Beyond Russky Mir
Confidence, Sovereignty and Europe’s Missing Eastern Strategy
Europe is learning how to defend itself.
The war in Ukraine has accelerated rearmament, increased defense
spending and forced Europe to assume responsibilities that for decades were
largely delegated to the United States. Europe is becoming more capable, more
resilient and more strategically aware.
Yet one important question remains largely unanswered:
What is Europe’s long-term vision for the East?
Europe increasingly knows what it wants to prevent. It wants to
prevent Russian domination of Ukraine. It wants to prevent aggression against
neighboring states. It wants to prevent a return to a world in which larger
powers decide the fate of smaller nations.
But what kind of relationship does Europe ultimately hope to build
with Russia?
This question sits at the heart of an important debate.
One view, associated with Jeffrey Sachs, argues that Russian
insecurity is the central problem. NATO expansion, military deployments and the
gradual movement of Western institutions eastward are seen as the primary
drivers of confrontation.[1]
A second view, closer to what Chancellor Friedrich Merz might argue,
accepts that Russian insecurity exists but sees a deeper issue as well:
Russia’s conception of its role and rights in relation to neighboring states.[1]
Both perspectives contain part of the truth.
Russia’s security concerns matter.
But so does the tension between Europe’s principle of sovereign choice and the
current interpretation of Russky Mir.
The question is what follows from that observation.
The Missing Dimension
Europe’s current answer is largely
deterrence. Support Ukraine. Strengthen defense. Increase resilience. Maintain
sanctions.
These policies may all be necessary. But
they do not yet constitute a long-term Eastern Strategy.
They answer: How do we manage today’s confrontation?
They do not answer: What kind of Eastern Europe do we hope eventually to build?
Nor do they answer an even deeper question: What could eventually become more
attractive than Russky Mir?
This is where much of the current
debate falls short. Russky Mir is often discussed as a geopolitical doctrine. In
reality, its strength comes from something deeper.
It offers confidence.
It tells Russians that Russia matters.
That Russia is respected.
That Russia remains a great civilization.
That Russia has a future.
That Russia belongs to history’s future, not merely its past.
This is why Russky Mir resonates.
Its power does not primarily come from
military doctrine or territorial claims. Its power comes from addressing
anxiety. Anxiety about relevance, about status, about identity, about decline.
The Lesson of Gorbachev
History offers a useful lesson.
During the final years of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev introduced
Glasnost, Perestroika and the idea of a “common European home.”
These were remarkable attempts to move from confrontation toward cooperation.
Yet they ultimately failed to establish a durable alternative narrative.
They offered reform. They offered openness. They offered cooperation.
But they never fully answered a deeper
question:
If Russia is no longer directing an empire, what civilizational mission
replaces it?
The success of the “Great Russia”
narrative from President Putin that followed it should not be surprising.
It answered the question. It transformed uncertainty into confidence.
Whether one agrees with that vision is
beside the point.
The lesson is that people need more than institutions. They need meaning, purpose,
confidence.
Sachs Offers Security.
Europe Should Offer Confidence.
This brings us back to the debate between Sachs and Merz.
Sachs’ answer is essentially a security answer. Reduce Russian insecurity.
Create conditions in which Russia feels less threatened.
There is logic in this.
Where the problem is larger than insecurity alone, Europe needs a
broader response.
Europe should aim not only to reduce Russian insecurity. It should gradually
help create the conditions for Russian confidence.
The distinction is important. Security addresses fear. Confidence
addresses identity.
Security asks: How do we avoid threats?
Confidence asks: How do we remain meaningful?
This leads to a different strategic question: Can Russia remain fully
Russia without needing to dominate its neighbors?
If the answer is no, then confrontation is likely to remain a
recurring feature of European politics. If the answer is yes, a different
future becomes imaginable.
Confidence Without Dominance
The central challenge for Europe
is therefore not how to defeat Russian identity. Nor how to erase Russian
civilization.
The challenge is how to imagine a
future in which Russian confidence no longer depends upon Russian dominance.
A future in which Russia remains historically
significant, culturally influential, scientifically important and politically
relevant, without requiring special rights over neighboring states.
One might describe this as a transition from Russky Mir toward a broader
Slavic Renaissance.
Not the disappearance of a Slavic
civilizational space. But its transformation.
Instead of greatness through control, greatness through achievement.
Instead of hierarchy, cooperation.
Instead of dominance, attraction.
Europe cannot create such a transformation. Only Russians can.
But Europe can recognize that long-term stability becomes more plausible if
confidence and sovereignty reinforce one another rather than compete.
Ukraine’s Unique
Role
This is where Ukraine becomes
strategically important. Not primarily as a bridge between governments. Not
primarily as a buffer between military blocs. But as a possible demonstration
that sovereignty and civilizational connection can coexist.
Current thinking often assumes a choice. Either
Ukraine belongs to Europe. Or Ukraine belongs to the Russian world.
Yet Western Europe itself demonstrates that identities can overlap.
A citizen can simultaneously be French, European and Western. These identities
reinforce rather than undermine one another.
A future sovereign, secure and European
Ukraine could eventually demonstrate something similar. That national
independence, European integration and broader Slavic cultural connections are
not necessarily incompatible.
This is not a task for today. Ukraine’s
immediate priorities remain security, sovereignty and reconstruction. But in
the longer term Ukraine may become the first proof that confidence and
sovereignty can coexist.
That cultural connection does not require political subordination. And that
sovereignty does not require cultural separation.
Providing such an example could ultimately prove powerful for confidence building.
The Long Road
None of this implies that such a
future is close. Russia is probably not ready. Ukraine is probably not ready. Europe
itself may not yet be ready. History rarely moves directly from conflict to
reconciliation. The more likely path is gradual.
Military stabilization – Reconstruction -
Economic recovery - Limited reopening of contacts - New institutions.
Slow changes in perceptions and
identities. The evolution from security through control toward security through
cooperation. This process cannot be imposed. Nor can it be rushed.
The purpose of describing such a future
is therefore not to predict history. It is to provide direction. A destination.
A sense of what Europe hopes eventually to build.
What Should Europe Actually Do?
If the destination is not yet
attainable, what should Europe do now?
First, continue
deterrence. Confidence without security is fantasy.
Europe must continue demonstrating that borders cannot be changed by force and
that sovereign states retain the right to choose their own future.
Second, develop
a positive Eastern vision.
Europe spends enormous effort explaining what it opposes. It spends remarkably
little effort explaining what kind of Eastern order it hopes eventually to
create.
This should change.
Third, begin
communicating directly to Russian citizens.
Not with propaganda. Not with lectures. Not with demands.
But with a consistent message:
- Europe does not seek
Russia’s humiliation.
- Europe does not seek
Russia’s disintegration.
- Europe recognizes Russia as
a great civilization.
- Europe believes Russian
greatness does not require domination of others.
Such messages may have little effect
today. That is not the point.
Strategic communication is measured in decades, not news cycles.
Not a peace plan. Not a negotiation proposal. A statement of strategic intent.
Built upon a few simple ideas:
- Sovereignty is non-negotiable.
- Security must be mutual.
- Deterrence is a means, not a destination.
- Civilizations need not be empires.
- Participation in future frameworks of cooperation must be voluntary.
Beyond Russky Mir
The war in Ukraine has forced Europe
to think seriously about defense.
It must now begin thinking equally seriously about the future.
A continent cannot organize itself indefinitely around resistance alone.
Eventually it must decide what kind of order it hopes to build.
The challenge facing Europe is therefore
not simply how to manage today’s confrontation.
It is how to prepare for the world that may one day follow it.
Jeffrey Sachs argues that Europe must
address Russian insecurity. He is probably right.
But if Friedrich Merz is also right—if the problem involves not only insecurity
but also Russia’s conception of its role in relation to its neighbors—then
Europe must think more broadly.
Security alone will not be enough. Europe
needs a strategy of confidence.
Confidence that Russia can remain fully Russia without dominating others.
Confidence that sovereignty and dignity can coexist.
Confidence that greatness does not require control.
And confidence that one day the relationship between Europe, Ukraine and Russia
can be built on attraction rather than fear.
The moment for such a future may not yet
have arrived. But great transformations rarely begin when history is ready.
They begin when
someone starts preparing for them.
Reference
[1] Dear Professor
Sachs, On your Open Letter to Me - Friedrich Merz
https://europe-is-us.blogspot.com/2026/05/dear-professor-sachs-on-your-open.html
