Chancellor Merz's Hypothetical Response
Professor Sachs,
Thank you for your letter.
I share your concern regarding the escalating dangers facing Europe. I agree that diplomacy is indispensable and that a stable peace between Russia, Ukraine, and the rest of Europe must ultimately be achieved through negotiation rather than military means.
However, I believe your analysis is incomplete.
You interpret the conflict primarily through the lens of Western actions and Russian security concerns. In doing so, you substantially underestimate another factor: the nature of the Russian state and the political ideas that have increasingly guided its leadership.
The central question facing Europe is not whether Russia has security interests. Every state does.
The central question is whether Russia accepts the right of neighboring states to make sovereign choices that differ from Moscow's preferences.
On NATO Expansion
You argue that NATO enlargement violated understandings reached at the end of the Cold War.
This debate will continue among historians.
Yet even if one accepts your interpretation, another question must be answered:
Why did so many countries seek NATO membership in the first place?
Poland, the Baltic states, the Czech Republic, Romania, and others did not seek NATO because NATO threatened them.
They sought NATO because they feared a future Russia.
History did not begin in 1990.
The experience of Russian imperial rule and Soviet domination shaped the choices of those nations.
To understand NATO enlargement solely as a Western project is to overlook the agency and fears of the states that requested it.
On Ukraine
You propose Ukrainian neutrality as the foundation of peace.
In principle, neutrality has often served Europe well.
However, neutrality can only function if all parties trust that it will be respected.
The experience of Ukraine since 2014 has profoundly damaged that trust.
Many Ukrainians now conclude that neutrality did not protect them.
Any durable settlement must therefore address not only Russian security concerns but Ukrainian security concerns as well.
Peace cannot be built on the security of one side alone.
On Russia's Identity
You describe Russia as a European country.
In cultural, historical, and intellectual terms, I agree.
Russia is undeniably part of European civilization.
Yet Europe is not merely a geography or a culture.
Europe is also a political order.
That order rests on principles:
- sovereignty,
- territorial integrity,
- freedom of political choice,
- and the rejection of spheres of influence enforced through military power.
The difficulty we face today is that important currents within contemporary Russian thought appear to embrace a different vision.
Concepts such as Russky Mir suggest that cultural proximity creates enduring political claims.
Europe cannot accept such claims as a basis for international order.
A stable peace requires that all states, regardless of size, possess equal rights under international law.
On Germany's Responsibility
You argue that Germany should reopen dialogue.
On this point I agree.
Diplomatic channels should never be closed.
Dialogue remains necessary even during war.
But dialogue is not an alternative to deterrence.
History teaches that diplomacy is most successful when all parties understand both the costs of war and the limits of coercion.
For this reason Germany will continue to support Ukraine while simultaneously supporting every credible diplomatic effort.
These are not contradictory goals.
They are complementary ones.
On Germany's Economy
You argue that Germany's prosperity depended upon economic cooperation with Russia.
That was true.
But it is equally true that prosperity based on strategic dependence carries risks.
The events of recent years have demonstrated that economic interdependence alone does not guarantee peace.
Germany therefore seeks diversification, resilience, technological competitiveness, and strategic autonomy.
The objective is not confrontation with Russia.
The objective is to ensure that Germany's prosperity is never dependent upon political developments beyond its control.
The Real Question
The question before Europe is not whether we should seek peace.
We should.
The question is what kind of peace can endure.
A peace based solely on military exhaustion will prove temporary.
A peace based solely on Russian security concerns will prove unstable.
A peace based solely on Ukrainian aspirations will prove incomplete.
The challenge is to construct a European security order in which Russia is secure, Ukraine is sovereign, and Europe is stable.
That remains Germany's objective.
When Russia is prepared to engage on that basis, Germany will be ready for dialogue.
Until then, we must pursue both diplomacy and deterrence together.
Respectfully,
Friedrich Merz
What is striking is that such a reply would not actually reject Sachs' call for diplomacy.
It would reject his implied premise that the conflict is fundamentally the result of Western mistakes.
The core disagreement would be:
Sachs: "Russian insecurity is the central problem."
Merz: "Russian insecurity is one problem; Russia's conception of its role and rights in relation to its neighbors is another."
And that distinction is precisely where much of today's European strategic debate resides.
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