Why Europe Cannot Yet Develop
the Leadership It Needs

The missing Democratic Capacity behind Europe’s Credibility Gap

R.M. Westerink; September 2026 

 

Europe’s problem is no longer a lack of ambition. Across security, defense, economic resilience, energy, technology, migration, and geopolitical autonomy, the direction of travel is becoming clearer. Citizens can want a Europe that protects them and acts with greater unity. Yet they still struggle to see how that Europe will come into being, who can credibly lead it, and how they themselves participate in authorizing its direction.

This is more than a delivery problem. It is also a democratic Leadership problem. The European Union has institutions for negotiation, legislation, administration, and restraint, but only weakly developed processes for sensing Europeans as a political community, imagining a shared future, allowing European Leaders to emerge, and testing their Leadership publicly. Europe’s Credibility Gap is therefore partly, but importantly, a Leadership-development gap.

From Credibility Gap to Leadership gap

The Europe Citizens Want—But Cannot Yet See Coming [2] described a widening distance between European aspirations and visible political movement. Citizens may broadly support a stronger and more independent Europe while doubting that National Governments and EU Institutions can create it. Strategies, summit conclusions, spending commitments, and legislative programs accumulate, but responsibility remains divided and the common undertaking remains difficult to recognize.

Why Democratic Parties Struggle to Develop Strong Leaders [3] identified a related weakness at national level. Democratic Systems select officeholders and limit their power, but they do not reliably develop Leaders who combine social recognition, political imagination, direction, delivery, and self-restraint. Those qualities are often left to emerge from an uncertain combination of personality, circumstances, public demand, and communication.

The problem is magnified in the European Union. Political authority is distributed among National Governments, the European Council, the Commission, the European Parliament, political parties, and administrations at several levels. That distribution protects pluralism and prevents easy concentration of power. It also makes it difficult for citizens to identify who represents a European direction, who carries responsibility for achieving it, and how a different direction could be democratically chosen.

Europe consequently has many Leaders, but no complete and continuously visible Leadership relationship with its citizens. National Leaders speak from national mandates. The Commission proposes and administers in the Union’s general interest. Parliament is directly elected but does not alone form a European Government. European political families appear most visibly during election campaigns and remain weakly rooted in everyday public life. Each carries part of European Leadership; none carries the whole.

The Threat from Within

This weakness matters because the human needs involved do not disappear. Under conditions of uncertainty, citizens continue to seek recognition, protection, belonging, and direction. Authoritarian and radical-right movements offer forceful interpretations of those needs. They identify a neglected people, define who belongs, describe internal and external threats, and present visible Leaders who promise to restore control.

Europe often answers with the benefits of integration, the requirements of law, policy programs, or warnings about nationalism. These answers may be justified, but they do not necessarily create an equally tangible political relationship. Citizens can be told why Europe is necessary without being enabled to imagine themselves as participants in a common European undertaking.

When Europe’s democratic political system fails to develop Resonant Leadership
and a compelling, inclusive image of Europe as a shared Political Community,
it leaves more room for authoritarian movements to interpret citizens’ desire for recognition, protection, belonging, and direction.

This does not mean that European Leadership failure causes the Far Right. Economic disruption, migration pressures, unequal regional development, cultural conflict, distrust, and organized political radicalization have their own importance. The narrower claim is that Democratic Europe leaves political space available when it performs essential Leadership functions only weakly. The Threat from Within grows not only from what authoritarian movements do, but also from functions Democratic Europe leaves insufficiently fulfilled.

Four Democratic Leadership Functions

Europe does not need to settle its final constitutional form before addressing this weakness. Nor must it immediately create a directly elected European President or transfer National Leadership to Brussels. It can begin by recognizing four functions as necessary democratic capacities and strengthening them through existing institutions and political organizations.

1  European Community Sensing

The EU already conducts opinion research, consultations, citizen dialogues, and deliberative exercises. What remains underdeveloped is a continuous political interpretation of how Europeans experience their communities and when they expect Europe to act. Aggregate approval ratings cannot reveal the relationships among insecurity, identity, institutional trust, regional difference, and demands for common protection.

A modest institutional direction would be to connect existing citizen panels, regional networks, public-opinion research, and frontline institutions in a recurring European assessment of lived problems and underlying needs. Such work should distinguish what citizens experience from the explanations political actors attach to those experiences. It should also show where national situations differ, where they converge, and where a European answer could become politically meaningful. The aim is not to replace electoral judgment with consultation. It is to give European Political Leadership a richer social starting point.

2  European Democratic Imagination

National Politics can draw upon countries that citizens already imagine as historical and political communities. Europe cannot assume the same depth of common identification. Its task is not to erase national belonging or manufacture a uniform European identity. It is to make Europe recognizable as an additional Political Community in which different Nations and citizens can pursue purposes they cannot secure alone.

Recurring European Democratic Imagination forums could bring citizens together with political leaders, historians, writers, artists, scientists, local representatives, and practitioners. Their task would not be to produce an official Brussels narrative. They would develop and test different accounts of what Europeans share, what Europe exists to protect, what future requires joint action, and what obligations accompany European solidarity. Their work should inform political programs and major public choices before communications specialists turn those choices into messages.

This is the critical function because it creates both vision and internal legitimacy. Vision identifies a destination. Internal legitimacy arises when citizens can recognize their countries, experiences, and agency within the undertaking. Communication explains what institutions intend to do; Democratic Imagination helps establish whose undertaking it is and why Europeans might authorize it.

3  European Leadership Emergence

Europe also needs more visible routes through which potential Leaders can acquire a genuinely European Political Identity. This is sensitive because Leadership Emergence eventually touches the selection of the Commission and other senior offices. Under the Treaties, the European Council proposes a candidate for Commission president after taking the European elections into account, and the European Parliament elects that candidate.[1] The resulting balance among elections, governments, Parliament, party families, and member states should not be casually displaced.

The immediate question, however, is less constitutional: can potential European Leaders become visible before formal negotiations distribute offices? European Political Families could identify candidates earlier, give them cross-national political assignments, require sustained engagement in several member states, and expose their judgment and record to public scrutiny. This would create a developmental layer before nomination without predetermining who must receive office.

Europe does not initially need a new procedure for electing one Leader. It needs a stronger process through which potential Leaders can demonstrate European experience, build relationships beyond their country and party base, and become recognizable to citizens before appointment decisions are made. Over time, such a process might make European elections and Commission selection more politically consequential. The present argument does not depend on agreeing to that further step.

4  European Public Testing

Leadership and political direction acquire legitimacy only when they face citizens under demanding conditions. European debate remains heavily mediated through national political arenas, while formal hearings often emphasize competence, portfolios, and institutional positioning. These are necessary tests, but they do not show whether a prospective Leader can connect different national experiences to a common direction.

European Political Families, Parliament, National Parliaments, Regions, and independent civic organizations could organize recurring multilingual public debates and citizen questioning across Member States. Prospective Leaders would have to explain tradeoffs, respond to conflicting regional experiences, defend democratic boundaries, and show how public criticism changed—or did not change—their position. Public testing would not replace elections or parliamentary responsibility. It would make the relationship preceding formal selection more European, visible, and demanding.

An agenda rather than a blueprint

The Four Functions reinforce one another.
Community Sensing discovers how Europeans experience change and protection.
Democratic Imagination translates those experiences into possible shared futures.
Leadership Emergence allows people capable of representing those futures to become visible.
Public Testing determines whether their claims deserve confidence beyond their original national and political constituencies.

None of these directions requires Europe first to resolve the argument between federation and confederation, rewrite the treaties, or construct a presidential system. They can begin as stronger connections among activities that already exist. The important change is conceptual and organizational: sensing, imagination, emergence, and testing should be treated as parts of democratic Leadership development, not as separate exercises in consultation, culture, personnel selection, and communication.

Nor can these capacities substitute for delivery. A European story contradicted by governmental failure will deepen distrust. Leadership must connect shared direction to choices, responsibility, implementation, and visible results. But delivery alone cannot tell citizens who “we” are, why common action belongs to them, or how they can authorize its direction.

Europe’s Credibility Gap will not be closed by better messaging.
Europe must develop the Democratic Conditions under which Leadership can become visible, resonant, effective, and legitimate.
The objective is not to manufacture a European leader or impose a European Identity.
It is to ensure that when Europeans need recognition, protection, belonging, and direction, Democratic Europe is capable of answering in its own voice.

 

References

[1] Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, Article 17(7). EUR-Lex.
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12016M017

[2] Europe Is Us. “The Europe Citizens Want—But Cannot Yet See Coming.” September 2026.
https://europe-is-us.blogspot.com/2026/09/the-europe-citizens-want-but-cannot-yet.html

[3] Europe Is Us. “Why Democratic Parties Struggle to Develop Strong Leaders.” September 2026.
https://europe-is-us.blogspot.com/2026/09/why-democratic-parties-struggle-to.html

 

Why Democratic Parties Struggle to Develop Strong Leaders - What Germany’s struggle with the AfD reveals about a neglected democratic capacity

 

Why Democratic Parties Struggle to Develop Strong Leaders

What Germany’s struggle with the AfD reveals about a neglected democratic capacity

R.M. Westerink; September 2026 

The rise of the authoritarian right exposes more than public anger or policy failure. It reveals a weakness in how democratic parties develop Leadership. People continue to look for recognition, protection, belonging, and direction, especially when social change feels threatening or government appears unable to act. Authoritarian movements offer direct answers to those needs. They define a threatened community, identify who supposedly endangers it, and present a leader who promises to restore control.

Democratic Parties usually respond with policy proposals, warnings about extremism, or promises of better administration. All three may be necessary. Together, however, they still leave a gap. They do not necessarily give citizens a convincing sense of who “we” are, what binds us together, what future we are trying to build, and who will take responsibility for getting us there.

Germany’s confrontation with the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) provides an urgent test. The question is not simply whether the Christian Democratic Union should maintain its firewall against cooperation with the AfD. The deeper question is whether the CDU and other democratic parties can offer a more credible form of Leadership than the AfD: strong without becoming authoritarian, protective without becoming exclusionary, and imaginative without abandoning facts or constitutional restraint.

The desire for Leadership is not Authoritarian

Citizens do not make political choices by comparing complete policy programs as if they were technical specifications. They also rely on political identity, prior experience, trusted people, perceived competence, and judgments about whether a party understands people like them. Political heuristics are not simply evidence of irrationality. They are practical ways of making decisions under limited time, knowledge, and attention.[1]

Under conditions of uncertainty or perceived threat, the need for orientation can become more important. People may look more strongly for protection, social order, group cohesion, and Leaders who appear able to act. Research on authoritarian attitudes supports a relationship between threat, uncertainty, and receptiveness to authoritarian responses, but the outcome is not automatic.[2] Stress can also produce solidarity, civic participation, or renewed support for democratic institutions. Much depends on how events are interpreted and what kind of Leadership is available.

This distinction matters. The desire to be seen, protected, and guided toward a recognizable future is not inherently antidemocratic. It becomes dangerous when political Leaders translate it into obedience, unequal citizenship, permanent enemies, or personal control over institutions. If Democratic Parties treat the need itself as suspect, they leave authoritarian Leaders in possession of the language of strength.

What Authoritarian Leadership supplies

Authoritarian movements rarely present themselves as constitutional theories. They tell a story about a community. The people have been neglected. The country has lost control. Established elites refuse to see what ordinary citizens experience. Outsiders or internal enemies receive protection while the authentic community is abandoned. Renewal therefore requires a decisive break and a Leader willing to act.

This political offer joins several functions that democratic politics often separates. It recognizes emotion, supplies an explanation, defines a collective identity, identifies danger, promises protection, and concentrates responsibility in a visible person or movement. Its power lies not only in the individual claims, but in the relationship it creates between Leader, Followers, and Community.

Germany’s AfD has built such an offer around immigration, national identity, distrust of governing institutions, resentment toward established elites, and a particularly strong sense of neglect in the eastern states. In the September 2026 state election in Saxony-Anhalt, the party won about 44 percent of the vote. Reported exit polling also found exceptionally high dissatisfaction with the national government.[3] A result of that scale cannot be explained by one issue or dismissed as a temporary protest. The AfD has become, for many voters, an organized political identity.

The Democratic Leadership Weakness

Democratic systems do produce officeholders. Elections select representatives; parties develop programs; parliaments authorize governments; courts and constitutions limit their power. These are major democratic achievements. Yet the same system does not reliably produce Leaders who can recognize social experience, create a shared interpretation, express a common direction, organize delivery, and remain visibly self-limiting.

Democratic Parties often select for other valuable abilities: policy knowledge, internal reliability, negotiating skill, coalition management, media discipline, and administrative experience. A politician can possess all of them and still fail to establish a meaningful Leadership relationship with citizens. Government is organized; Resonant Leadership is left largely to emerge from an uncertain combination of personality, circumstance, public need, and communication.

This helps explain why Democratic Parties can be institutionally competent yet politically unconvincing. Their Leaders explain separate measures while authoritarian challengers describe a common predicament. They defend procedures while their opponents embody purpose. They distribute responsibility while their opponents claim it. The democratic caution is often justified, but citizens may experience the result as absence.

The problem is therefore not that Democracy lacks Leaders altogether. It is that Democracy is better at constraining Leadership than at intentionally cultivating Leaders who combine resonance, direction, action, and restraint.
The United States gives individuals more room to build personal electoral movements, but also creates greater risks of personalization and Leader worship.
European Parliamentary Systems contain those risks more effectively, yet often fragment Leadership across parties, coalitions, and institutions.

Democracy must Sense its Community and Imagine its Future

Political imagination must begin with sensitivity to how citizens experience their community. A large political community cannot depend on personal acquaintance among its members. Citizens must be able to imagine themselves as participants in a shared society with a history, a character, mutual obligations, and a possible future. Leaders, institutions, public language, and political symbols help make that imagined community recognizable.

National Socialism demonstrated the destructive power of political imagination. It offered an organic and racial people, a mythologized past, national humiliation, internal enemies, rebirth, sacrifice, and a leader who claimed to embody the nation. The lesson should not be that democratic politics must avoid imagination. It should be that democracy needs a fundamentally different kind of imagination: civic rather than ethnic, plural rather than homogeneous, historically responsible rather than mythically pure, and centered on equal citizenship rather than obedience.

The democratic answer to authoritarian imagination is not the absence of imagination.
It is a stronger and more inclusive account of the community.

Such an account must answer basic questions. Who are we? Who belongs? What have we learned from our history? What do we want to protect? What changes must we manage? What future can we build together? Democratic leaders cannot answer these questions once and impose the result. They must articulate answers that grow from public experience, survive disagreement, and remain open to correction.

Social identity research helps explain why this matters. Leaders gain influence when they are seen as representing, advancing, and shaping a shared “we.” Effective identity Leadership is not merely a personal attribute; it is a relationship in which Leaders and Followers construct a sense of common membership and collective capacity.[4] The democratic test concerns the boundaries of that “we.” Does it enable different citizens to belong, or does it require some of them to disappear?

Keeping Citizens In while keeping Authoritarian Power Out

The distinction between membership, needs, behavior, and power can seem abstract. A brief comparison with smaller groups helps. A parent can make clear that a child belongs to the family without permitting that child to dominate or harm others. A coach can take dissatisfied players seriously, adjust roles or methods, and still enforce rules that apply to the whole team. A Democracy is neither a family nor a sports team, and citizens are not children. The relevant parallel is the ability to preserve membership while setting behavioral and institutional boundaries.

Applied to Germany, this means that AfD voters remain full members and co-owners of the democratic community. Their experiences must be investigated and their legitimate needs addressed. But their membership does not make every interpretation correct, every proposal acceptable, or every party automatically entitled to government power. Equal citizenship is unconditional; access to power is subject to constitutional conduct.

This distinction corrects two inadequate strategies. Moral exclusion can allow the AfD to claim that the democratic establishment despises its voters. Programmatic imitation can confirm that the AfD defined the problem correctly and was needed to force action. Comparative research finds little support for the expectation that mainstream parties generally weaken the radical right by adopting its positions. Accommodation can instead increase the salience and legitimacy of the radical right’s agenda.[5]

What a Resonant CDU could do differently

A CDU with imaginative and resonant Leadership would not promise to make the AfD disappear. Economic stagnation, regional inequality, immigration pressures, demographic change, distrust of institutions, and separate media environments cannot be solved through Leadership alone. Nor should resonance mean repeating what AfD voters already believe. It means understanding what citizens experience and giving those experiences an independent democratic interpretation.

On immigration, for example, the CDU could recognize that citizens expect the state to control entry, make asylum decisions promptly, distribute local burdens fairly, and enforce decisions. It need not accept the claim that equal citizenship or German continuity requires ethnic homogeneity. Its answer could join control with constitutional confidence: a Democratic State decides who may enter, expects integration, protects social cohesion, and treats lawful citizens as equal Germans.

In eastern Germany, recognition would have to go beyond campaign visits. A resonant CDU would make eastern German experiences part of the national account of reunification, leadership, investment, and institutional representation. It would acknowledge loss, outmigration, unequal influence, and repeated disappointment without telling citizens that resentment excuses authoritarian politics. Local and regional Leaders would be essential because national imagination cannot be credible if it is experienced as another message from outside.

The CDU would also need a democratic-conservative image of Germany strong enough to compete with the AfD’s closed nationalism. It might describe Germany as a historic, cultural, and constitutional community that has the right and capacity to protect its security, continuity, prosperity, and social order. All citizens who share its laws and responsibilities belong within that community. Germany regains control through competent government, managed change, civic cohesion, and European capacity, not by ranking citizens according to ancestry.

This approach would also make the firewall more intelligible. Noncooperation with the AfD would no longer stand as the CDU’s main answer. It would become one boundary within a larger democratic strategy. Voters are included. Problems are addressed. Proposals are judged on their merits and constitutional effects. Government cooperation remains conditional on respect for equal citizenship, independent courts, free media, political opposition, and peaceful transfers of power.

A democratic boundary becomes more credible when citizens can see what stands behind it: recognition, an alternative direction, and the capacity to deliver.

Leadership: From Accidental Emergence to Democratic Leadership Development

The practical implication reaches beyond Germany. Democratic parties should stop treating resonant Leadership as charisma that appears by chance. They cannot manufacture a Churchill, Mandela, or Obama, and attempts to do so would probably produce artificial candidates. They can, however, create conditions in which potential Leaders are more likely to emerge, be recognized, tested, and developed while remaining democratically constrained.

This requires an additional institutional capacity alongside policy development and preparation for government.

Capacity	Purpose	Practical methods
Leadership emergence	Find people who can connect social experience, common purpose, decision, and responsibility	Open recruitment, local assignments, crisis simulations, public problem solving, work across social groups
Democratic imagination	Develop an inclusive account of who belongs, what is protected, and what future is possible	Listening processes, historical and cultural work, narrative development, testing across regions and constituencies
Public testing	Determine whether leadership resonates beyond the party and remains democratic under pressure	Citizen dialogue, hostile questions, diverse evaluators, real responsibility, assessment of correction and recovery
Communication and enactment	Make the shared direction understandable and credible	Major speeches, repeatable public language, symbolic moments, milestones, transparent reporting on delivery
Democratic safeguards	Prevent resonance from becoming a personality cult or exclusionary movement	Shared leadership, internal dissent, term limits, independent facts, succession, constitutional review

The relationship among these capacities matters. Democratic imagination cannot be delegated to a communications agency after the program has been written. It should begin with social experience and help determine political direction. Communication then makes that direction intelligible, while government makes it credible. A compelling story repeatedly contradicted by policy failure will eventually deepen distrust.

Leadership candidates should therefore be tested on more than speeches or internal party advancement. Can they listen without merely affirming? Can they explain fear without exploiting it? Can they create a “we” that reaches beyond the existing base? Can they choose under uncertainty, organize implementation, accept correction, and defend democratic rules against their own supporters? Resonance without these tests can select the most effective demagogue rather than the strongest democratic leader.

Well-designed citizen participation can contribute to this development by exposing parties and leaders to considered public judgment rather than only polls, social media pressure, or activist intensity. OECD research on deliberative processes finds that representative public deliberation can improve the handling of complex tradeoffs and support public trust when it is tied to real decisions.[6] It should inform Leadership, not replace elected responsibility.

A stronger Democratic idea of Strength

Germany’s problem is not simply that the AfD is strong or that the CDU has communicated poorly.
The deeper weakness is that democratic politics has allowed the authoritarian right to claim ownership of recognition, protection, belonging, direction, and decisive Leadership. Policy improvement and administrative competence remain indispensable, but they will not close this gap by themselves.

Democratic Parties need Leaders who can imagine the community and allow citizens to recognize themselves within it. Those Leaders must connect public experience to a shared account of the country, translate that account into choices, and prove it through visible government. They must also remain accountable, correctable, replaceable, and unable to define inconvenient citizens out of the nation.

A resonant CDU would therefore be better equipped to respond to the AfD. It could separate voters from the party’s authoritarian interpretations, compete over the meaning of Germany rather than imitate AfD positions, and place the firewall within a positive democratic project. It would not eliminate the structural sources of radical-right support, but it would stop leaving their political interpretation largely to the radical right.

The broader lesson is that democratic Leadership should no longer be left entirely to accidental emergence. Parties can institutionalize the search for people who combine imagination, resonance, political judgment, delivery, and self-restraint. A stronger system for developing Leaders who can embody a shared future without claiming ownership of the people who must create it.

When democratic parties fail to develop resonant leadership and a compelling, inclusive image of the community, they leave the desire for recognition, protection, belonging, and direction open to authoritarian interpretation.

Appendix - CDU

What Democratic Leadership Development Could Look Like in the CDU

The argument of this article becomes meaningful only if leadership development can be translated into institutions. The following proposal is therefore not a blueprint for reorganizing the CDU, but a practical pilot that CDU politicians could adopt, test, and revise. It is designed to supplement policy development, candidate training, and preparation for government—not to replace them.

The suggested pilot proposition is deliberately limited: one year, three contrasting regions, twenty potential leaders, and three real public problems. A national mandate and common evaluation framework would give the experiment weight, while selected state and local associations would keep it connected to actual communities. The aim would not be to manufacture one charismatic figure. It would be to create an environment in which several potential leaders can emerge, assume responsibility, and demonstrate whether they can combine resonance, imagination, delivery, and democratic self-restraint.

1  Community Sensing Unit

A small interdisciplinary team would connect local party branches with mayors, schools, employers, trade unions, social services, churches, associations, police, and citizens who no longer feel represented by established parties. Its task would be qualitative political diagnosis rather than another stream of opinion polling. Monthly briefs would distinguish among the lived problem, the human need expressed through it, the explanation citizens attach to it, the exclusionary interpretation offered by the AfD, and a possible democratic interpretation and response.

This distinction is crucial. It would allow the CDU to recognize experiences of insecurity, loss, cultural change, weak public services, or governmental disorder without automatically accepting the AfD's definition of their causes or solutions. The unit should report to the Leadership-development pilot rather than to the campaign or communications apparatus. Its findings should shape political judgment before messages are written.

2  Leadership Field Program

State and local associations would nominate participants, while an open route would allow mayors, civic leaders, professionals, and younger members outside the usual party ladder to apply. Selection would look beyond rhetorical performance and internal visibility. Candidates would need to show that they can listen across social divisions, formulate a direction, make decisions under uncertainty, organize implementation, explain constraints honestly, and accept correction.

Each participant would receive responsibility for a real regional assignment—for example asylum administration, housing, local transport, school capacity, economic renewal, or access to public services. The work would be conducted with the institutions and communities involved, not as a classroom exercise. Participants would have to define the problem, build a working coalition, establish measurable milestones, communicate progress, and account publicly for failure or delay. Political imagination would thus remain connected to governing capacity.

3  Democratic Imagination Studio

This would be the most distinctive component. Citizens, local leaders, historians, writers, cultural figures, policy specialists, and participating politicians would work on competing accounts of Germany's common future. The studio would not be a slogan workshop. It would examine who belongs, what Germans may legitimately wish to preserve, what obligations accompany membership, what the country has learned from its history, and how continuity and change can be joined within equal citizenship.

The output should not be one centrally imposed narrative. The studio could develop two or three formulations and test them across eastern and western Germany, cities and rural areas, generations, religious and secular communities, and citizens with and without migration backgrounds. A democratic-conservative account of Germany would succeed only if it were historically recognizable, emotionally meaningful, constitutionally inclusive, and capable of guiding actual choices. Communication specialists could later help express it, but they should not create it in isolation.

4  Public Leadership Tests

Potential Leaders would face mixed citizen assemblies, difficult town halls, hostile questioning, crisis simulations, and public reviews of their field assignments. Evaluation would include citizens, peers, implementation partners, and independent observers. The purpose would be to test whether a participant can recognize anger without flattering it, defend boundaries without excluding citizens, revise a position without appearing directionless, and retain authority when facts or implementation require an unwelcome answer.

These tests would also expose the principal danger in institutionalizing resonance: selecting the most effective performer or demagogue. Strong democratic Leadership must remain accountable and replaceable. The pilot should therefore develop several Leaders simultaneously, use transparent criteria, rotate assessors, protect internal dissent, and separate final evaluation from any single party sponsor or communications team.

From Pilot to Party Capacity

After twelve months, the CDU should be able to assess tangible outputs: a map of social stresses and underlying needs in three regions; two or three tested accounts of democratic belonging and direction; a pool of potential Leaders who have performed under public responsibility; three documented delivery cases; and evidence about which forms of leadership can reach citizens attracted to the AfD without imitating its authoritarian interpretation.

If the pilot works, the four functions could become a recurring party capacity rather than a temporary project. Community Sensing would inform program development. Field assignments would become part of Leadership selection. Democratic imagination would connect social experience to political direction. Public tests would make advancement depend partly on demonstrated democratic Leadership rather than only on internal career success. The result would not guarantee great leaders. It would make their emergence less accidental and give the party better evidence for recognizing them.

The institutional principle is simple:
Do not search only for a charismatic leader.
Build an organization in which multiple leaders can emerge, prove that they can represent a plural community, deliver under real conditions, and remain democratically constrained.

References

[1] Lau, R. R., and Redlawsk, D. P. “Advantages and Disadvantages of Cognitive Heuristics in Political Decision Making.” American Journal of Political Science, 2001. https://doi.org/10.2307/2669334

[2] Nilsson, A., and Jost, J. T. “The Psychological Causes and Societal Consequences of Authoritarianism.” Nature Reviews Psychology, 2023. https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC10281241/

[3] Reuters. “Far-right AfD wins historic victory in German state election.” September 6, 2026. https://www.reuters.com/world/germanys-far-right-afd-seeks-landmark-state-victory-saxony-anhalt-votes-2026-09-06/

[4] Haslam, S. A., Reicher, S. D., and Platow, M. J. “Rethinking the Psychology of Leadership.” Daedalus, 2015. https://www.amacad.org/publication/daedalus/rethinking-psychology-leadership-personal-identity-social-identity

[5] Krause, W., Cohen, D., and Abou-Chadi, T. “Does Accommodation Work Mainstream Party Strategies and the Success of Radical Right Parties.” Political Science Research and Methods, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2020.26

[6] OECD. Innovative Citizen Participation and New Democratic Institutions. 2020. https://doi.org/10.1787/339306da-en

 

 

The Europe Citizens Want — But Cannot Yet See Coming

Europeans want a more united, secure and stronger Europe.

As the State of the Union approaches, can Europe’s leaders show them who is building it?

A new European study contains both encouraging and uncomfortable news for Europe's political leaders.

As reported by The Guardian, Europeans surveyed across six countries can describe a Europe they would like to see: stronger, more united, secure and capable of determining its own future. Yet many look at Europe today and see deterioration, slowness and uncertainty.[1][2]

That contradiction matters. Europe's problem may not simply be declining belief in the European project. Many Europeans still expect quite a lot from Europe. What they increasingly doubt is whether Europe's political system can produce it.

With the European Parliament preparing for the State of the Union, that raises a harder question:

Where is the European power capable of protecting the Europe citizens want?

Europeans Have Not Given Up on Europe

The European Sentiment Compass 2026, produced by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) and the European Cultural Foundation, draws on 5,834 interviews in France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland and the United Kingdom, complemented by analysis of political and media debate across 15 EU countries.[2]

Its findings initially seem contradictory. On average, 68% of respondents describe today's Europe through deterioration or a loss of normality. Only 12% primarily see awakening or renewal. Yet roughly three-quarters can describe a positive Europe they would like to inhabit twenty years from now, commonly involving greater unity, security and prosperity.[2]

This is not straightforward Euroscepticism. Dissatisfaction with Europe as it currently functions can coexist with considerable ambition for what Europe should become.

Earlier, the WE ARE EUROPE series on this blog approached the question through generally felt European values:
Personal freedom, democratic participation, equality before law, protection against arbitrary power, solidarity, tolerance of difference and peaceful resolution of disagreements.[3]

The new research raises the next question:

Do Europeans believe Political Europe can actually protect the conditions under which those values can survive?

Where Is the European Counterweight?

ECFR identifies recurring doubts about whether Europe can act, protect its citizens and live according to its own values. Respondents complain about slowness and fragmentation. The study also finds remarkably little recognition of political leadership beyond respondents' own countries.[2]

This study does not ask whether Europeans want a counterweight to Trump, Putin or Xi. That is an inference we make explicitly as our own.

But consider the environment in which these attitudes are developing.
Europeans see Donald Trump exercising American power, Vladimir Putin mobilizing Russian power and Xi Jinping pursuing Chinese economic, technological and geopolitical objectives.

What is much harder to see is the   E u r o p e a n  C o u n t e r w e i g h t

Europe possesses enormous economic resources, advanced societies, substantial military capabilities and nearly 450 million EU citizens. Yet these assets do not consistently translate into a political actor that Europeans—or others—recognize as capable of establishing objectives and mobilizing power behind them.

This does not mean Europe needs its own Trump, Putin or Xi. Its challenge is precisely the opposite:

To demonstrate that democratic, pluralistic government can generate strategic power without sacrificing democratic restraints.

From Aspiration to Capability

ECFR calls the problem an “imagination gap”.
People can imagine the Europe they want but struggle to see a credible route from today's Europe towards it.[2]

Europe has no shortage of ambitions. Its institutions announce strategies, targets and programmes. National leaders repeatedly call for a stronger, more sovereign or more competitive Europe.

But citizens need to recognize the connection between what Europe promises, what Europe decides, what Europe does and what they experience.

That requires more than better communication. Many doubts identified by ECFR concern things people believe they can observe themselves: slow decisions, inconsistently applied principles and uncertainty about Europe's capacity to guarantee security.[2]

Europe therefore needs recognizable Counterweight Leadership: political direction citizens can understand, sufficient capacity behind it to make that direction credible, and political representatives prepared to explain it and accept responsibility for delivering it.

Europe does not necessarily need one leader.
It needs European leadership that people can recognize.

When Europe Does Not Deliver

This connects with what this blog has previously called the Threat from Within.[4]

That threat is not ordinary political disagreement. Europeans are entitled to oppose EU policies, reject further integration or demand powers back from Brussels.

The danger arises when persistent dissatisfaction begins to undermine Europe's democratic capacity to disagree, decide and act together: when concentrated power becomes attractive because democratic government appears incapable of acting, when European cooperation becomes synonymous with weakness, or when external powers successfully exploit existing divisions.

Insufficient European action does not automatically produce populism, extremism or foreign influence. But institutional underperformance creates political space for those offering simpler answers.

European democracy cannot answer that challenge merely by explaining why authoritarian power is dangerous.

It has to demonstrate that democratic power works.

A Task for Europe's Political Representatives

This gives Members of the European Parliament a concrete challenge.

MEPs cannot themselves create a unified European executive or determine every national government's foreign policy. But they can force European politics to organize around recognizable strategic choices.

They can ask the Commission and Europe's political families:

What must Europe be capable of doing independently?
Where must it be able to act when Washington chooses differently?
How will it deter Moscow?
Where must it compete with Beijing?
Which dependencies are unacceptable?
What should Europe itself be capable of doing by 2030?

And most importantly:
Who represents Counterweight Europe?

And they can ask whether Europe's many individual policies actually add up to those objectives.
That would help turn European politics from an accumulation of policy files into something citizens can recognize as politics about Europe's future.

The State of the Union 2026 - Test

That makes the forthcoming State of the Union particularly relevant.

When Commission President Ursula von der Leyen addresses the European Parliament, she will inevitably present policies, programmes and priorities. But Europe's present circumstances require something above the program: Direction.

Can Europeans recognize in those policies the outline of the Europe they say they want? Can they see how today's decisions lead towards a Europe capable of protecting itself and defending its interests? And can they recognize who is taking responsibility for getting it there?

For MEPs responding to the speech, the test should therefore not merely be: What will the Commission do next?
It should also be:
Does this add up to the European counterweight citizens increasingly appear to be waiting for—and can Europe's leaders show them the route?

The encouraging finding in the ECFR research is that European aspiration has not disappeared. The warning is that too many Europeans cannot yet see it becoming reality.
Trump, Putin and Xi make power visible. Europe's challenge is not to imitate their political systems.

It is to make democratic European power equally recognizable.
The citizens in this study can already imagine the Europe they want.
What they cannot yet see clearly enough is who is organizing it.
The State of the Union would be a good place to start.

References

[1] Jon Henley, “Europeans want a united Europe but question whether it can get there, study finds,” The Guardian, 9 September 2026.

[2] Paweł Zerka, European Sentiment Compass 2026 — Future Nostalgia: Europe’s Unfinished Song, European Council on Foreign Relations / European Cultural Foundation, 9 September 2026.

[3] Europe Is Us, WE ARE EUROPE — Our European Values, August 2026.
https://europe-is-us.blogspot.com/2026/08/we-are-europe-our-european-values.html

[4] Europe Is Us, WE ARE EUROPE — Keeping Europe European — Internal Threats, August 2026.
https://europe-is-us.blogspot.com/2026/08/we-are-europe-keeping-europe-european_01764668262.html

 

 

Beyond Left and Right: Israel’s ‘Israel First’ Reality and Its Implications

How a Hardline Vision Reshapes Politics, Values, and the Future of the Conflict

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Introduction: The Collapse of the Left-Right Framework

For decades, Israel’s political landscape was understood through the prism of a left-right divide, with debates centered on economics, security, and ideology. Yet today, this framework no longer captures the reality of Israeli politics. The defining split is now between those who prioritize an "Israel First" agenda—rejecting Palestinian statehood, dismissing international criticism, and entrenching military control—and those who remain open to balanced, long-term solutions with Palestinians.

This shift reflects a fundamental transformation in Israeli society, where existential fear, Zionist idealism, and unbound state tactics have reshaped the political landscape.
The "Israel First" approach is not merely a political stance but a worldview that frames Israel’s survival as dependent on permanent control, defiance of international norms, and the suppression of Palestinian aspirations. For outsiders, understanding this distinction is key to grasping Israel’s current trajectory, its relationship with the world, and the stress points that define its future.

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The Rise of ‘Israel First’ to Political Dominance

The "Israel First" bloc now dominates Israeli politics. This coalition includes Likud, Religious Zionism, Otzma Yehudit, and Haredi parties, united by a shared commitment to rejecting Palestinian statehood, expanding settlements, and weakening judicial oversight. These positions, once considered far-right, have become mainstream among Jewish voters. The "Israel First" camp is electorally dominant, while the "Open to Balanced Solutions" camp—comprising the Zionist left, center, and Palestinian citizen parties—remains fragmented and weak.

The 2026 election will likely reinforce this trend. While it may be framed as a contest between right and left, the real debate is how far right Israel will go. The election’s outcome will not hinge on whether to adopt hardline policies but on how to implement them.

This political reality reflects a broader societal shift. The far right "Israel First" agenda is no longer a fringe ideology but the default position for a majority of Jewish Israelis. This dominance is rooted in historical trauma, security concerns, and a deep-seated belief that compromise with Palestinians is not only unnecessary but dangerous.

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‘Israel First’ as Zionist Dream and Existential Fear

The Zionist Dream: Sovereignty and Sacred Land

At its core, the "Israel First" agenda is the fulfillment of historical Zionism. For many Israelis, sovereignty over Eretz Israel (the Land of Israel) is a non-negotiable religious and national right. Settlements in the West Bank are not merely strategic outposts but sacred landmarks, tied to a messianic vision of Jewish return to biblical lands like Judea and Samaria. This perspective frames military control over Palestinians as a permanent necessity, ensuring Jewish demographic and security dominance.

This messianic vision is not unique to Israel. History offers numerous examples of movements driven by a belief in a divine or destiny-driven mission, often at a high cost in human lives. The Crusades, for instance, were fueled by a Christian messianic vision to reclaim the Holy Land, resulting in centuries of bloodshed. Similarly, ISIS’s caliphate was an attempt to establish a purist Islamic state, leading to widespread destruction and loss of life. In the 20th century, Nazi Germany’s vision of a racial utopia led to the Holocaust, while Soviet communism’s messianic belief in a classless society resulted in the deaths of millions. These examples illustrate how messianic visions, when pursued with absolute conviction, can lead to catastrophic human consequences.

The "Israel First" worldview is also deeply tied to the trauma of the Holocaust. For many Israelis, the lesson of the Holocaust is that Jewish survival depends on absolute control—never again can Israel rely on the goodwill of others or the international community. This mindset is reinforced by the 1948 and 1967 wars, which are remembered as existential struggles where Israel’s survival hung in the balance. The October 7, 2023, attacks further cemented this narrative, reinforcing the belief that concessions lead to vulnerability.

The Road Not Taken: Missed Opportunities for Compromise

The "Israel First" approach is not just a strategic choice but a psychological and historical inevitability for many Israelis. The rejection of early compromise opportunities—such as those explored in 1948—has left a legacy of unresolved conflict. In 1948, Israel faced a crossroads: it could have pursued a binational state or a partition plan that might have offered a different path. Instead, the creation of Israel as a Jewish state came at the expense of Palestinian displacement, an event known to Palestinians as the Nakba (catastrophe).

This dual narrative—Israeli independence vs. Palestinian dispossession—lies at the heart of the conflict. The "Israel First" agenda perpetuates this unresolved trauma, making reconciliation ever more distant. For Israelis, the fear of repeating the mistakes of the past (e.g., the Holocaust, the 1948 war) justifies a hardline stance. For Palestinians, the Nakba is a living memory, reinforcing their demand for justice and self-determination.

Unbound State Strategy: Security Over Diplomacy

The "Israel First" approach prioritizes security over diplomacy. Military solutions—such as strikes, blockades, and settlement expansion—are seen as the only reliable means of ensuring Israel’s survival. Preemptive force is justified as deterrence, even if it escalates cycles of violence. This mindset is reflected in policies such as:

·        Judicial reforms that weaken checks on executive power, allowing for the unfettered pursuit of nationalist goals (e.g., annexation, settlement expansion).

·        Media and NGO crackdowns, where critics (e.g., human rights groups, left-wing media) are labeled as traitors or foreign agents.

·        International defiance, including the rejection of UN/EU resolutions (e.g., settlements as illegal, occupation as unlawful) and alignment with like-minded states (e.g., the U.S. under Trump-like leadership, authoritarian regimes).

The Paradox of ‘Israel First’

The "Israel First" approach—meant to secure Israel’s future—risks undermining its long-term stability. By alienating allies (e.g., the EU, progressive U.S. factions), radicalizing Palestinian resistance (e.g., Hamas, Islamic Jihad), and eroding democratic norms (e.g., judicial independence, minority rights), this agenda ultimately weakens the state it seeks to protect.

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Jewishness vs. Zionism: The Moral and Democratic Dilemma

At its core, the "Israel First" agenda forces a reckoning with the tension between Jewishness and Zionism. While Jewishness is a cultural and religious identity, Zionism was originally a political movement aimed at securing a Jewish homeland. Today, "Israel First" often conflates the two, framing Jewish survival as dependent on perpetual control over Palestinians.

This conflation has profound implications for Israel’s democratic and moral foundations. A state that prioritizes Jewish sovereignty above all else risks marginalizing its non-Jewish citizens (e.g., Palestinian citizens of Israel, who make up 20% of the population) and undermining the principles of equality and democracy. The "Israel First" approach also erodes the distinction between Zionism as a liberatory movement and Zionism as a tool of oppression—a distinction that was once central to the Israeli left’s vision.

For many Israelis, Jewishness and Zionism are inseparable. The Law of Return, which grants automatic citizenship to Jews, and the Nation-State Law, which declares that only Jews have the right to self-determination in Israel, are examples of policies that prioritize Jewish identity over democratic pluralism. This tension is not just theoretical but practical, shaping everything from immigration policies to military strategies.

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The Palestinian State: The Marginalization of a Two-State Solution

The marginalization of the two-state solution is one of the most consequential outcomes of the "Israel First" agenda. For decades, the two-state solution—a Palestinian state alongside Israel—was the international consensus for resolving the conflict. Today, this vision is increasingly seen as unrealistic by both Israelis and Palestinians.

For "Israel First" advocates, the two-state solution is a non-starter. They argue that Palestinian statehood would pose an existential threat to Israel, citing the failure of past withdrawals (e.g., Gaza in 2005, which led to Hamas control) and the ongoing violence from groups like Hamas and Hezbollah. Instead, they advocate for permanent military control over the West Bank and Gaza, framing it as a necessary security measure.

For Palestinians, the two-state solution is also losing credibility. Many see it as a fantasy given Israel’s expanding settlements, military occupation, and refusal to negotiate in good faith. The Oslo Accords, once hailed as a breakthrough, are now widely viewed as a failure that entrenched Israeli control without delivering Palestinian statehood. The October 7 attacks and Israel’s subsequent military response have further diminished hopes for a negotiated settlement.

The marginalization of the two-state solution has profound implications for the region. Without a viable path to Palestinian statehood, the conflict risks perpetuating indefinitely, with cycles of violence, occupation, and resistance continuing unabated. This reality also deepens Israel’s international isolation, as the EU, UN, and other global actors increasingly view Israel’s policies as contrary to international law and human rights.

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European Values and the Loss of Support

European Values at Odds with ‘Israel First’

The "Israel First" agenda clashes with European values, particularly the EU’s commitment to human rights, international law, and democracy. Policies such as settlement expansion, military occupation, and home demolitions violate core EU principles, including:

• General European People's Human Values sentiments (https://europe-is-us.blogspot.com/2026/08/we-are-europe-our-european-values.html)
• The Geneva Conventions, which protect civilians in occupied territories.
• UN Resolutions (e.g., 242, 338) calling for Israeli withdrawal from occupied lands.
• The EU’s own guidelines on differentiation between Israel and its settlements.

The "Israel First" approach also undermines democratic norms. Judicial reforms that weaken the Supreme Court and crackdowns on dissent and media freedom mirror illiberal trends in countries like Hungary and Poland—directly conflicting with the EU’s democratic conditioning.

The Struggle: Historic Obligation vs. Values

Europe’s relationship with Israel has long been shaped by a dual narrative: historic obligation and values-based diplomacy. On one hand, Europe’s post-WWII guilt and commitment to Israel’s security (e.g., Holocaust remembrance, anti-Semitism policies) have led to decades of unconditional support for Israel. On the other hand, the EU’s commitment to human rights and international law has increasingly clashed with Israel’s policies.

This tension is now coming to a head. Public opinion in Europe is shifting, with growing sympathy for Palestinians, especially among younger generations and left-leaning parties. This shift is reflected in:

-     Policy responses: The EU’s 2023 ban on settlement products and funding cuts to Israeli NGOs linked to occupation signal a toughening stance.

·        Diplomatic isolation: EU member states (e.g., Ireland, Sweden, Belgium) are pushing for recognition of Palestinian statehood and reducing diplomatic engagement with hardline Israeli leaders.

·        BDS movement: Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS) campaigns are gaining traction, with European pension funds and universities divesting from Israeli companies tied to occupation.

Strategic Dilemma for Europe

European leaders face a strategic dilemma: balancing values and interests. While Israel remains a key partner in counterterrorism and intelligence-sharing, its "Israel First" policies undermine the EU’s moral authority. The economic and tech ties between Israel and Europe (e.g., cybersecurity, AI, gas exports) make full disengagement costly, but the moral and legal contradictions of supporting Israel’s policies are increasingly untenable.

If "Israel First" policies persist, the EU may formalize its shift from unconditional support to conditional engagement, aligning more closely with Palestinian rights and international law.

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The Middle East: Still Possible?

Short-Term: More Israeli Extremism

In the short term, Israel’s "Israel First" policies are likely to further harden. This trajectory is driven by:

·        Domestic politics: Hardline factions dominate the political landscape, with little incentive to moderate.

·        Security concerns: Ongoing violence and instability (e.g., Gaza, West Bank) reinforce the siege mentality.

·        Lack of alternatives: The "Open to Balanced Solutions" camp remains weak and fragmented.

Long-Term: Regional Realignment and Pressure on Israel

The long-term outlook is more complex. The US’s traditional role as a peace broker in the Middle East is diminishing, due to:

·        Domestic polarization: US politics are increasingly divided on Israel-Palestine, with progressive factions criticizing unconditional support for Israel.

·        Focus shift: The US is prioritizing competition with China and Russia, reducing its bandwidth for Middle East diplomacy.

·        Loss of credibility: The US-Israel war on Iran and unconditional support for Israeli actions have eroded trust among Arab states and Palestinians.

As US influence wanes, Middle Eastern countries are taking matters into their own hands, forming new alliances to address regional security and economic interests. The Strait of Hormuz, a critical chokepoint for global oil trade, has become a leverage point for regional powers like Iran and the Gulf states, which are collaborating to stabilize the region, often excluding Israel.

The Role of Turkey

Turkey, as a regional power with historic ties to both the Arab world and Israel, is positioning itself as a mediator and security guarantor. Turkey’s balancing act—maintaining ties with Israel while supporting Palestinian rights and engaging with Iran—makes it a key player in any regional realignment. If US influence continues to decline, Turkey and Iran may coordinate more closely on regional security and economic integration, further isolating Israel.

Pressure on Israel

As the US steps back, Israel faces increasing pressure from:

·        Regional alliances (e.g., Turkey-Iran-Gulf cooperation) that exclude or oppose Israeli interests, leaving it more vulnerable to military and security challenges from coalitions like Iran-backed groups or Turkish influence.

·        Economic and diplomatic isolation: Israel’s hardline policies risk alienating even its traditional allies (e.g., Egypt, Jordan).

·        Public opinion erosion: Growing international and regional disapproval of Israel’s policies further weakens its standing.

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Conclusion: Stress Points to Overcome

Israel today is defined by four key stress points:

1.       Holocaust/Nakba: The dual traumas that shape Israeli and Palestinian identities, reinforcing mutual distrust and fear.

2.       The Road Not Taken: The rejection of early compromise (e.g., 1948) and the entrenchment of hardline policies that make peace ever more distant.

3.       Jewishness vs. Zionism: The tension between Israel as a Jewish state and a democratic state, where "Israel First" often conflates the two, risking the moral and democratic foundations of the country.

4.       Palestinian Statehood: The marginalization of the two-state solution and the rise of permanent military control, which perpetuates the conflict.

The "Israel First" framework explains Israel’s current reality—its political dominance, international isolation, and existential fears.
Yet this path has proven to be only sustainable through continued cycles of violence and the negation of human values.
The stress points—Holocaust/Nakba, the road not taken, Jewishness vs. Zionism, and the marginalization of Palestinian statehood—are not just historical footnotes but active forces shaping a future where conflict is perpetuated rather than resolved. The Middle East remains a region where change is possible, but the window for a balanced, lasting peace is narrowing, and the cost of inaction grows with each passing day.