Iran Power Map — July 2026

A Snapshot of Iran’s Public Leadership Structure Through the Mehr News Window

Snapshot	July 2026
Observation Window	Mehr News (English)
Observation Period	May–July 2026
Leadership Profiles	10
Purpose	Map Iran’s publicly projected governing architecture

 

Figure 1. Public Leadership Architecture (Mehr News Snapshot, July 2026)

This figure is an analytical interpretation of the leadership structure currently projected through Mehr News reporting. It is not a constitutional organisation chart.

Introduction

The assassination of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei marked one of the most consequential moments in the history of the Islamic Republic. Outside observers immediately focused on one question: Who is leading Iran now?

Answering that question is not straightforward. Iran’s political system combines constitutional authority, revolutionary institutions, military organisations, religious leadership and informal networks of influence. Much of that internal decision-making remains outside public view.

This article therefore takes a deliberately different approach. Rather than attempting to uncover Iran’s hidden power structure, it examines how the Islamic Republic currently presents its own leadership.

The analysis uses a single observational window: the English-language edition of Mehr News. As one of Iran’s principal state-aligned news agencies, Mehr consistently reports the officials announcing policy, directing military operations, conducting diplomacy and speaking on behalf of the state. By identifying the individuals who repeatedly appear in these roles, it becomes possible to construct a snapshot of Iran’s publicly projected leadership structure.

This methodology has clear limitations. Public visibility is not identical to political influence, and some powerful actors may deliberately remain outside the spotlight. Likewise, state-aligned media naturally present a more coordinated picture of government than might exist behind closed doors.

Yet that public presentation is itself significant. It reveals which institutions Iran currently chooses to emphasise, which personalities are entrusted with communicating policy and how responsibility appears to be distributed across the country’s principal centres of authority.

The result is therefore not a definitive map of who governs every aspect of the Islamic Republic. It is a snapshot of the governing architecture that Iran currently projects to domestic and international audiences.

Snapshot Observations

Institutional continuity

The most striking impression is continuity. Despite the loss of a Supreme Leader who shaped Iranian politics for more than three decades, Mehr presents a state whose principal institutions continue to operate with little visible disruption. Rather than projecting a search for new leadership, it projects continuity of governance.

The Supreme National Security Council appears central

Below the Supreme Leader, the Supreme National Security Council appears to function as the principal coordinating body linking military affairs, diplomacy and government. Its prominence suggests that strategic coordination, rather than individual political leadership, has become one of the defining characteristics of Iran’s post-war governance.

Security influence extends beyond the IRGC

The Revolutionary Guard remains one of Iran’s most powerful institutions, but its influence is not confined to uniformed command. Several senior civilian officeholders also possess long IRGC careers, illustrating how revolutionary security experience is embedded across multiple branches of the state.

Diplomacy remains a strategic pillar

The prominence of Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei demonstrates that diplomacy continues to occupy a central place in Iran’s national strategy. Military resilience and diplomatic engagement are presented as complementary instruments rather than competing alternatives.

Iran projects institutional unity

Perhaps the strongest overall message is one of coordination. Mehr does not emphasise competition between clerics, military leaders, politicians or technocrats. Instead, it presents different institutions as contributing to a common national strategy under the authority of the Supreme Leader.

Leadership Profiles

Mojtaba Khamenei

Position
Supreme Leader

Represents
Supreme religious, constitutional and strategic authority.

Current Role
Provides the Islamic Republic’s final authority on national strategy, defence and foreign policy while symbolising continuity after the death of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

Snapshot Assessment
Mehr presents Mojtaba Khamenei as the ultimate source of political legitimacy rather than the day-to-day manager of government. His public role is to authorise strategic direction while allowing established institutions to continue operating within their existing responsibilities.

Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr

Position
Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council

Represents
Iran’s national-security coordination system.

Current Role
Coordinates military, diplomatic and executive policy across the principal state institutions responsible for national security.

Snapshot Assessment
Among officials below the Supreme Leader, Zolghadr appears to occupy one of the most influential coordinating positions. His extensive IRGC background also illustrates how security expertise has become embedded within Iran’s civilian decision-making structures.

Ahmad Vahidi

Position
Commander-in-Chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)

Represents
The revolutionary military and security establishment.

Current Role
Leads the IRGC and oversees Iran’s strategic military posture, deterrence and protection of the revolutionary system.

Snapshot Assessment
Mehr consistently portrays Vahidi as one of Iran’s principal military leaders. His prominence confirms that the IRGC remains a central pillar of the Islamic Republic while operating within a broader institutional leadership structure.

Masoud Pezeshkian

Position
President of the Islamic Republic of Iran

Represents
The civilian executive branch.

Current Role
Directs government administration, economic policy and implementation of national decisions while representing Iran internationally.

Snapshot Assessment
Pezeshkian remains a visible and active political leader. Mehr presents him as the senior civilian executive responsible for translating strategic decisions into government policy rather than determining Iran’s overall strategic direction independently.

Abbas Araghchi

Position
Minister of Foreign Affairs

Represents
Iran’s diplomatic establishment.

Current Role
Leads negotiations, regional diplomacy and implementation of Iran’s foreign policy following the Iran–US conflict.

Snapshot Assessment
Araghchi’s consistent prominence demonstrates that diplomacy remains one of Iran’s principal strategic instruments. Rather than replacing diplomacy, Iran’s strengthened military position is presented as reinforcing its negotiating leverage.

Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf

Position
Speaker of Parliament (Majlis)

Represents
The political establishment and its close links with the revolutionary security community.

Current Role
Provides parliamentary leadership, political consensus and legislative support for the government’s strategic direction.

Snapshot Assessment
Ghalibaf occupies a unique position at the intersection of politics and security. His long IRGC background, combined with his role as Speaker, makes him an important bridge between Iran’s civilian institutions and its revolutionary establishment.

Amir Hatami

Position
Commander-in-Chief of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army (Artesh)

Represents
Iran’s conventional armed forces.

Current Role
Commands the regular military responsible for territorial defence and conventional operations alongside the Revolutionary Guard.

Snapshot Assessment
Hatami’s visibility underlines that Iran’s defence structure extends beyond the IRGC. Mehr presents the Artesh as an important national institution contributing to continuity, deterrence and state resilience following the leadership transition.

Esmaeil Qaani

Position
Commander of the IRGC Quds Force

Represents
Iran’s regional security and external military partnerships.

Current Role
Oversees relations with Iran’s regional partners and the network commonly referred to as the Resistance Front.

Snapshot Assessment
Although less publicly visible than during periods of active regional conflict, Qaani remains one of the key figures connecting Iran’s domestic leadership with its broader regional strategy. His continued presence reflects the enduring importance of regional deterrence in Iranian policy.

Gholamhossein Mohseni Ejei

Position
Chief Justice

Represents
The judiciary and Iran’s internal legal and institutional order.

Current Role
Leads the judicial system while contributing to national leadership on questions of internal stability and state security.

Snapshot Assessment
Mehr consistently includes Ejei among Iran’s senior state leaders. His role illustrates that internal governance and regime stability remain integral components of Iran’s overall strategic posture rather than separate domestic concerns.

Esmaeil Baghaei

Position
Spokesman, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Represents
Iran’s official diplomatic communication.

Current Role
Communicates government positions on negotiations, regional developments and relations with foreign governments.

Snapshot Assessment
Baghaei is one of the most frequently quoted officials in Mehr’s international reporting. While not a principal decision-maker, his prominence makes him an important indicator of how Iran chooses to explain and frame its foreign policy to both domestic and international audiences.

What This Snapshot Suggests

Viewed through the Mehr News window, post-Khamenei Iran presents itself as a state that has absorbed a major leadership shock without abandoning its governing architecture.

The picture that emerges is neither one of rule by a single dominant personality nor of a military system dominated exclusively by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Instead, Iran projects an integrated structure in which the Supreme Leader provides strategic authority, the Supreme National Security Council coordinates national policy, the military and security institutions safeguard deterrence, the government manages implementation, the Foreign Ministry conducts diplomacy, parliament provides political legitimacy and the judiciary maintains internal stability.

An equally important observation is the integration of military and civilian experience. Several leading figures occupying formally civilian positions also possess extensive careers within the Revolutionary Guard or the wider revolutionary-security establishment. Rather than replacing civilian institutions, that experience appears to have become embedded within them.

Whether this public image fully reflects internal decision-making cannot be determined from Mehr News alone. That is not the purpose of this snapshot. Its value lies in identifying the leadership architecture that Iran currently chooses to present to domestic and international audiences.

Repeated at regular intervals, future Iran Power Maps may reveal shifts in institutional prominence, the emergence of new leadership figures or changing balances between diplomacy, military power and civilian governance. In that sense, the snapshot provides not a definitive answer, but the beginning of a structured time series for observing the public evolution of Iran’s leadership.

References

Methodological note: This snapshot is based primarily on reporting published by the English-language edition of Mehr News during the period surrounding the Iran–US conflict, the leadership transition following the death of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and the subsequent diplomatic phase. As one of Iran’s principal state-aligned news agencies, Mehr consistently reports the officials announcing policy, directing military operations, conducting diplomacy and speaking on behalf of the state.
It maps Iran’s publicly projected leadership structure and should not be interpreted as a definitive representation of confidential internal decision-making.

Principal used Mehr News type sources

1.       Appointment and public role of Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei.

2.       Reporting on the activities of President Masoud Pezeshkian and meetings of the heads of the three branches.

3.       Coverage of Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr and the Supreme National Security Council.

4.       Reporting on IRGC Commander Ahmad Vahidi and the Revolutionary Guard.

5.       Reporting on Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and post-war diplomacy.

6.       Reporting on Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf.

7.       Reporting on Army Commander Amir Hatami.

8.       Reporting on Quds Force Commander Esmaeil Qaani.

9.       Reporting on Judiciary Chief Gholamhossein Mohseni Ejei.

10.  Reporting quoting Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei on negotiations, regional developments and Iran’s foreign policy.

 

 

NATO 3.0: The Alliance After Ankara

How NATO is adapting to an America that no longer sees itself as Europe’s permanent security provider

Introduction

The 2026 NATO Summit in Ankara may ultimately be remembered less for the decisions it announced than for the strategic transition it acknowledged.

Most headlines after the summit focused on familiar themes: higher defense spending, stronger military capabilities, continued support for Ukraine and renewed Allied unity. Those were important achievements. Together they demonstrated that NATO remains determined to strengthen its collective deterrence in response to an increasingly unstable security environment.

Yet beneath those decisions lies a broader story.

For more than seventy-five years, NATO rested on a relatively stable division of responsibilities. The United States provided the indispensable military backbone of European security, while European Allies contributed within an American-led strategic framework. That model successfully deterred the Soviet Union, survived the Cold War and continued, with adaptations, throughout NATO’s post-Cold War enlargement and expeditionary operations.

Today, however, the Alliance is entering a different strategic environment. The United States continues to regard NATO as its principal security alliance, but increasingly views its global responsibilities through a wider strategic lens that includes the Indo-Pacific and long-term competition with China. At the same time, successive American administrations—and particularly the current one—have made increasingly clear that Europe is expected to assume far greater responsibility for the conventional defense of the European continent.

The Ankara Summit did not fundamentally change NATO.

It made this transition visible.

This article therefore approaches the summit from two complementary perspectives. The first examines the principal decisions and observable developments that emerged from Ankara. The second asks what those developments collectively reveal about the future direction of the Alliance.

The argument advanced here is that Ankara did more than produce another summit communiqué. It signaled the gradual emergence of what is increasingly described as a NATO 3.0: an Alliance built not on European dependence, but on a stronger European pillar sharing strategic responsibility with North America.

If that interpretation is correct, the Ankara Summit also points to a second transition—one that concerns Europe itself. A stronger NATO will require not only greater European military capabilities, but also a Europe increasingly able to think, organize and act as a mature strategic partner.

Understanding that second transition may ultimately prove to be Ankara’s most important legacy.

Part I — Ankara 2026: The Observable Changes

Before considering what the Ankara Summit may mean for NATO’s future, it is useful to examine what the Allies actually agreed. Much of the public debate surrounding the summit focused on political personalities and defence spending targets. Yet the summit’s significance lies not in any single decision, but in the combination of decisions that together reveal the Alliance’s current direction.

Collective Defense Remains the Foundation

The first and perhaps most important conclusion is that Ankara reaffirmed rather than redefined NATO’s central purpose.

The Summit Declaration leaves no ambiguity regarding Article 5, reaffirming that collective defense remains the Alliance’s core mission [1]. Equally significant, the communiqué maintains NATO’s 360-degree approach to security, recognizing that threats may emerge from the east, the south, the High North, cyberspace or other domains. For Türkiye, the summit host, this comprehensive approach reflected the importance of maintaining attention to security challenges on NATO’s southern flank alongside continued focus on Russia.

Far from signaling uncertainty about NATO’s mission, Ankara demonstrated broad agreement on the Alliance’s continuing role as the cornerstone of Euro-Atlantic collective defense.

Europe Accepts Greater Responsibility

The summit’s most visible political message concerned Europe’s own role within the Alliance.

Over recent years, European Allies have significantly increased defense spending, accelerated capability development and expanded military readiness. Ankara confirmed that these efforts are no longer viewed as temporary responses to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, but as part of a broader and more permanent strengthening of European defense.

Perhaps more importantly, the discussion increasingly moved beyond financial commitments alone. Capability targets, force generation, military mobility, logistics, resilience and readiness featured prominently throughout the summit. The debate is gradually shifting from how much Europe spends to what Europe is able to deliver.

Ukraine Becomes Part of Europe’s Long-Term Security

Ukraine remained central to the Alliance’s strategic outlook.

Although Ankara announced relatively few new headline initiatives, it reaffirmed long-term military assistance, continued defense-industrial cooperation and ongoing training efforts [1]. Increasingly, support for Ukraine is no longer presented simply as assistance to a partner under attack. It is understood as an investment in the long-term security and stability of Europe itself.

This reflects an important evolution in NATO’s thinking. Ukraine’s security is increasingly viewed as part of the broader European security architecture rather than as a separate crisis requiring temporary attention.

Defense Industry Becomes a Strategic Capability

One of Ankara’s most significant developments received comparatively little public attention.

The summit treated defense production not merely as an economic or procurement issue, but as a strategic capability in its own right. Expanding industrial capacity, strengthening supply chains, increasing ammunition production, improving interoperability and accelerating technological innovation all featured prominently in discussions about NATO’s future preparedness [2].

The experience of the war in Ukraine has demonstrated that sustained deterrence depends not only on the quality of military forces, but also on the industrial capacity required to equip, reinforce and sustain them over time.

America’s Message

The Ankara Summit also clarified the evolving American perspective on the Alliance.

Washington reaffirmed its commitment to NATO while simultaneously emphasizing that Europe should assume substantially greater responsibility for conventional defense within the European theatre. The United States continues to provide capabilities that remain indispensable to the Alliance—including nuclear deterrence, strategic intelligence, long-range mobility and other critical strategic enablers—but increasingly expects European Allies to provide a larger share of conventional military capability.

The message was therefore not one of American withdrawal.

It was one of strategic rebalancing.

From Decisions to Direction

Taken individually, none of Ankara’s principal decisions fundamentally changes NATO.

Collective defense remains the Alliance’s foundation.
Support for Ukraine continues.
European military capabilities continue to grow.
Defense industry has become a strategic priority.
The United States remains committed while encouraging greater European responsibility.

Viewed together, however, these developments suggest more than another successful summit. They indicate that the Alliance is gradually entering a new strategic phase.

To understand that transition, it is useful to step back and view NATO’s evolution over the past three quarters of a century.

Timeline: Three Generations of NATO

Period	Character	Defining Purpose
NATO 1.0 - 1949	Collective defense against the Soviet Union	Deterring a single strategic adversary through American military leadership and transatlantic solidarity.
NATO 2.0 - 1991	American-led security alliance	Combining collective defense with enlargement, crisis management, counter-terrorism and expeditionary operations in a post-Cold War world.
NATO 3.0 - 2026	Shared strategic responsibility	A stronger European pillar assuming greater conventional responsibility within an Alliance that remains strategically anchored by the United States.

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Part II — NATO 3.0: Understanding the Transition

The Ankara Summit did not formally announce the arrival of a NATO 3.0.
Nor did it fundamentally alter the Alliance’s mission. Instead, it acknowledged a strategic transition that has been unfolding for several years.

It is tempting to explain this transition primarily through Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The war has undoubtedly accelerated European rearmament and reinforced NATO’s focus on collective defense. Yet it is not the deeper structural driver.

The more fundamental change lies in the strategic evolution of the United States itself.

For most of NATO’s history, Europe represented Washington’s principal security priority. Today, the United States continues to regard NATO as indispensable, but increasingly balances European commitments against wider global responsibilities. Strategic competition with China, the growing importance of the Indo-Pacific, domestic debates over defense priorities and increasing pressure for greater burden-sharing all point in the same direction.

The issue is therefore not whether America remains committed to NATO. It does.

The issue is that America increasingly expects Europe to become a stronger strategic partner rather than primarily a security beneficiary.

This subtle but important shift changes the nature of the Alliance.

For decades, NATO’s internal debates largely revolved around burden-sharing.
Who spends enough? Who contributes enough troops? Who reaches agreed capability targets?

Those questions remain important. But Ankara suggests that a different question is now emerging. The central issue is no longer simply how Europe contributes more. It is how Europe exercises greater strategic responsibility within the Alliance.

That transition can best be understood as the movement from NATO 2.0 to NATO 3.0.

NATO 2.0	NATO 3.0
American-led Alliance	Shared strategic responsibility
Europe primarily protected	Europe increasingly co-protects
Burden sharing	Capability sharing
American conventional predominance	European conventional pillar
Strategic dependence	Strategic partnership

NATO 3.0 therefore represents far more than higher defense spending. It represents a gradual redistribution of strategic responsibility across the Atlantic.

That redistribution raises an equally important question. If Europe is expected to assume greater responsibility within NATO, what must Europe itself become?

NATO 3.0 Requires Europe 2.0

The Ankara Summit largely answered the question of resources.
It left largely unanswered the question of leadership.

If Europe is expected to assume greater responsibility within NATO, how should it organize itself to exercise that responsibility? How should political leadership be coordinated? Which command structures should evolve? How should Europe prepare for situations in which the United States is temporarily unwilling—or simply unable—to lead a particular crisis?

These questions received relatively little attention in Ankara, yet they may ultimately determine whether NATO 3.0 succeeds.

Political commentator Gesine Weber has argued that Europe now requires more than increased defense spending [3]. It needs a practical roadmap for the Alliance’s next phase: a political vision for a stronger European pillar, better coordination among European governments, and dual-track planning. In her view, Europe should continue to plan and operate fully within NATO while simultaneously developing European contingency planning for situations in which Europeans may temporarily need to assume operational leadership themselves. Such preparations are not an alternative to NATO. They are a way of making a stronger NATO possible.

This insight points towards what may be called Europe 2.0.

Europe 2.0 does not describe a different European Union, nor does it imply strategic separation from the United States.

It describes the next stage in Europe’s strategic maturity: a Europe capable not only of financing its defense, but also of planning it, organizing it and, when necessary, leading it.

That transition rests on three mutually reinforcing foundations.

Capabilities — Building the Forces

The first requirement is the one already receiving the greatest political attention.

Europe must continue strengthening its armed forces, expanding defense-industrial production, improving military mobility, increasing readiness and closing critical capability gaps. Without credible military capabilities, no strategic ambition can be sustained.

Ankara demonstrated that this transition is already underway.

Organization — Building the Institutions

Capabilities alone, however, do not create effective defense.

Europe also requires institutions capable of translating military resources into operational action.

This means stronger political coordination, integrated planning, evolving command arrangements and the dual-track planning proposed by Weber. NATO should remain the primary framework for collective defense, but Europe also needs contingency arrangements that enable Europeans to act coherently whenever circumstances temporarily require greater European leadership.

Strategic responsibility demands organizational readiness.

Doctrine — Building the Strategy

The third transition may prove to be the most important because it receives the least attention.

If Europe is to become NATO’s principal conventional pillar, it must do more than build forces and institutions.

It must also develop a shared strategic doctrine.

Such a doctrine would connect political objectives with military means. It would establish common principles for deterrence, resilience, military preparedness, force generation, civil preparedness and the circumstances under which Europe is prepared to assume greater strategic leadership within the Alliance.

Without that shared framework, stronger capabilities could still produce fragmented policies.

Capabilities create military power.
Organization creates operational effectiveness.
Doctrine creates strategic coherence.

Europe 2.0 requires all three.

Summary:
Europe 2.0 - Growing to Strategic Maturity

The Ankara Summit answered many important questions about defense spending, military capabilities and the future direction of the Alliance.

It also revealed a larger challenge.
If NATO 3.0 is to succeed, Europe must complete a transition of its own.
Europe 2.0 is not a new European Union.

It is the next stage in Europe’s strategic maturity.
A Europe capable not only of financing its defense, but also of planning it, organizing it and, when necessary, leading it.

That maturity will not be measured by defense budgets alone.
It will be measured by Europe’s ability to transform capabilities into power, institutions into leadership, and strategy into coherent action.

The Ankara Summit did not complete that transition. It simply made clear that the transition has begun.

Whether Europe succeeds in completing it may ultimately become Ankara’s most enduring legacy.

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References

[1] NATO, 2026 Ankara Summit Declaration, North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

[2] NATO, 2026 Ankara Summit – Official Overview and Supporting Documents, North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

[3] Gesine Weber, A European Post-Ankara Roadmap, Geopolitical Europe, 10 July 2026.
https://geopoliticaleurope.substack.com/p/a-european-post-ankara-roadmap