Beyond Russky Mir

Confidence, Sovereignty and Europe’s Missing Eastern Strategy

Europe is learning how to defend itself.

The war in Ukraine has accelerated rearmament, increased defense spending and forced Europe to assume responsibilities that for decades were largely delegated to the United States. Europe is becoming more capable, more resilient and more strategically aware.

Yet one important question remains largely unanswered:

What is Europe’s long-term vision for the East?

Europe increasingly knows what it wants to prevent. It wants to prevent Russian domination of Ukraine. It wants to prevent aggression against neighboring states. It wants to prevent a return to a world in which larger powers decide the fate of smaller nations.

But what kind of relationship does Europe ultimately hope to build with Russia?

This question sits at the heart of an important debate.

One view, associated with Jeffrey Sachs, argues that Russian insecurity is the central problem. NATO expansion, military deployments and the gradual movement of Western institutions eastward are seen as the primary drivers of confrontation.[1]

A second view, closer to what Chancellor Friedrich Merz might argue, accepts that Russian insecurity exists but sees a deeper issue as well: Russia’s conception of its role and rights in relation to neighboring states.[1]

Both perspectives contain part of the truth.
Russia’s security concerns matter.
But so does the tension between Europe’s principle of sovereign choice and the current interpretation of Russky Mir.

The question is what follows from that observation.

The Missing Dimension

Europe’s current answer is largely deterrence. Support Ukraine. Strengthen defense. Increase resilience. Maintain sanctions.

These policies may all be necessary. But they do not yet constitute a long-term Eastern Strategy.
They answer: How do we manage today’s confrontation?
They do not answer: What kind of Eastern Europe do we hope eventually to build?
Nor do they answer an even deeper question: What could eventually become more attractive than Russky Mir?

This is where much of the current debate falls short. Russky Mir is often discussed as a geopolitical doctrine. In reality, its strength comes from something deeper.
    It offers confidence.
    It tells Russians that Russia matters.
    That Russia is respected.
    That Russia remains a great civilization.
    That Russia has a future.
    That Russia belongs to history’s future, not merely its past.
This is why Russky Mir resonates.

Its power does not primarily come from military doctrine or territorial claims. Its power comes from addressing anxiety. Anxiety about relevance, about status, about identity, about decline.

The Lesson of Gorbachev

History offers a useful lesson.
During the final years of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev introduced Glasnost, Perestroika and the idea of a “common European home.”
These were remarkable attempts to move from confrontation toward cooperation.
Yet they ultimately failed to establish a durable alternative narrative.
They offered reform. They offered openness. They offered cooperation.

But they never fully answered a deeper question:
If Russia is no longer directing an empire, what civilizational mission replaces it?

The success of the “Great Russia” narrative from President Putin that followed it should not be surprising.
It answered the question. It transformed uncertainty into confidence.

Whether one agrees with that vision is beside the point.
The lesson is that people need more than institutions. They need meaning, purpose, confidence.

Sachs Offers Security.
Europe Should Offer Confidence.

This brings us back to the debate between Sachs and Merz.
Sachs’ answer is essentially a security answer. Reduce Russian insecurity.
Create conditions in which Russia feels less threatened.
There is logic in this.

Where the problem is larger than insecurity alone, Europe needs a broader response.
Europe should aim not only to reduce Russian insecurity. It should gradually help create the conditions for Russian confidence.

The distinction is important. Security addresses fear. Confidence addresses identity.
Security asks: How do we avoid threats?
Confidence asks: How do we remain meaningful?
This leads to a different strategic question: Can Russia remain fully Russia without needing to dominate its neighbors?

If the answer is no, then confrontation is likely to remain a recurring feature of European politics. If the answer is yes, a different future becomes imaginable.

Confidence Without Dominance

The central challenge for Europe is therefore not how to defeat Russian identity. Nor how to erase Russian civilization.

The challenge is how to imagine a future in which Russian confidence no longer depends upon Russian dominance.

A future in which Russia remains historically significant, culturally influential, scientifically important and politically relevant, without requiring special rights over neighboring states.
One might describe this as a transition from Russky Mir toward a broader Slavic Renaissance.

Not the disappearance of a Slavic civilizational space. But its transformation.
Instead of greatness through control, greatness through achievement.
Instead of hierarchy, cooperation.
Instead of dominance, attraction.
Europe cannot create such a transformation. Only Russians can.
But Europe can recognize that long-term stability becomes more plausible if confidence and sovereignty reinforce one another rather than compete.

Ukraine’s Unique Role

This is where Ukraine becomes strategically important. Not primarily as a bridge between governments. Not primarily as a buffer between military blocs. But as a possible demonstration that sovereignty and civilizational connection can coexist.

Current thinking often assumes a choice. Either Ukraine belongs to Europe. Or Ukraine belongs to the Russian world.
Yet Western Europe itself demonstrates that identities can overlap.
A citizen can simultaneously be French, European and Western. These identities reinforce rather than undermine one another.

A future sovereign, secure and European Ukraine could eventually demonstrate something similar. That national independence, European integration and broader Slavic cultural connections are not necessarily incompatible.

This is not a task for today. Ukraine’s immediate priorities remain security, sovereignty and reconstruction. But in the longer term Ukraine may become the first proof that confidence and sovereignty can coexist.
That cultural connection does not require political subordination. And that sovereignty does not require cultural separation.
Providing such an example could ultimately prove powerful for confidence building.

The Long Road

None of this implies that such a future is close. Russia is probably not ready. Ukraine is probably not ready. Europe itself may not yet be ready. History rarely moves directly from conflict to reconciliation. The more likely path is gradual.

Military stabilization – Reconstruction - Economic recovery - Limited reopening of contacts - New institutions.

Slow changes in perceptions and identities. The evolution from security through control toward security through cooperation. This process cannot be imposed. Nor can it be rushed.

The purpose of describing such a future is therefore not to predict history. It is to provide direction. A destination. A sense of what Europe hopes eventually to build.

What Should Europe Actually Do?

If the destination is not yet attainable, what should Europe do now?

First, continue deterrence. Confidence without security is fantasy.
Europe must continue demonstrating that borders cannot be changed by force and that sovereign states retain the right to choose their own future.

Second, develop a positive Eastern vision.
Europe spends enormous effort explaining what it opposes. It spends remarkably little effort explaining what kind of Eastern order it hopes eventually to create.
This should change.

Third, begin communicating directly to Russian citizens.
Not with propaganda. Not with lectures. Not with demands.
But with a consistent message:
    - Europe does not seek Russia’s humiliation.
    - Europe does not seek Russia’s disintegration.
    - Europe recognizes Russia as a great civilization.
    - Europe believes Russian greatness does not require domination of others.

Such messages may have little effect today. That is not the point.
Strategic communication is measured in decades, not news cycles.

Finally, Europe should define its long-term principles in what might be called a European Eastern Settlement Declaration.
Not a peace plan. Not a negotiation proposal. A statement of strategic intent.
Built upon a few simple ideas: 
Not a peace plan. Not a negotiation proposal. A statement of strategic intent.
Built upon a few simple ideas: 
    - Sovereignty is non-negotiable.
    - Security must be mutual.
    - Deterrence is a means, not a destination.
    - Civilizations need not be empires.
    - Participation in future frameworks of cooperation must be voluntary.

Beyond Russky Mir

The war in Ukraine has forced Europe to think seriously about defense.
It must now begin thinking equally seriously about the future.
A continent cannot organize itself indefinitely around resistance alone.
Eventually it must decide what kind of order it hopes to build.

The challenge facing Europe is therefore not simply how to manage today’s confrontation.
It is how to prepare for the world that may one day follow it.

Jeffrey Sachs argues that Europe must address Russian insecurity. He is probably right.
But if Friedrich Merz is also right—if the problem involves not only insecurity but also Russia’s conception of its role in relation to its neighbors—then Europe must think more broadly.

Security alone will not be enough. Europe needs a strategy of confidence.
Confidence that Russia can remain fully Russia without dominating others.
Confidence that sovereignty and dignity can coexist.
Confidence that greatness does not require control.
And confidence that one day the relationship between Europe, Ukraine and Russia can be built on attraction rather than fear.

The moment for such a future may not yet have arrived. But great transformations rarely begin when history is ready.

They begin when someone starts preparing for them.

Reference

[1] Dear Professor Sachs, On your Open Letter to Me - Friedrich Merz

https://europe-is-us.blogspot.com/2026/05/dear-professor-sachs-on-your-open.html