

R.M. Westerink; August 2026 

Een jaar geleden schreef ik op deze plaats: “Het is tijd voor een Noodplan Woningbouw en Sterke Leiders.”[A]

Niet omdat Nederland geen woningbouwbeleid had. Er waren plannen, doelstellingen, subsidies en afspraken met provincies en gemeenten.
Het probleem was eenvoudiger: er kwamen te weinig woningen.

Daarmee werd woningbouw een voorbeeld van een groter Nederlands bestuurlijk probleem. We organiseren beleid, verdelen verantwoordelijkheden en maken nieuwe plannen. Maar wanneer de uitvoering jarenlang onvoldoende resultaat oplevert, stapelen problemen zich op. Een beleidsprobleem wordt dan een maatschappelijk probleem.

Bij immigratie zien we inmiddels iets vergelijkbaars.

Ook hier ontbreekt het niet aan beleid

Nederland heeft asielbeleid, arbeidsmigratiebeleid, opvangbeleid, integratiebeleid en Europese afspraken. We hebben ministeries, IND, COA en gemeenten met ieder hun eigen verantwoordelijkheid.

En toch blijft Nederland spreken over grip op migratie.

Asielprocedures duren lang. Opvangplaatsen blijven bezet omdat statushouders geen woning kunnen vinden. Ter Apel werd het terugkerende symbool van een systeem dat zijn capaciteit niet op orde heeft. Gemeenten worden geconfronteerd met opvangvraagstukken terwijl woningen en voorzieningen lokaal al onder druk staan.

Kabinetten en regels veranderen. Het onderliggende probleem blijft.

Net als bij de woningbouw is het probleem niet dat Nederland geen beleid heeft. Het probleem is dat het geheel onvoldoende resultaat oplevert.

Daarom hebben we een Noodplan Immigratiemanagement nodig. Niet omdat immigratie een nationale noodtoestand is, maar omdat de normale manier waarop we immigratie besturen onvoldoende resultaat oplevert.

Instroom én capaciteit

Onze analyse van Nederland met het E–I–σ-model [B] wees op een combinatie van twee problemen: nieuwe immigratiedruk én capaciteitstekorten die zich inmiddels hebben opgehoopt.

Minder nieuwe asielaanvragen lossen bestaande IND-achterstanden niet op. Ze creëren geen woningen voor statushouders. Maar steeds meer capaciteit toevoegen is evenmin een duurzame oplossing wanneer de druk sneller groeit dan Nederland capaciteit kan realiseren.

Een noodplan zou daarom kunnen beginnen met tijdelijke en gerichte vermindering van immigratiedruk waar dat daadwerkelijk helpt een vastgelopen systeem te herstellen.

Dat betekent niet dat alle immigratie omlaag moet. Asielzoekers, kennismigranten, arbeidsmigranten, internationale studenten en gezinsmigranten komen om verschillende redenen en vragen verschillende vormen van capaciteit.

We zouden per migratiestroom moeten vragen: waarom vindt deze migratie plaats, wat levert zij Nederland op of welke verplichting ligt eraan ten grondslag, hoeveel invloed hebben we erop en beschikken we over de benodigde capaciteit?

Waar Nederland invloed heeft en een migratiestroom substantieel bijdraagt aan een capaciteitsprobleem, kan tijdelijke beperking ademruimte creëren.

Gebruik die ademruimte

Die ademruimte heeft alleen zin wanneer Nederland tegelijkertijd de reeds opgebouwde druk verwijdert.

Bij asiel moeten aanvraag, beslissing, opvang, huisvesting en vestiging in gemeenten daarom als één keten worden bestuurd:

aanvraag → beslissing → opvang → huisvesting → gemeente

Begin 2026 wachtten meer dan 51.000 mensen op een asielbesluit. De gemiddelde wachttijd in de algemene asielprocedure lag rond 67 weken.

Snellere procedures helpen. Maar wanneer erkende vluchtelingen daarna geen woning vinden, verplaatst het probleem zich naar de opvang. Meer opvang helpt, maar wanneer procedures vastlopen raakt die capaciteit opnieuw gevuld.

Voeg minder vermijdbare druk toe en verwijder tegelijkertijd de reeds opgebouwde druk uit het systeem.

Gebruik Europa waar Europa nodig is

Ook Europa moet onderdeel zijn van het management. Buitengrenzen, secundaire migratie binnen Europa, verantwoordelijkheid voor asielaanvragen en terugkeer zijn onderwerpen waarbij Nederland Europese samenwerking nodig heeft.

Nederland deed in 2025 bijvoorbeeld 6.313 verzoeken om mensen volgens de Dublinregels aan andere Europese landen over te dragen. Uiteindelijk vonden 1.865 overdrachten plaats. Betere Europese uitvoering kan dus verschil maken.

Maar Brussel kan geen Nederlandse IND-achterstand wegwerken, geen woningen bouwen en geen lokaal draagvlak voor opvang organiseren.

Gebruik Europa waar het probleem Europees is. Lever zelf waar het probleem Nederlands is.

Stop met één immigratiedebat

Een Noodplan Immigratiemanagement moet ook het idee doorbreken dat Nederland één immigratiebeleid nodig heeft dat alleen maar ruimer of strenger kan worden.

Nederland kan kennismigranten willen aantrekken en tegelijkertijd minder afhankelijk willen worden van laagproductieve arbeidsmigratie. We kunnen bescherming bieden aan vluchtelingen en tegelijkertijd secundaire asielmigratie proberen te verminderen.

Soms ontstaat migratievraag bovendien mede door onze eigen keuzes. Wanneer bedrijfstakken structureel afhankelijk zijn van buitenlandse arbeidskrachten, mogen we ook naar die economische structuur kijken — maar alleen wanneer het migratie-effect substantieel is én er onafhankelijk daarvan goede redenen zijn om die structuur te veranderen.

Het doel is niet zo weinig mogelijk immigratie.
Het doel is een niveau en samenstelling van immigratie die Nederland daadwerkelijk kan besturen en dragen.

Hetzelfde probleem als bij de woningbouw

Daarmee komen woningbouw en immigratie bij elkaar. Het zijn verschillende problemen, maar ze raken elkaar. Onvoldoende woningbouw vermindert de capaciteit om bevolkingsgroei op te vangen. Immigratiebeleid zonder rekening te houden met woningen, opvang, procedures en lokale voorzieningen kan die capaciteit verder belasten.

Kan de overheid nog voldoende resultaat leveren wanneer een probleem meerdere ministeries, bestuurslagen en maatschappelijke systemen tegelijk raakt?

Bij woningbouw formuleerden we jarenlang doelen. Terwijl het tekort opliep. Bij immigratie beloofden opeenvolgende kabinetten grip terwijl delen van het systeem vastliepen.

Dan is nog een plan alleen niet genoeg. Er moet verantwoordelijkheid komen voor het resultaat van het geheel.

Daar zijn sterke leiders voor nodig

Sterke leiders zijn niet de politici die het hardst over immigratie praten.
Sterk leiderschap betekent: Bepalen wat Nederland werkelijk kan beïnvloeden, eerlijk zeggen wat niet kan, keuzes maken waar dat wel kan — en vervolgens zorgen dat de overheid levert.

Geen onmogelijke beloften of excuses over Europa. Geen gemeenten opzadelen met nationale problemen zonder voldoende middelen en voorspelbaarheid. Geen burgers vertellen dat zichtbare capaciteitsproblemen vooral beeldvorming zijn. Maar ook niet beloven dat één lager immigratiecijfer alle opgebouwde problemen oplost.

Sterke leiders zijn politici die bepalen wat Nederland daadwerkelijk kan uitvoeren, daar keuzes aan verbinden en vervolgens zorgen dat het gebeurt.

Dat is uiteindelijk dezelfde les als bij de woningbouw.

Nederland heeft niet alleen behoefte aan beter beleid. Nederland heeft behoefte aan een overheid die weer levert.

Een Noodplan Immigratiemanagement hoeft ons niet voor of tegen immigratie te maken. Het moet iets fundamentelers bereiken:

Nederland moet weer in staat zijn immigratie te besturen.

Dat vraagt om keuzes. Dat vraagt om uitvoering.

En ja — dat vraagt om sterke leiders.

Referenties

[A] Het is tijd voor een Noodplan Woningbouw en Sterke Leiders; 
https://europe-is-us.blogspot.com/2025/10/het-is-tijd-voor-een-noodplan.html

[B] The Dutch Immigration Case Article II — When Capacity Cannot Keep Up;
https://europe-is-us.blogspot.com/2026/08/the-dutch-immigration-case-article-ii.html

 

The Dutch Immigration Case
Article II — When Capacity Cannot Keep Up

Using E–I–σ to Find Plausible Directions for Dutch Immigration Policy

R.M. Westerink; August 2026 

Our former E–I–σ  Dutch Case “Article I — When Pressure Becomes Politics” analysis concluded that the Netherlands has both an incoming-pressure problem and an accumulated-capacity problem.[A]

That immediately sets the policy question.
Reducing immigration alone will not clear IND backlogs, empty reception centers or create housing.
Expanding capacity alone may not work quickly enough if incoming pressure continues.

In Immigration Policy Is Also Social Policy, we argued that government can respond through three broad fields: influence incoming change (I), strengthen the receiving society (E), and address circumstances (σ) that amplify or dampen the resulting social stress.

Given the diagnosis, what could the Dutch government plausibly do?

 

Create breathing space — and use it

Dutch absorptive capacity can be increased, but not instantly. Homes take years to build. IND capacity takes time to expand. Reception locations require facilities, procedures and municipal cooperation.

When E cannot adjust quickly enough to I, selectively reducing incoming pressure becomes a plausible part of capacity recovery. That does not mean concluding that all immigration is too high. Asylum, labor migration, international students, family migration, EU mobility and temporary protection place different demands on Dutch society and are subject to different degrees of government control.

The relevant test is more precise: would reducing a particular flow materially relieve a capacity problem that government has actually diagnosed?

Asylum illustrates the logic. Fewer new applications can reduce additional pressure, but they do not remove the pressure already accumulated. At the beginning of 2026 more than 51,000 people were waiting for an asylum decision, while recognized status holders were also occupying reception places because housing was unavailable.

The asylum chain therefore has to recover at the same time:

application → decision → reception → housing → municipal settlement

Improving only one part may simply move the bottleneck elsewhere.

Stop adding avoidable pressure,  while removing the pressure already accumulated inside the system.

Temporary or selective reduction of I can create breathing space. Its value depends on using that space to repair E.

Use Europe where Europe adds leverage

European membership limits some unilateral Dutch choices. It also provides leverage the Netherlands does not possess on its own.

External entry into the European asylum system, secondary movement, responsibility allocation between member states and returns all have a European dimension.

The evidence suggests keeping expectations realistic. In 2025 the Netherlands made 6.313 outgoing Dublin requests but completed 1.865 outgoing transfers. Better European implementation could therefore matter, but it will not by itself resolve Dutch asylum pressure.

Europe can help reduce pressure entering or moving through the European system. The Netherlands must repair pressure already embedded in its own processing, reception and housing systems.

 That makes Europe a supporting control multiplier, rather than either the source of Dutch helplessness or an escape route from domestic problems.

Manage migration by stream, not by slogan

Once immediate capacity alignment begins to recover, the same reasoning could change Dutch migration policy more fundamentally. There is no single type I.

Government could examine the principal migration streams separately: why does this type of migration occur, what benefit or obligation justifies it, how controllable is it, what Dutch capacity does it require, and is that capacity available?

The answers need not point in one direction. The Netherlands might want to facilitate migration carrying high economic or social value, accept other migration because legal or humanitarian obligations require it, and reduce streams whose benefits no longer justify their capacity demands.

The same test can occasionally be applied from the other side. Some migration demand originates inside E because Dutch industries or institutions recruit abroad. Addressing those activities should only become an immigration-policy option where the migration effect is substantial and the change is independently defensible for reasons such as productivity, labour standards, environmental policy or spatial planning.

This is more discriminating than an aggregate target of “more” or “less” immigration. It amounts to matching migration choices more explicitly to the capacity required to sustain them.

And make government predictable

The Dutch case also showed why σ matters. Ter Apel was a genuine capacity failure, but then also became a national symbol of loss of control. AZC decisions turned national policy into local conflicts. Governments raised expectations that implementation could not always meet.

Communication cannot solve such failures. Predictable government (avoiding the inconsistent handling of the Spreidingswet) can however prevent adding unnecessary uncertainty to them.

A government could therefore organize both policy and communication around five straightforward ideas:
Control — reduce avoidable pressure and make existing rules work.
Capacity — repair systems that have fallen behind.
Fairness — distinguish between migration streams and unequal local burdens.
Europe — use collective leverage where the problem is European.
Review — measure whether temporary restrictions and capacity measures are actually restoring alignment.

This is not about persuading citizens that a failing system works. It is about allowing them to see what government is trying to change and whether it is succeeding.

A plausible Dutch direction

Taken together, the E–I–σ diagnosis points toward a combination rather than one dominant instrument.

In the near term, the Netherlands could reduce avoidable incoming pressure while recovering immigrants’ processing, reception and housing capacity, supported by European action where the pressure is genuinely European.

Over the medium term, migration streams could be managed more selectively and connected more explicitly to the capacities they require.

Over time, government could replace recurring emergency management with periodic capacity assessment: has E changed sufficiently, what is happening to I, and are developments in σ creating new social or political pressure?

The objective would be neither permanently lower immigration nor unlimited expansion of absorptive capacity. It would be capacity alignment:

Reduce pressure where necessary, recover capacity where it has fallen behind, and reassess the balance as circumstances change.

 

Reference

[A] The E–I–σ Framework - A Diagnostic Model for Understanding the Social Mechanics of Immigration; https://europe-is-us.blogspot.com/2026/08/the-ei-framework-diagnostic-model-for.html