Europe Needs Its Own Middle East Strategy

Strategic autonomy is not only the ability to act independently. It is also the ability to communicate independently.

Another round of American - Iranian negotiations appear to be stalling with again mutual military actions (https://en.mehrnews.com/news/245062/Iran-retaliates-against-US-attacks-warns-full-Hormuz-closure).
Iran threatens a complete closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Where both sides continue to suggest that an agreement remains possible, current reality is that negotiation results proove difficult to achieve and repeated military actions can persist.

For Europe, this should raise an uncomfortable question.
Why does Europe's economic security remain so dependent on negotiations over which Europe exercises so little influence?

Europe did not start the war between the United States, Israel and Iran.
Throughout the crisis, European leaders have repeatedly emphasized restraint, diplomacy and de-escalation. They have largely avoided direct military participation while calling for stability and freedom of navigation.

Yet, despite these efforts, Europe continues to be perceived as part of the American - Israeli camp.

That would be a strategic mistake.
Not because Europe should distance itself from its allies, but because Europe possesses—and can further develop—a different geopolitical asset:
Diplomatic credibility independent from the United States.

A Different Position

Europe's relationship with Iran has never been simple.
The European Union has profound disagreements with Tehran over human rights, regional security and nuclear proliferation. Those differences are real and will remain so.

At the same time, Europe has never officially embraced regime change as its objective. Nor did it choose to initiate the current military confrontation.

This places Europe in an intermediate position.
Politically aligned with the West. Militarily largely uninvolved. Diplomatically still searching for solutions.
That position offers opportunities.
Europe should ask itself whether it fully exploits the diplomatic space it still possesses.

The Limits of Military Logic

American strategy often rests on a familiar assumption: military pressure creates negotiating leverage. Perhaps it will.

But Europe cannot build its own security entirely around the expectation that Washington and Tehran will eventually reach an agreement.

Iran appears to operate according to a different strategic logic. It may believe that time favors larger regional powers, that Western political attention eventually shifts elsewhere, and that economic adaptation is possible.
Whether that calculation is correct is almost secondary.
What matters is that Europe's economic exposure to prolonged instability is enormous. A lasting disruption of the Strait of Hormuz would directly affect European energy supplies, inflation and industrial competitiveness. Europe therefore has a large stake in long-term regional stability.

Europe cannot build its Middle East policy solely around the expectation that others will eventually solve Europe's strategic problem.
Strategic autonomy also means preparing for futures that Washington may not expect—or prefer.

Asia Offers Another Lesson

Interestingly, several major Asian powers have pursued a different approach.
China, India, Japan and South Korea all maintain extensive economic relations across the region.
    They cooperate with Gulf states.
    They maintain communication with Iran.
    They work with the United States.
    They maintain relations with Israel.
None of them have solved the region's conflicts. But they have largely avoided becoming identified as direct adversaries. This has preserved diplomatic channels that may become increasingly valuable as crises deepen. Asia has largely built its own relationships with Iran.

Europe still largely waits for the outcome of America's relationship with Iran. That is not strategic autonomy. It is strategic dependence.

Europe is free to explore another route.

Thinking Beyond Regime Change

Much Western discussion about Iran quietly assumes that lasting stability depends upon political transformation inside the country. Perhaps one day that will happen.
But strategy should also consider another possibility:
What if Iran remains broadly the same political system for the next twenty years?

What relationship should Europe seek then?
This is not an argument for accepting Iranian policies. It is an argument for preparing for geopolitical reality.
Europe has already begun asking similar questions about Russia.
How can deterrence coexist with a future political relationship?
How can conflict eventually give way to stability?
The same question deserves to be asked about Iran.

Europe should not wait for a future American - Iranian settlement to define its own interests. It should begin developing its own long-term diplomatic framework for stability in the Gulf.

The Value of Diplomatic Capital

Europe today invests heavily in military capabilities. That is necessary. A more dangerous world requires stronger defenses.
But military assets are not the only strategic assets that states possess.
    Countries also accumulate trust.
    Communication channels.
    Mediator credibility.
    Political legitimacy.
These forms of diplomatic capital are difficult to build and remarkably easy to lose. This is why Europe's emerging role in militarily protecting navigation around the Strait of Hormuz deserves careful consideration.

Protecting civilian shipping is a legitimate and necessary objective.
But Europe should avoid gradually becoming perceived as merely an extension of the American military approach. The closer Europe moves toward direct military integration in the conflict, the smaller its diplomatic space may become.

Security and diplomacy should reinforce one another, not compete with one another.

Strategic Autonomy Means More Than Weapons

Europe often defines strategic autonomy in terms of defense spending, industrial production and military readiness. Those capabilities matter.
But genuine strategic autonomy also means possessing an independent political voice.
    It means retaining the ability to speak to actors that others cannot.
    It means preserving channels of communication during conflict.
    It means being able to help shape the peace that eventually follows war.

America's comparative advantage is military power. Europe's comparative advantage may increasingly become political legitimacy and diplomatic credibility. Europe should be careful not to trade away the latter while trying to strengthen the former.

Conclusion

The disruption of the Strait of Hormuz directly affects European energy security, inflation and industrial competitiveness. Europe's stake in regional stability is big and immediate.

Europe should not outsource its Middle East strategy to Washington and Tehran.
Europe should begin developing Strategic Autonomy now.
With an independent diplomatic framework. Carefully balancing military activities to not to be an extension of US.

Because durable security ultimately requires more than military power, developing the ability to communicate a future beyond conflict is required
Europe did not choose this war. Now Europe should choose its own peace strategy.

 

More Than an Invitation

Zelensky's Open Letter Was Written for More Than Putin

When Volodymyr Zelensky published his open letter to Vladimir Putin [1], many observers naturally focused on the obvious question: Was this a genuine invitation to negotiate? That question matters. But it may not be the most interesting one.

Great political letters are rarely addressed to only one person. They often have multiple audiences and multiple purposes. Abraham Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, Winston Churchill's wartime speeches and even the Cold War's major declarations were simultaneously directed at adversaries, allies, citizens and history itself.

Zelensky's letter belongs to that tradition.

More Than an Invitation

Certainly, the letter offers dialogue. It creates a public record that Ukraine remains prepared to talk directly with Russia's leadership.

But by making the invitation public, the letter also changes the diplomatic equation.
If negotiations do not happen, the question naturally becomes: who refused?

The letter therefore functions not only as diplomacy, but also as a mechanism for assigning political responsibility.

Speaking Over the Kremlin

Perhaps the most interesting audience is not Putin at all.
The letter repeatedly speaks to ordinary Russians.  It acknowledges suffering. It avoids language of national humiliation. It suggests that another future remains possible.
In doing so, Zelensky bypasses the Kremlin and communicates directly with Russian society.

That is unusual in wartime. But it also reflects an important strategic insight: wars eventually end through political change as much as through military events.

Writing for History

Political leaders know that documents survive. Years from now, historians may not ask whether the letter produced immediate negotiations.
They may ask whether Ukraine demonstrated that it consistently left open a political path out of the conflict.
The open letter establishes exactly such a historical record.

A Message to Europe

The letter also appears directed at Europe's political leadership.

As American strategic attention increasingly shifts toward the Indo-Pacific, Europeans are quietly confronting a new reality: Europe itself may have to carry a larger share of both deterrence and diplomacy.

That requires more than weapons. It requires a political vision.
Europe is learning how to deter Russia.
But what future should Europe ultimately offer beyond deterrence?

Europe's Missing Communication Strategy

This question was explored in the article Europe Needs a Strategy of Confidence Toward Russia.[2]
The central argument was simple:
Europe should communicate that it seeks neither Russia's humiliation nor its destruction. It should communicate that Russia has a future inside a stable European security order—provided it abandons imperial domination of its neighbors.

Zelensky's letter contains elements of that same logic.
Not forgiveness. Not surrender. But the recognition that a path out must remain visible.

The Future Perspective

Wars are fought over the future. But peace also requires a future.

The most striking aspect of Zelensky's letter is not that it invites Putin to negotiation talks.
It is that it quietly suggests another possibility:
That one day Russia, Ukraine and Europe may again need to share the same continent without permanent confrontation. Whether that day comes soon or far in the future, political leaders must eventually begin communicating toward it.

More Than an Invitation

Viewed this way, the letter is not simply an invitation.
It is a diplomatic signal. A communication to Russian citizens. A message to European leaders. A statement for history.

And perhaps most importantly, an acknowledgment that even amid war, a path out must remain imaginable.

That may ultimately prove to be its greatest significance.

Reference

[1] Full text of Zelensky's open letter to Putin https://kyivindependent.com/full-text-of-zelenskys-open-letter-to-putin/

[2] Europe Needs a Strategy of Confidence Toward Russia https://europe-is-us.blogspot.com/2026/06/europe-needs-strategy-of-confidence.html

Europe's Next Defence Challenge: Military Mass

Europe is rebuilding its defence industry and increasing military spending.
The next question is whether it can rebuild the manpower and mobilisation systems needed to deter Russia.

Rebuilding Defence Capabilities

Since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Europe has undergone a remarkable strategic transformation.

Defence spending is rising across the continent. Ammunition production is expanding. New European defence-industrial initiatives have emerged. NATO allies are increasing force readiness, and governments that once spoke cautiously about defence now openly discuss deterrence and rearmament.

Europe is rearming at speed. Yet beneath this visible transformation lies a less discussed question. If deterrence were ever tested, could Europe generate sufficient military mass?

Europe's defence debate has largely focused on budgets, weapons systems and industrial production. These are essential components of military power.
But wars are ultimately fought by people. Military capability depends not only on equipment, but also on the ability to recruit, train, mobilise and sustain large numbers of personnel over time.

As Europe rebuilds its armed forces, military manpower may become the next major strategic challenge.

Measuring Military Potential

Army size alone provides an incomplete picture of military strength.

To understand Europe's manpower position and developments, three factors matter.

- The first is current Military Personnel Capacity (MPC): the military manpower available today through active personnel, trained reserves, conscripts and territorial defence structures.
- The second is the Military Personnel Reinforcement Index (MPRI): the current degree to which a country has expanded military manpower since 2020 through measures such as conscription, reserve growth, recruitment initiatives and force expansion.
- The third is Mobilisation Readiness (MR): the ability to transform additional citizens into operational military capability. This includes reserve systems, mobilisation plans, training structures, civil defence arrangements and national preparedness.

Together these factors form what might be called a European Military Manpower Potential Index (EMMPI).

The distinction is important.

A country may possess substantial military manpower today but be expanding only slowly. Another may have a smaller force but be rapidly strengthening recruitment, reserves and mobilisation systems.

Military power is not simply about how many personnel exist today. It is also about how rapidly manpower can be expanded and how effectively additional citizens can be transformed into military capability.

Table 1. European Military Manpower Potential (EMMPI) – Illustrative Assessment 2026

Country	MPC (Current Capacity)	MPRI (Growth Since 2020)	MR (Mobilisation Readiness)	Overall Assessment
Poland	High	Very High	High	Very High
Finland	Medium	Very High	Very High	Very High
Estonia	Low	Very High	Very High	High
Lithuania	Low-Medium	Very High	High	High
Latvia	Low	Very High	High	High
Sweden	Medium	High	High	High
Denmark	Medium-Low	High	Medium-High	Medium-High
Germany	High	High	Medium	High
France	High	Medium-High	Medium	High
Romania	Medium	Medium	Medium	Medium
Netherlands	Medium	Medium	Low-Medium	Medium
Italy	High	Low-Medium	Low-Medium	Medium
Spain	High	Low	Low	Medium-Low
Russia	Very High	High	Very High	Very High

EMMPI combines Military Personnel Capacity (MPC), Military Personnel Reinforcement Index (MPRI), and Mobilisation Readiness (MR). Scores are qualitative assessments intended to compare strategic trends rather than exact force numbers.
Sources used: Assessment based on NATO and EDA defence data, national defence ministry publications, official force-development plans, reserve-force expansion programmes, conscription reforms, mobilisation policies, and military manpower targets announced by European governments and Russia between 2020 and 2026.

Table 2. The Three Europes

Group	Countries	Characteristics
Mobilisation Europe	Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Sweden, Denmark	Expanding conscription, strengthening reserves, investing in civil defence and mobilisation systems
Latent Power Europe	Germany, France	Large manpower capacity and economic strength, but mobilisation systems still rebuilding
Low-Mobilisation Europe	Spain, Italy, Belgium, Portugal and others	Significant economic and military potential, but manpower mobilisation remains a lower strategic priority

Table 3. Europe versus Russia

Factor	European Union	Russia
Population Base	Superior	Inferior
Economic Base	Superior	Inferior
Industrial Potential	Superior	Inferior
Current Military Personnel Capacity	Comparable	Comparable
Military Personnel Reinforcement Trend	Improving	High
Mobilisation Readiness	Uneven	Strong
Strategic Challenge	Organisation and integration	Long-term sustainment

The tables above reveal an important pattern. Europe's challenge is not a shortage of people, wealth or industrial potential. Instead, the continent displays significant variation in its ability to mobilise military manpower. Some countries are rebuilding mobilisation systems rapidly, others possess enormous latent potential, while a third group remains focused primarily on spending and equipment rather than manpower generation.

Viewed through this lens, Europe increasingly appears divided into three distinct manpower models.

Three Europes Are Emerging

Mobilisation Europe

The first group consists of countries that have made military manpower a central element of their security strategy.
Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Sweden and Denmark fall broadly into this category.
These countries are expanding conscription systems, strengthening reserves, investing in civil defence and rebuilding mobilisation structures. For them, military preparedness is not an abstract policy objective. It is a practical requirement shaped by geography and proximity to Russia.

Poland has embarked on one of Europe's most ambitious military expansion programmes. Finland continues to maintain one of the continent's most robust reserve-based defence models.
The Baltic states have moved rapidly to strengthen manpower systems that were often neglected during the post-Cold War period.

These countries increasingly think in terms of mobilisation.

Latent Power Europe

A second group consists of countries with enormous potential but more limited mobilisation traditions.
Germany and France are the most important examples.
Both possess large populations, strong economies and significant defence-industrial capacity. Both are increasing defence spending and expanding military ambitions.

Yet their challenge is different.
Their military potential is enormous, but much of it remains latent. The institutions, reserve structures and mobilisation culture required to rapidly generate military mass are less developed than in many Nordic and Baltic states.

Germany's efforts to rebuild military personnel and reserves may ultimately become one of the most consequential developments in European defence.
France is pursuing reserve expansion and new forms of voluntary military service.

Neither country lacks potential. The question is how quickly that potential can be converted into usable capability.

Low-Mobilisation Europe

A third group consists of countries where military manpower has not yet become a major strategic priority. This includes much of Western and Southern Europe.

Countries such as Spain, Italy, Belgium and Portugal possess significant economic resources and important armed forces. Yet compared with the Nordic, Baltic and Polish models, manpower mobilisation has generally advanced more slowly.
This is not necessarily a criticism. Security environments differ, and governments face different strategic priorities.
However, it does suggest that Europe's defence transformation remains uneven.

What Russia Understands

Russia's war against Ukraine has demonstrated many weaknesses in the Russian system.
It has also highlighted something that Europe often overlooks.
Military power is not merely a matter of spending. Russia continues to think in terms of mobilisation.
Its defence system integrates active forces, reserves, industrial production and state structures into a broader capacity to generate military mass. Years of war have reinforced this orientation.
Russia's economy remains smaller than Europe's. Its technological base is narrower. Its demographic challenges are significant.

Yet Russia retains an important advantage: a stronger mobilisation culture and a greater institutional familiarity with generating large-scale military manpower.
This does not make Russia stronger overall. But it does highlight an area where Europe still has work to do.

Europe's Real Advantage

The encouraging reality is that Europe possesses extraordinary strengths.

The European Union's population is roughly three times larger than Russia's.
Europe's economy is vastly larger.
Its technological base is broader.
Its long-term industrial potential is greater.

In other words, Europe does not fundamentally suffer from a shortage of people, wealth or productive capacity.
The challenge is organisational.

Europe's strategic question is therefore not whether it can match Russia's manpower potential.
It almost certainly can.

The question is whether it can organise, train and mobilise that potential effectively enough to sustain credible integrated deterrence.

The Missing Piece: Mobilisation Readiness

This is where the debate increasingly shifts.

The issue is no longer simply how many tanks Europe can buy or how many artillery shells it can produce. The issue is how quickly Europe can generate military capability when required.

Mobilisation readiness depends on institutions.

• It depends on reserve systems.
• It depends on training capacity.
• It depends on civil defence structures.
• It depends on public preparedness and political willingness.

Many of the countries making the greatest progress in this area are not necessarily the largest. Finland's influence on European defence thinking today stems not from population size, but from its ability to mobilise society for national defence. Similar lessons can be found across the Baltic region.

The challenge for larger European states may therefore be less about spending and more about rebuilding the machinery of mobilisation itself.

Conclusion

Europe's defence rebuild is real.

The continent is spending more, producing more and preparing more than at any point since the Cold War. Yet deterrence requires more than budgets and factories. 

It requires people. Europe has the people.
The challenge is rebuilding the institutions capable of turning those people into military capability.
If it fails, the continent may discover that weapons alone are not enough.

That may be the most important defence question Europe faces in the decade ahead.