The Europe Citizens Want — But Cannot Yet See Coming

Europeans want a more united, secure and stronger Europe.

As the State of the Union approaches, can Europe’s leaders show them who is building it?

A new European study contains both encouraging and uncomfortable news for Europe's political leaders.

As reported by The Guardian, Europeans surveyed across six countries can describe a Europe they would like to see: stronger, more united, secure and capable of determining its own future. Yet many look at Europe today and see deterioration, slowness and uncertainty.[1][2]

That contradiction matters. Europe's problem may not simply be declining belief in the European project. Many Europeans still expect quite a lot from Europe. What they increasingly doubt is whether Europe's political system can produce it.

With the European Parliament preparing for the State of the Union, that raises a harder question:

Where is the European power capable of protecting the Europe citizens want?

Europeans Have Not Given Up on Europe

The European Sentiment Compass 2026, produced by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) and the European Cultural Foundation, draws on 5,834 interviews in France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland and the United Kingdom, complemented by analysis of political and media debate across 15 EU countries.[2]

Its findings initially seem contradictory. On average, 68% of respondents describe today's Europe through deterioration or a loss of normality. Only 12% primarily see awakening or renewal. Yet roughly three-quarters can describe a positive Europe they would like to inhabit twenty years from now, commonly involving greater unity, security and prosperity.[2]

This is not straightforward Euroscepticism. Dissatisfaction with Europe as it currently functions can coexist with considerable ambition for what Europe should become.

Earlier, the WE ARE EUROPE series on this blog approached the question through generally felt European values:
Personal freedom, democratic participation, equality before law, protection against arbitrary power, solidarity, tolerance of difference and peaceful resolution of disagreements.[3]

The new research raises the next question:

Do Europeans believe Political Europe can actually protect the conditions under which those values can survive?

Where Is the European Counterweight?

ECFR identifies recurring doubts about whether Europe can act, protect its citizens and live according to its own values. Respondents complain about slowness and fragmentation. The study also finds remarkably little recognition of political leadership beyond respondents' own countries.[2]

This study does not ask whether Europeans want a counterweight to Trump, Putin or Xi. That is an inference we make explicitly as our own.

But consider the environment in which these attitudes are developing.
Europeans see Donald Trump exercising American power, Vladimir Putin mobilizing Russian power and Xi Jinping pursuing Chinese economic, technological and geopolitical objectives.

What is much harder to see is the   E u r o p e a n  C o u n t e r w e i g h t

Europe possesses enormous economic resources, advanced societies, substantial military capabilities and nearly 450 million EU citizens. Yet these assets do not consistently translate into a political actor that Europeans—or others—recognize as capable of establishing objectives and mobilizing power behind them.

This does not mean Europe needs its own Trump, Putin or Xi. Its challenge is precisely the opposite:

To demonstrate that democratic, pluralistic government can generate strategic power without sacrificing democratic restraints.

From Aspiration to Capability

ECFR calls the problem an “imagination gap”.
People can imagine the Europe they want but struggle to see a credible route from today's Europe towards it.[2]

Europe has no shortage of ambitions. Its institutions announce strategies, targets and programmes. National leaders repeatedly call for a stronger, more sovereign or more competitive Europe.

But citizens need to recognize the connection between what Europe promises, what Europe decides, what Europe does and what they experience.

That requires more than better communication. Many doubts identified by ECFR concern things people believe they can observe themselves: slow decisions, inconsistently applied principles and uncertainty about Europe's capacity to guarantee security.[2]

Europe therefore needs recognizable Counterweight Leadership: political direction citizens can understand, sufficient capacity behind it to make that direction credible, and political representatives prepared to explain it and accept responsibility for delivering it.

Europe does not necessarily need one leader.
It needs European leadership that people can recognize.

When Europe Does Not Deliver

This connects with what this blog has previously called the Threat from Within.[4]

That threat is not ordinary political disagreement. Europeans are entitled to oppose EU policies, reject further integration or demand powers back from Brussels.

The danger arises when persistent dissatisfaction begins to undermine Europe's democratic capacity to disagree, decide and act together: when concentrated power becomes attractive because democratic government appears incapable of acting, when European cooperation becomes synonymous with weakness, or when external powers successfully exploit existing divisions.

Insufficient European action does not automatically produce populism, extremism or foreign influence. But institutional underperformance creates political space for those offering simpler answers.

European democracy cannot answer that challenge merely by explaining why authoritarian power is dangerous.

It has to demonstrate that democratic power works.

A Task for Europe's Political Representatives

This gives Members of the European Parliament a concrete challenge.

MEPs cannot themselves create a unified European executive or determine every national government's foreign policy. But they can force European politics to organize around recognizable strategic choices.

They can ask the Commission and Europe's political families:

What must Europe be capable of doing independently?
Where must it be able to act when Washington chooses differently?
How will it deter Moscow?
Where must it compete with Beijing?
Which dependencies are unacceptable?
What should Europe itself be capable of doing by 2030?

And most importantly:
Who represents Counterweight Europe?

And they can ask whether Europe's many individual policies actually add up to those objectives.
That would help turn European politics from an accumulation of policy files into something citizens can recognize as politics about Europe's future.

The State of the Union 2026 - Test

That makes the forthcoming State of the Union particularly relevant.

When Commission President Ursula von der Leyen addresses the European Parliament, she will inevitably present policies, programmes and priorities. But Europe's present circumstances require something above the program: Direction.

Can Europeans recognize in those policies the outline of the Europe they say they want? Can they see how today's decisions lead towards a Europe capable of protecting itself and defending its interests? And can they recognize who is taking responsibility for getting it there?

For MEPs responding to the speech, the test should therefore not merely be: What will the Commission do next?
It should also be:
Does this add up to the European counterweight citizens increasingly appear to be waiting for—and can Europe's leaders show them the route?

The encouraging finding in the ECFR research is that European aspiration has not disappeared. The warning is that too many Europeans cannot yet see it becoming reality.
Trump, Putin and Xi make power visible. Europe's challenge is not to imitate their political systems.

It is to make democratic European power equally recognizable.
The citizens in this study can already imagine the Europe they want.
What they cannot yet see clearly enough is who is organizing it.
The State of the Union would be a good place to start.

References

[1] Jon Henley, “Europeans want a united Europe but question whether it can get there, study finds,” The Guardian, 9 September 2026.

[2] Paweł Zerka, European Sentiment Compass 2026 — Future Nostalgia: Europe’s Unfinished Song, European Council on Foreign Relations / European Cultural Foundation, 9 September 2026.

[3] Europe Is Us, WE ARE EUROPE — Our European Values, August 2026.
https://europe-is-us.blogspot.com/2026/08/we-are-europe-our-european-values.html

[4] Europe Is Us, WE ARE EUROPE — Keeping Europe European — Internal Threats, August 2026.
https://europe-is-us.blogspot.com/2026/08/we-are-europe-keeping-europe-european_01764668262.html

 

 

Beyond Left and Right: Israel’s ‘Israel First’ Reality and Its Implications

How a Hardline Vision Reshapes Politics, Values, and the Future of the Conflict

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Introduction: The Collapse of the Left-Right Framework

For decades, Israel’s political landscape was understood through the prism of a left-right divide, with debates centered on economics, security, and ideology. Yet today, this framework no longer captures the reality of Israeli politics. The defining split is now between those who prioritize an "Israel First" agenda—rejecting Palestinian statehood, dismissing international criticism, and entrenching military control—and those who remain open to balanced, long-term solutions with Palestinians.

This shift reflects a fundamental transformation in Israeli society, where existential fear, Zionist idealism, and unbound state tactics have reshaped the political landscape.
The "Israel First" approach is not merely a political stance but a worldview that frames Israel’s survival as dependent on permanent control, defiance of international norms, and the suppression of Palestinian aspirations. For outsiders, understanding this distinction is key to grasping Israel’s current trajectory, its relationship with the world, and the stress points that define its future.

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The Rise of ‘Israel First’ to Political Dominance

The "Israel First" bloc now dominates Israeli politics. This coalition includes Likud, Religious Zionism, Otzma Yehudit, and Haredi parties, united by a shared commitment to rejecting Palestinian statehood, expanding settlements, and weakening judicial oversight. These positions, once considered far-right, have become mainstream among Jewish voters. The "Israel First" camp is electorally dominant, while the "Open to Balanced Solutions" camp—comprising the Zionist left, center, and Palestinian citizen parties—remains fragmented and weak.

The 2026 election will likely reinforce this trend. While it may be framed as a contest between right and left, the real debate is how far right Israel will go. The election’s outcome will not hinge on whether to adopt hardline policies but on how to implement them.

This political reality reflects a broader societal shift. The far right "Israel First" agenda is no longer a fringe ideology but the default position for a majority of Jewish Israelis. This dominance is rooted in historical trauma, security concerns, and a deep-seated belief that compromise with Palestinians is not only unnecessary but dangerous.

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‘Israel First’ as Zionist Dream and Existential Fear

The Zionist Dream: Sovereignty and Sacred Land

At its core, the "Israel First" agenda is the fulfillment of historical Zionism. For many Israelis, sovereignty over Eretz Israel (the Land of Israel) is a non-negotiable religious and national right. Settlements in the West Bank are not merely strategic outposts but sacred landmarks, tied to a messianic vision of Jewish return to biblical lands like Judea and Samaria. This perspective frames military control over Palestinians as a permanent necessity, ensuring Jewish demographic and security dominance.

This messianic vision is not unique to Israel. History offers numerous examples of movements driven by a belief in a divine or destiny-driven mission, often at a high cost in human lives. The Crusades, for instance, were fueled by a Christian messianic vision to reclaim the Holy Land, resulting in centuries of bloodshed. Similarly, ISIS’s caliphate was an attempt to establish a purist Islamic state, leading to widespread destruction and loss of life. In the 20th century, Nazi Germany’s vision of a racial utopia led to the Holocaust, while Soviet communism’s messianic belief in a classless society resulted in the deaths of millions. These examples illustrate how messianic visions, when pursued with absolute conviction, can lead to catastrophic human consequences.

The "Israel First" worldview is also deeply tied to the trauma of the Holocaust. For many Israelis, the lesson of the Holocaust is that Jewish survival depends on absolute control—never again can Israel rely on the goodwill of others or the international community. This mindset is reinforced by the 1948 and 1967 wars, which are remembered as existential struggles where Israel’s survival hung in the balance. The October 7, 2023, attacks further cemented this narrative, reinforcing the belief that concessions lead to vulnerability.

The Road Not Taken: Missed Opportunities for Compromise

The "Israel First" approach is not just a strategic choice but a psychological and historical inevitability for many Israelis. The rejection of early compromise opportunities—such as those explored in 1948—has left a legacy of unresolved conflict. In 1948, Israel faced a crossroads: it could have pursued a binational state or a partition plan that might have offered a different path. Instead, the creation of Israel as a Jewish state came at the expense of Palestinian displacement, an event known to Palestinians as the Nakba (catastrophe).

This dual narrative—Israeli independence vs. Palestinian dispossession—lies at the heart of the conflict. The "Israel First" agenda perpetuates this unresolved trauma, making reconciliation ever more distant. For Israelis, the fear of repeating the mistakes of the past (e.g., the Holocaust, the 1948 war) justifies a hardline stance. For Palestinians, the Nakba is a living memory, reinforcing their demand for justice and self-determination.

Unbound State Strategy: Security Over Diplomacy

The "Israel First" approach prioritizes security over diplomacy. Military solutions—such as strikes, blockades, and settlement expansion—are seen as the only reliable means of ensuring Israel’s survival. Preemptive force is justified as deterrence, even if it escalates cycles of violence. This mindset is reflected in policies such as:

·        Judicial reforms that weaken checks on executive power, allowing for the unfettered pursuit of nationalist goals (e.g., annexation, settlement expansion).

·        Media and NGO crackdowns, where critics (e.g., human rights groups, left-wing media) are labeled as traitors or foreign agents.

·        International defiance, including the rejection of UN/EU resolutions (e.g., settlements as illegal, occupation as unlawful) and alignment with like-minded states (e.g., the U.S. under Trump-like leadership, authoritarian regimes).

The Paradox of ‘Israel First’

The "Israel First" approach—meant to secure Israel’s future—risks undermining its long-term stability. By alienating allies (e.g., the EU, progressive U.S. factions), radicalizing Palestinian resistance (e.g., Hamas, Islamic Jihad), and eroding democratic norms (e.g., judicial independence, minority rights), this agenda ultimately weakens the state it seeks to protect.

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Jewishness vs. Zionism: The Moral and Democratic Dilemma

At its core, the "Israel First" agenda forces a reckoning with the tension between Jewishness and Zionism. While Jewishness is a cultural and religious identity, Zionism was originally a political movement aimed at securing a Jewish homeland. Today, "Israel First" often conflates the two, framing Jewish survival as dependent on perpetual control over Palestinians.

This conflation has profound implications for Israel’s democratic and moral foundations. A state that prioritizes Jewish sovereignty above all else risks marginalizing its non-Jewish citizens (e.g., Palestinian citizens of Israel, who make up 20% of the population) and undermining the principles of equality and democracy. The "Israel First" approach also erodes the distinction between Zionism as a liberatory movement and Zionism as a tool of oppression—a distinction that was once central to the Israeli left’s vision.

For many Israelis, Jewishness and Zionism are inseparable. The Law of Return, which grants automatic citizenship to Jews, and the Nation-State Law, which declares that only Jews have the right to self-determination in Israel, are examples of policies that prioritize Jewish identity over democratic pluralism. This tension is not just theoretical but practical, shaping everything from immigration policies to military strategies.

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The Palestinian State: The Marginalization of a Two-State Solution

The marginalization of the two-state solution is one of the most consequential outcomes of the "Israel First" agenda. For decades, the two-state solution—a Palestinian state alongside Israel—was the international consensus for resolving the conflict. Today, this vision is increasingly seen as unrealistic by both Israelis and Palestinians.

For "Israel First" advocates, the two-state solution is a non-starter. They argue that Palestinian statehood would pose an existential threat to Israel, citing the failure of past withdrawals (e.g., Gaza in 2005, which led to Hamas control) and the ongoing violence from groups like Hamas and Hezbollah. Instead, they advocate for permanent military control over the West Bank and Gaza, framing it as a necessary security measure.

For Palestinians, the two-state solution is also losing credibility. Many see it as a fantasy given Israel’s expanding settlements, military occupation, and refusal to negotiate in good faith. The Oslo Accords, once hailed as a breakthrough, are now widely viewed as a failure that entrenched Israeli control without delivering Palestinian statehood. The October 7 attacks and Israel’s subsequent military response have further diminished hopes for a negotiated settlement.

The marginalization of the two-state solution has profound implications for the region. Without a viable path to Palestinian statehood, the conflict risks perpetuating indefinitely, with cycles of violence, occupation, and resistance continuing unabated. This reality also deepens Israel’s international isolation, as the EU, UN, and other global actors increasingly view Israel’s policies as contrary to international law and human rights.

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European Values and the Loss of Support

European Values at Odds with ‘Israel First’

The "Israel First" agenda clashes with European values, particularly the EU’s commitment to human rights, international law, and democracy. Policies such as settlement expansion, military occupation, and home demolitions violate core EU principles, including:

• General European People's Human Values sentiments (https://europe-is-us.blogspot.com/2026/08/we-are-europe-our-european-values.html)
• The Geneva Conventions, which protect civilians in occupied territories.
• UN Resolutions (e.g., 242, 338) calling for Israeli withdrawal from occupied lands.
• The EU’s own guidelines on differentiation between Israel and its settlements.

The "Israel First" approach also undermines democratic norms. Judicial reforms that weaken the Supreme Court and crackdowns on dissent and media freedom mirror illiberal trends in countries like Hungary and Poland—directly conflicting with the EU’s democratic conditioning.

The Struggle: Historic Obligation vs. Values

Europe’s relationship with Israel has long been shaped by a dual narrative: historic obligation and values-based diplomacy. On one hand, Europe’s post-WWII guilt and commitment to Israel’s security (e.g., Holocaust remembrance, anti-Semitism policies) have led to decades of unconditional support for Israel. On the other hand, the EU’s commitment to human rights and international law has increasingly clashed with Israel’s policies.

This tension is now coming to a head. Public opinion in Europe is shifting, with growing sympathy for Palestinians, especially among younger generations and left-leaning parties. This shift is reflected in:

-     Policy responses: The EU’s 2023 ban on settlement products and funding cuts to Israeli NGOs linked to occupation signal a toughening stance.

·        Diplomatic isolation: EU member states (e.g., Ireland, Sweden, Belgium) are pushing for recognition of Palestinian statehood and reducing diplomatic engagement with hardline Israeli leaders.

·        BDS movement: Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS) campaigns are gaining traction, with European pension funds and universities divesting from Israeli companies tied to occupation.

Strategic Dilemma for Europe

European leaders face a strategic dilemma: balancing values and interests. While Israel remains a key partner in counterterrorism and intelligence-sharing, its "Israel First" policies undermine the EU’s moral authority. The economic and tech ties between Israel and Europe (e.g., cybersecurity, AI, gas exports) make full disengagement costly, but the moral and legal contradictions of supporting Israel’s policies are increasingly untenable.

If "Israel First" policies persist, the EU may formalize its shift from unconditional support to conditional engagement, aligning more closely with Palestinian rights and international law.

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The Middle East: Still Possible?

Short-Term: More Israeli Extremism

In the short term, Israel’s "Israel First" policies are likely to further harden. This trajectory is driven by:

·        Domestic politics: Hardline factions dominate the political landscape, with little incentive to moderate.

·        Security concerns: Ongoing violence and instability (e.g., Gaza, West Bank) reinforce the siege mentality.

·        Lack of alternatives: The "Open to Balanced Solutions" camp remains weak and fragmented.

Long-Term: Regional Realignment and Pressure on Israel

The long-term outlook is more complex. The US’s traditional role as a peace broker in the Middle East is diminishing, due to:

·        Domestic polarization: US politics are increasingly divided on Israel-Palestine, with progressive factions criticizing unconditional support for Israel.

·        Focus shift: The US is prioritizing competition with China and Russia, reducing its bandwidth for Middle East diplomacy.

·        Loss of credibility: The US-Israel war on Iran and unconditional support for Israeli actions have eroded trust among Arab states and Palestinians.

As US influence wanes, Middle Eastern countries are taking matters into their own hands, forming new alliances to address regional security and economic interests. The Strait of Hormuz, a critical chokepoint for global oil trade, has become a leverage point for regional powers like Iran and the Gulf states, which are collaborating to stabilize the region, often excluding Israel.

The Role of Turkey

Turkey, as a regional power with historic ties to both the Arab world and Israel, is positioning itself as a mediator and security guarantor. Turkey’s balancing act—maintaining ties with Israel while supporting Palestinian rights and engaging with Iran—makes it a key player in any regional realignment. If US influence continues to decline, Turkey and Iran may coordinate more closely on regional security and economic integration, further isolating Israel.

Pressure on Israel

As the US steps back, Israel faces increasing pressure from:

·        Regional alliances (e.g., Turkey-Iran-Gulf cooperation) that exclude or oppose Israeli interests, leaving it more vulnerable to military and security challenges from coalitions like Iran-backed groups or Turkish influence.

·        Economic and diplomatic isolation: Israel’s hardline policies risk alienating even its traditional allies (e.g., Egypt, Jordan).

·        Public opinion erosion: Growing international and regional disapproval of Israel’s policies further weakens its standing.

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Conclusion: Stress Points to Overcome

Israel today is defined by four key stress points:

1.       Holocaust/Nakba: The dual traumas that shape Israeli and Palestinian identities, reinforcing mutual distrust and fear.

2.       The Road Not Taken: The rejection of early compromise (e.g., 1948) and the entrenchment of hardline policies that make peace ever more distant.

3.       Jewishness vs. Zionism: The tension between Israel as a Jewish state and a democratic state, where "Israel First" often conflates the two, risking the moral and democratic foundations of the country.

4.       Palestinian Statehood: The marginalization of the two-state solution and the rise of permanent military control, which perpetuates the conflict.

The "Israel First" framework explains Israel’s current reality—its political dominance, international isolation, and existential fears.
Yet this path has proven to be only sustainable through continued cycles of violence and the negation of human values.
The stress points—Holocaust/Nakba, the road not taken, Jewishness vs. Zionism, and the marginalization of Palestinian statehood—are not just historical footnotes but active forces shaping a future where conflict is perpetuated rather than resolved. The Middle East remains a region where change is possible, but the window for a balanced, lasting peace is narrowing, and the cost of inaction grows with each passing day.

 

EU2.0 Needs an Information Strategy

Europe is learning to defend itself in the information war. The next step is connecting military influence, democratic resilience and communication with societies beyond its borders.

 

For years, Europe has treated information warfare primarily as something done to us. Russia interferes in European information environments.
China has developed sophisticated influence capabilities.
Extremist organizations have used digital media to recruit and mobilize.
Artificial intelligence is making manipulation cheaper and faster, while foreign actors can exploit existing political divisions rather than having to create them.

Europe's response has therefore understandably concentrated on defense: identifying disinformation, exposing foreign interference, regulating platforms, improving cyber resilience and protecting democratic processes. The European External Action Service (EEAS), for example, has developed Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) into a distinct field of activity and now regularly documents attempts to manipulate European and neighboring information environments.[1]

But something is changing.

A recent study by the French Institute of International Relations (Ifri) describes how France has gradually moved beyond this predominantly defensive conception. Experiences with Islamic State propaganda, information confrontation in the Sahel and Russia's hybrid warfare have helped persuade French defense planners that information is not simply a communications problem surrounding military operations. It is itself part of the strategic environment in which conflicts are conducted and political outcomes shaped.[2]

France has consequently begun constructing doctrine and capabilities for information warfare and influence. That may appear to be a specifically French military development. In reality, it points toward a much larger European question.

Europe Is Discovering Information Power

Military power has always involved more than weapons. Countries seek to influence what opponents expect, what populations believe possible, what allies consider credible and what choices political leaders think are available. Digital communication has enormously expanded this arena.

The important development in France is therefore not that Europe is finally learning how to conduct propaganda. Quite the opposite. The French approach described by Ifri explicitly confronts the problem facing democracies: authoritarian adversaries may manipulate, fabricate and deceive in ways democratic states should not imitate. France now accepts an offensive dimension in the information domain while explicitly maintaining its refusal of lying. Ifri argues that preserving law and truth is not simply a handicap but a defining boundary for democratic information warfare.[2]

Europe therefore needs to become better not at manufacturing reality, but at explaining, persuading and making credible alternatives visible. Doing that requires capabilities which Europe has traditionally kept in separate boxes: military information operations; protection of European societies against foreign manipulation; and strategic communication with societies outside Europe. A stronger Europe will increasingly need all three.

Competing in the Information Environment

The military lesson is becoming difficult to ignore. France's experience in the Sahel demonstrated that military capability alone does not guarantee political success.
Ifri concludes that information campaigns helped delegitimize Operation Barkhane, while Russia's hybrid confrontation has demonstrated that the cognitive environment can remain contested long before conventional hostilities begin.[2]

Russia has taken that principle considerably further. The EU already treats information manipulation as part of Russia's broader hybrid confrontation. In 2026 the Council imposed further sanctions on individuals involved in Russian FIMI activities, while the EEAS continued documenting systematic Russian efforts to manipulate political perceptions and weaken support for Ukraine.[1][3]

Information therefore cannot remain an afterthought to European defense. If Europe is serious about developing a stronger European pillar within NATO — and ultimately the greater strategic capability we might call EU2.0 — information capability belongs alongside military readiness, intelligence, cyber defense and industrial capacity.

But that is only the first layer.

Protecting Europe's Democratic Space

Information competition also takes place inside European societies, and here the issue becomes considerably more delicate. Foreign powers do not necessarily need to invent European divisions. Migration, inequality, national identity, distrust of institutions, dissatisfaction with government and arguments over European integration already exist. External actors can exploit these divisions by amplifying particular narratives, supporting sympathetic networks, injecting misleading information or simply increasing the visibility and intensity of conflicts already dividing Europeans.

This is the Threat from Within.[4] But the phrase requires an important qualification. The threat is not disagreement. People opposing immigration policy, European integration, defense expenditure or sanctions against Russia do not become agents of foreign influence simply because Moscow happens to favor similar positions. A democracy that starts treating dissent as a security problem damages precisely what it claims to defend.

Europe therefore faces a difficult balancing act: becoming considerably better at identifying manipulation, covert financing and organized foreign interference while continuing to protect political pluralism and open argument. Significantly, the French doctrine described by Ifri recognizes essentially this boundary: military capabilities may act toward an adversary, while protection of domestic civilian society should not become an attempt to influence that society.[2]

A European information strategy must therefore protect the democratic information environment without trying to control it. That distinction should become one of its governing principles.

Defense Is Only Half a Strategy

There remains another asymmetry. Russia communicates actively into Europe. Europe does much less to communicate strategically into Russia.

Europe sanctions. Europe condemns. Europe supports Ukraine. Europe strengthens NATO. European leaders explain these policies primarily to Europeans and other governments. But what political future does Europe communicate to Russian citizens?

That question was central to Europe Needs a Strategy of Confidence Toward Russia’s Citizens.[5] Its proposition was deliberately different from either appeasement or regime change. Europe can make clear that its problem is not Russia's existence, Russian culture or the Russian people's legitimate desire for security and dignity. Its problem is an imperial conception of security under which neighboring countries are denied the freedom to determine their own futures.

That leaves open another possibility. A Russia secure within its internationally recognized borders, no longer seeking domination over neighboring states, could progressively rebuild a peaceful and mutually beneficial relationship with Europe.

That proposition matters strategically because deterrence by itself describes only what Europe wants Russia not to do.
It says remarkably little about what Europe wants eventually to happen.

Deterrence Needs a Political Destination

Consider the strategic choice presented to Russians today. Continued confrontation means Ukrainian resistance, stronger European defense, NATO reinforcement, sanctions, economic separation and continuing insecurity. Europe has become increasingly credible about that side of the equation.

The alternative remains much less visible.

What would actually happen if a future Russia abandoned territorial aggression? Europe could make that possibility more concrete without promising concessions today. Changed behavior could progressively create possibilities for sanctions relief, restored travel, scientific and educational exchange, cultural reopening, economic cooperation and eventually a different European security relationship.

The important word is conditional. Europe would not be offering rewards for aggression, nor would it determine Russia's political system. Russians themselves determine Russia's political future. Europe would simply make one proposition credible: Russia's choices affect Europe's choices.

That directly challenges the narrative that permanent confrontation is unavoidable because the West will remain Russia's enemy whatever Russia does. Europe's answer can instead be that another relationship is possible, but that it depends on another relationship between Russia and its neighbors as well.

This is strategically important. Deterrence raises the costs of aggression. Conditional cooperation increases the potential benefits of changed behavior. Communication makes that alternative knowable. None works as effectively without the others.

From Information Warfare to Societal Communication

This is where the emerging French doctrine and the European Russia question meet—but they should not be confused.

Military information warfare and communication with Russian society are not the same activity, nor should they become one. Military organizations need capabilities appropriate to conflict and adversarial information environments. European societies need protection against covert foreign interference. Independent journalists, researchers, cultural institutions, universities and Russian-language voices need the freedom and means to communicate across borders.

Governments can provide infrastructure, access and strategic clarity without determining what independent communicators are required to say. That distinction allows Europe to build influence capability without constructing a European propaganda ministry.

Much of the required ecosystem already exists.
Europe has broadcasters, independent media, universities, research institutions, cultural networks, Russian-language journalists, technology companies, diplomatic services and civil-society organizations. The missing element may therefore be less the creation of an enormous new apparatus than strategic coherence, sustained access, sufficient scale and political continuity.

Europe Already Has Something to Communicate

There is another reason Europe should not imitate authoritarian information warfare: Europe possesses its own story.

The WE ARE EUROPE series identified values that Europeans have gradually built into their societies: personal freedom, democratic voice, equality before law, protection against arbitrary power, solidarity, tolerance of difference, peaceful compromise and rejection of political deception.[6] Those values are not merely something to protect inside Europe. They are also part of Europe's attractiveness outside it.

This changes the purpose of European strategic communication.
Europe does not need to manufacture an artificial story about itself. It needs to make its actual society — its disagreements as well as its achievements, its failures as well as its aspirations — together with its intentions and possible relationships with others, visible and accessible in information environments where competing powers increasingly restrict or manipulate that visibility.

The values ecosystem therefore becomes strategic infrastructure. Not because European values become propaganda, but because they give European communication something credible to communicate.

An Emerging EU2.0 Capability

The significance goes well beyond Russia. A more autonomous Europe increasingly requires several forms of capacity simultaneously.
It needs military capacity to defend itself and economic capacity to finance defense, prosperity, technological development and the welfare state.
It needs diplomatic capacity to formulate European positions rather than automatically inheriting those of Washington or merely responding to Moscow and Beijing.
It needs democratic resilience so outside powers cannot easily exploit internal divisions.
Increasingly, it also needs information capacity: the ability to understand information environments, defend its own, operate in adversarial ones and communicate convincingly with societies beyond Europe's borders.

These capabilities are beginning to appear. France's developing information doctrine is one indication. Europe's expanding efforts against foreign information manipulation are another. The growing recognition that Russia's hybrid confrontation extends into European societies provides a third.[1][2][3]

But the pieces remain fragmented. EU2.0 would bring them into a coherent strategic architecture while maintaining the boundaries appropriate to a democratic society. Military information operations should remain subject to democratic authority and law. Protection against foreign interference should not become policing of political disagreement. Independent media should remain independent. Strategic communication should remain anchored in demonstrable reality. And Europe should be capable not merely of describing what it opposes, but of communicating the futures it is prepared to support.

This also suggests a broader way of understanding EU2.0.
The WE ARE EUROPE series asked what Europe is and what Europeans want to preserve. [6]
EU2.0 increasingly asks a complementary question: What capabilities does Europe need in order to preserve it?

Power Also Means Persuasion

Europe's geopolitical awakening has understandably begun with defense. Russia's invasion of Ukraine made military weakness impossible to ignore. American uncertainty has forced Europeans to reconsider strategic dependence. Chinese industrial competition has exposed economic vulnerabilities. The information dimension is now becoming visible as another part of the same transformation.

The lesson should not be that Europe needs its own propaganda machine. It is almost the reverse. A democratic Europe needs the confidence to believe that truthful persuasion can itself be a form of strategic power.

That means protecting Europeans against manipulation without protecting them against disagreement. It means confronting hostile information operations without copying their methods. And it means speaking beyond governments to societies whose choices will ultimately shape Europe's security environment.

Europe cannot choose Russia's future. Nor can it choose America's, China's or anyone else's. But Europe can decide whether those societies encounter only Europe's sanctions, regulations, military preparations and diplomatic objections — or whether they can also understand what Europe stands for, what it seeks and what another relationship could make possible.

That is why information strategy belongs in EU2.0.

Deterrence tells others where Europe will not retreat. Communication tells them where another road could lead.

References

[1] European External Action Service (EEAS), 2025 Report on EEAS Activities to Counter Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI), 24 June 2026. 

[2] Laurent Bansept, Convaincre pour vaincre. La France et la structuration d'une doctrine de guerre informationnelle, Focus stratégique No. 135, Institut français des relations internationales (Ifri), 7 September 2026. 
https://www.ifri.org/fr/etudes/convaincre-pour-vaincre-la-france-et-la-structuration-dune-doctrine-de-guerre

[3] Council of the European Union, Russian hybrid threats: four individuals added to EU sanctions list for information manipulation activities, 16 March 2026; see also the Council's June 2026 sanctions concerning Russian FIMI and propaganda actors. 

[4] WE ARE EUROPE — Keeping Europe European: The Threat From Within, August 2026. 
https://europe-is-us.blogspot.com/2026/08/we-are-europe-keeping-europe-european_01764668262.html

[5] Europe Needs a Strategy of Confidence Toward Russia’s Citizens, June 2026.
https://europe-is-us.blogspot.com/2026/06/europe-needs-strategy-of-confidence.html

 [6] WE ARE EUROPE - Key Notes to the Series - The European Environment We Have Built Around Ourselves, European Values series, August 2026. 
https://europe-is-us.blogspot.com/2026/08/we-are-europe-key-notes-to-series.html

 

 

The Other War Over Ukraine - Can Ukraine Last for Two More Years?

 

The Other War Over Ukraine

Can Ukraine Last for Two More Years Under Russia's Evolving Air Offensive?

Most reporting on Ukraine understandably follows the front line: Russian advances, Ukrainian defenses, territorial gains and losses, and the continuing struggle for soldiers and weapons.

But another war is developing above and behind that front.

It is fought over Kyiv, Odesa and other cities; over power stations, railways, ports and factories; and increasingly over the daily functioning of Ukrainian society. Russia is combining ballistic and cruise missiles with mass-produced attack drones while introducing faster and more difficult-to-intercept variants.

Ukraine is adapting. Europe and NATO are supplying weapons, financing production and beginning to build a broader air-defense architecture around lessons learned in Ukraine.

This creates two urgent questions.
- Can Ukraine and Europe develop and manufacture defensive systems quickly enough when Russia is setting much of the technological and production tempo?
- And can Ukrainian civilian society withstand another two years of an intensifying air war?

A Second War Above Ukraine

Russia's air campaign is not new. The same strategy of attacking Civilian Infrastructure and Civilians as they did in Cheniya and Syria. Ukrainian cities and infrastructure have been attacked since the full-scale invasion began in 2022.
What is changing is its scale and composition.

The Iranian-designed Shahed drone, produced in Russia as the Geran, helped transform the economics of long-range attack. Instead of relying only on expensive missiles, Russia could send relatively cheap one-way attack drones in large numbers.

Ukraine adapted with electronic warfare, mobile gun teams and increasingly interceptor drones. The principle was simple: do not use an expensive surface-to-air missile if a much cheaper weapon can destroy the same target.

Russia is also adapting and faster...

During 2026 it has increasingly introduced faster jet-powered Geran variants. These sharply reduce the defender's detection and interception time and make some inexpensive Ukrainian countermeasures less effective.

The ballistic threat is evolving as well. Russia has modified missiles in the Iskander family to make interception more difficult, including through terminal maneuvering and other countermeasures.

More important than any individual weapon is how Russia combines them. Slow drones, faster jet drones, cruise missiles and ballistic missiles can arrive as part of the same attack. Ukraine must identify them, determine which present the greatest danger and allocate scarce defensive weapons accordingly.

Russia therefore does not need to invent an unstoppable weapon. It can make successful defense increasingly difficult, by the numbers and by the costs.

The Economics of Air Defense

A less visible contest behind the explosions over Ukrainian cities.
A defender that destroys a relatively inexpensive drone with a million-euro missile may win the engagement while gradually losing the economic competition.

Ukraine therefore needs layers.

Electronic warfare and guns can deal with some drones.
Interceptor drones can destroy others.
Short-range systems deal with more demanding targets.
IRIS-T and NASAMS provide another layer.
Patriot and SAMP/T must be preserved for the most difficult threats, particularly ballistic missiles.

The objective is to match the cheapest effective defensive weapon to each incoming threat.

That makes mass production of inexpensive defensive systems almost as important as acquiring additional Patriots. If Russia can manufacture attack weapons faster and more cheaply than Ukraine and its partners can replace interceptors, even an effective air-defense system can eventually be exhausted.

Ukraine Has Become Europe's Air-Defense Laboratory

This is also changing Ukraine's relationship with Europe.
For much of the war the direction appeared straightforward: Europe and the United States possessed advanced weapons; Ukraine needed them.

Ukraine still urgently needs Western systems and interceptors. But knowledge is increasingly travelling in both directions.

No European NATO military has Ukraine's experience of defending a large country against years of mixed drone and missile attacks. Ukraine has learned to combine sophisticated missile systems with electronic warfare, cheap interceptors, mobile units and rapid technological innovation while under continuous attack.

That experience is becoming directly relevant to Europe's own defense.
European-Ukrainian cooperation increasingly connects battlefield experience with European financing, research and industrial capacity.

The relationship is gradually changing:  Europe → Ukraine  to  Europe ⇄ Ukraine.

Ukraine needs Europe's industrial depth.
Europe needs Ukraine's combat experience and extraordinarily rapid cycle of adaptation.

Europe Is Building a Shield — But It Is Not There Yet

Europe's response can appear confusing because it consists of overlapping national, EU and NATO programmes.

The German-led European Sky Shield Initiative remains an important part, encouraging participating countries to acquire and coordinate layered air- and missile-defense systems.

But a larger architecture is emerging around it.

The EU's European Air Shield is intended to strengthen integrated air and missile defense.
The European Drone Defense Initiative addresses the mass UAV threat. Eastern Flank Watch is intended to combine surveillance, electronic warfare, counter-drone and defensive capabilities along Europe's most exposed frontier. NATO's Integrated Air and Missile Defense system provides the broader command, sensor and interoperability framework.

European-Ukrainian industrial cooperation adds another component: producing drones, interceptors and other systems while incorporating lessons from Ukraine.

These programmes show that Europe increasingly understands the nature of the threat.
But announced capability is not the same as operational capability.

The EU envisages initial Drone Defense and Eastern Flank Watch capacity by the end of 2026, full Drone Defense functionality by the end of 2027 and Eastern Flank Watch by the end of 2028. Other elements of Europe's future air and missile defense extend towards 2030.

Russia's weapons are arriving now. That creates a dangerous transition period.

Concern One: Russia Is Setting the Speed

Russia has an important advantage in this competition: it can continuously test weapons against a real defensive system.

The technological cycle is increasingly measured in months.
Where traditional European defense procurement is measured in years.

Russia has simultaneously made mass production part of its strategy.
The challenge for Europe is therefore not simply to purchase more air-defense systems. It must shorten the entire cycle between Ukrainian battlefield experience, European research, industrial development, procurement and mass production.

Otherwise Europe faces a moving target: a defensive program designed around the Russian threat of 2024 may arrive in 2028 to confront the Russian threat of 2028.

The critical question is whether Europe's much larger economic and technological resources can be converted into military capability quickly enough.

Concern Two: Civilian Ukraine

There is a danger in discussing this contest mainly in terms of weapons and interception percentages.

People live underneath it.

Even if Ukraine destroys most incoming weapons, larger attacks mean that some get through. Damage accumulates.

An electricity substation can be repaired. Repeated attacks on the electricity network create a different problem. The same applies to heating, water, railways, factories, ports, hospitals and housing.

Behind infrastructure stands human behavior.

Families decide whether to remain in Ukraine. Refugees decide whether to return. Businesses decide whether to invest. Workers decide whether they can continue living in vulnerable cities. The government must divert resources into repair. Soldiers have families living under the same attacks.

Air defense therefore protects much more than military installations. It protects economic activity, employment, population retention, public morale and ultimately national resilience.

This is why the next two years matter.

Russia does not have to collapse Ukrainian society to achieve strategic effects. Making everyday life progressively harder can produce cumulative costs: additional migration, declining investment, enormous reconstruction expenditure and greater fatigue after years of war.

Protecting civilians is therefore not separate from sustaining Ukraine's military effort.
It is one of its foundations.

Can Ukraine Last for Two More Years?

There is no simple answer, and current evidence does not justify either confidence or fatalism.

Ukraine has demonstrated extraordinary adaptability and continues to receive substantial European support. European defense spending and production are increasing. Cheap interceptor drones and other new technologies could substantially improve the economics of air defense.

But Ukraine's sustainability increasingly depends on four connected races.

There is a production race: can Ukraine and its partners replenish defensive weapons as quickly as Russia produces offensive ones?

There is a cost race: can cheap attack drones increasingly be defeated by cheap defensive systems, preserving sophisticated missiles for sophisticated threats?

There is an infrastructure race: can Ukraine repair, protect and disperse essential systems faster than Russia can degrade them?

And there is a human-resilience race: can Ukrainian society continue living, working and maintaining confidence under another two winters of repeated attack?

The first two are principally military-industrial problems. The latter two turn them into a strategic European problem.

If Ukrainian air defence weakens because interceptor supplies cannot keep pace, the consequences will appear not only on military maps but in electricity supplies, industrial production, civilian casualties and migration—and eventually in Ukraine's capacity to sustain the land war.

The Race to 2028

There are reasons for cautious confidence. Europe is no longer treating drones as a secondary battlefield phenomenon. Air and missile defence has moved towards the centre of European defence planning. Production is expanding, and Ukraine is increasingly becoming a partner in European technological and industrial development rather than simply a recipient of Western weapons.

But the timing remains uncomfortable.

Russia is already deploying the evolving threat. Much of Europe's comprehensive response will mature between 2027 and 2030.

The gap between those two realities is the vulnerability.

It also makes the distinction between protecting Ukraine and preparing to protect Europe increasingly artificial.

Ukraine is confronting the missile, drone, electronic-warfare and saturation tactics that European planners must assume could one day threaten NATO's eastern members. Its engineers and air-defence crews are discovering in combat what works, what becomes obsolete and what must be produced cheaply in enormous quantities.

Europe's task is to turn those lessons into industrial capability faster than Russia can create the next problem.

Summary

Alongside the front-line war, an increasingly important air war is being fought over Ukraine's cities, infrastructure and population. Russia is combining mass-produced drones, faster jet-powered variants, cruise missiles and improved ballistic missiles to make defense harder and more expensive.

Ukraine has responded with layered air defense and rapid technological adaptation. In the process, it has become an important source of knowledge for Europe's own defense. European Sky Shield, the European Air Shield, Drone Defense, Eastern Flank Watch, NATO integration and European-Ukrainian industrial cooperation are beginning to form a much larger defensive architecture.

But much of that architecture is still being built.

For the next two years, two concerns dominate.

Russia is setting much of the speed. Europe must shorten the distance between battlefield lessons, technological development and mass production.

Civilian resilience is becoming part of military sustainability. Electricity, housing, employment, migration and people's willingness to remain in Ukraine ultimately affect the country's ability to continue fighting.

Europe has begun building the right kind of shield.

The question for 2026–2028 is whether Europe and Ukraine can build it fast enough to last.