Europe’s Missing Role in the Middle East Is Beginning to Appear

R.M. Westerink; September 1, 2026 

When the leaders of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation recently condemned the US-Israeli war against Iran, their statement appeared to confirm a familiar geopolitical development. American influence is being challenged while China, Russia and Iran promote a more multipolar international order.[1]

There is substance to that interpretation. Iran has found within the SCO an institutional environment receptive to its criticism of Western military intervention, sanctions and political dominance.

Looking at the Middle East itself, however, reveals another development. Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, Egypt and the Gulf states are expanding their own diplomatic and security relationships. Pakistan has become an important diplomatic participant. Qatar and Oman continue to provide mediation channels across difficult regional divides.

These countries have different interests and alliances. What increasingly connects them is a desire for greater room to determine regional affairs themselves.

Between the established American pole and the increasingly visible SCO pole, a strategic middle is beginning to appear.

And Europe appears to be moving closer to it.

American Predominance Is Changing

The United States remains the Middle East’s most important external military power.
Its relationships with Israel and the Gulf states remain substantial, its military infrastructure is extensive, and American diplomacy continues to play a central role.

What is changing is the assumption that American leadership will remain the principal organising force of the regional order.

The recent conflict with Iran demonstrated the risks of dependence particularly clearly. Regional governments found themselves exposed to decisions taken in Washington, Tehran and Jerusalem while having limited influence over them.

Their response has increasingly been diversification.

Saudi Arabia has expanded its relationship with China while maintaining close relations with Washington. The UAE similarly works across geopolitical divisions. Türkiye remains a NATO member while pursuing an increasingly autonomous regional policy. Qatar and Oman maintain channels with Iran alongside strong Western relationships.

The United States therefore remains important, but regional states are creating more room to manoeuvre around it.

The SCO Offers Another Pole

The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation represents another direction in which the international system is developing.

China provides enormous economic weight.
Russia adds military and geopolitical power.
Iran has become increasingly integrated into this political environment.
Together with India, Pakistan and the Central Asian members, the SCO covers a substantial part of Eurasia.

Its political vocabulary increasingly emphasizes multipolarity, sovereignty, opposition to unilateral sanctions and reform of international institutions.

For Iran, this environment is attractive. The SCO condemnation of the US-Israeli attack allows Tehran to place its confrontation with Washington and Israel within a broader argument about international legitimacy and the future global order.[1]

The SCO nevertheless contains very different strategic interests. India maintains important relationships with the United States, Europe, Israel and the Gulf and pursues its own strategic autonomy.

Middle Eastern governments face a similar calculation. Greater distance from Washington does not automatically imply closer alignment with Beijing, Moscow and Tehran. For countries seeking room for independent action, exchanging one dominant relationship for another offers limited attraction.

This leaves space for a third development.

The Emerging Middle

Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, Egypt, the UAE, Qatar and Oman do not constitute a political bloc. Their policies towards Iran and Israel differ, as do their security interests.

Yet their recent behaviour increasingly reflects a common search for greater regional agency.

Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have strengthened their political and security cooperation. Their Makkah Agreement framework now includes a Strategic Political and Defence Committee and a permanent secretariat in Saudi Arabia; the three governments explicitly describe their cooperation in terms of “regional ownership”.[2]
Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Pakistan have also developed the R4 consultation mechanism, reaffirming continued coordination on peace, security and stability in the Middle East.[3]

Pakistan has played a mediation role between the United States and Iran, a role explicitly commended by the EU.[4] Qatar and Oman continue to perform specialised mediation roles because they retain communication channels across competing camps.

These arrangements do not yet form a new regional alliance. They resemble a network in which different states bring different capabilities.

Saudi Arabia contributes financial resources and growing Arab and Gulf political weight. Türkiye combines military capacity with relationships extending into NATO, Europe, Iran and the Gulf. Egypt remains one of the Arab world’s central political powers. Pakistan adds strategic capacity and connections into South Asia. Qatar and Oman provide unusual diplomatic access.

Different combinations can address different problems.

The emerging common denominator is strategic autonomy: greater capacity for regional countries to manage regional affairs while maintaining relationships with several outside powers.

Europe Appears to Have Noticed

Several months ago, in Europe Needs Its Own Middle East Strategy, it was argued that Europe could no longer simply outsource its Middle Eastern strategy to Washington.[A]

Developments since then suggest that Europe itself has been moving in that direction.

The European Commission has created a dedicated Directorate-General for the Middle East, North Africa and the Gulf (DG-MENA, headed by Dubravka Šuica ). Its stated purpose is to build partnerships based on mutual interest and bring together the EU’s technical and financial instruments.[5] Kaja Kallas’s formal responsibilities also include development of an EU Middle East Strategy.[6]

Relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council increasingly include regional security alongside their established economic dimension. In July, EU foreign ministers emphasized close coordination with Gulf partners and held an EU-GCC High-Level Forum on regional security and cooperation.[7]

European engagement with individual regional powers is also becoming more strategic.

EU relations with Pakistan have included explicit recognition of its mediation efforts between the United States and Iran.[4] One European meeting was particularly illustrative: Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan and Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar joined EU foreign ministers for discussions about the Middle East. Kallas described both countries as important because of their extensive diplomatic engagement across the region and asked what more could be done together.[8]

Saudi Arabia is becoming an increasingly important centre of regional political activity. India has substantial relationships with Europe, the Gulf, Israel, the United States and Iran while maintaining its own strategic independence. Bringing both into a European Middle East discussion reflects a diplomatic environment built around overlapping relationships rather than fixed blocs.

Individually, these developments can be seen as normal diplomatic activity. Together, they suggest that Europe is positioning itself within the changing regional landscape.

Building Strategic Friendships

This emerging environment may fit European capabilities and purposes unusually well.

Many of the countries seeking greater regional autonomy are themselves building multiple relationships. Saudi Arabia can cooperate with Europe, America and China. Türkiye combines NATO membership with an independent Middle Eastern role. India works closely with Europe and the Gulf without becoming part of a European alliance. Qatar and Oman combine strong Western relationships with diplomatic access to Iran.

Europe is developing relationships within this same network.

Its contribution is broader than traditional security guarantees. Europe brings economic scale, investment, trade, technology, reconstruction capacity, regulatory expertise and extensive diplomatic networks. It also maintains working relationships with almost every significant actor in the region.

This creates the possibility of strategic partnership without requiring exclusive alignment.

India reinforces that character. European and Indian participation alongside regionally owned initiatives would provide substantial external support while leaving Middle Eastern countries at the centre of their own developing architecture.

Europe’s Missing Role [B]

This gives a broader meaning to the idea that Europe needs its own Middle East strategy.

Greater European strategic autonomy allows Europe to develop relationships based on its own interests while supporting a Middle East in which regional countries themselves assume greater responsibility.

That role does not require Europe to reproduce American predominance or compete with China for regional leadership. It is closer to becoming a substantial external partner for countries seeking greater room to manage their own regional order.

The relationship can work precisely because those countries also value autonomy.
Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, Egypt, Qatar, Oman and the UAE increasingly maintain several strategic relationships simultaneously. Pakistan and India extend that network beyond the region.

Europe’s role within such an environment depends less on organising it than on becoming a useful and trusted participant.

An Order Taking Shape

The Middle East is not moving neatly from one geopolitical order to another.

American predominance is weakening while American power remains substantial. China, Russia and Iran are developing an increasingly visible alternative environment around the SCO. Between them, Middle Eastern powers are expanding their own diplomatic and security relationships.

This emerging middle remains diverse and loosely connected. Its countries will continue to disagree and will cooperate with Washington, Beijing and others whenever their interests require it. That flexibility may itself become an important characteristic of regional strategic autonomy.

Europe’s response is also still developing. DG MENA, the forthcoming EU Middle East Strategy, stronger EU-GCC security cooperation and increasingly strategic relationships with Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, Egypt, Pakistan, India and others do not yet amount to a single European doctrine.

But they reveal a direction.

When Europe Needs Its Own Middle East Strategy was written, Europe’s missing role was principally an argument about what Europe needed to develop.

Today, the picture is becoming more concrete. Middle Eastern powers are creating greater room to determine their own affairs, while Europe is building relationships with many of the countries driving that change.

Europe’s missing role in the Middle East may no longer be missing. It may simply still be taking shape.

References

[1] Mehr News Agency, “SCO leaders slam US-Israeli war of aggression against Iran,” 1 September 2026. https://en.mehrnews.com/news/247377/SCO-leaders-slam-US-Israeli-war-of-aggression-against-Iran

[2] Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Strategic Political and Defence Committee of the Makkah Agreement for Joint Defence, Joint Statement,” 31 August 2026. https://www.mfa.gov.tr/strategic-political-and-defence-committee-of-the-makkah-agreement-for-joint-defence--joint-statement--31-august-2026.en.mfa

[3] Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Joint Statement of the R4 Following the Fourth Consultative Meeting of the Foreign Ministers,” 21 June 2026. https://www.mfa.gov.tr/joint-statement-of-the-r4-following-the-fourth-consultative-meeting-of-the-foreign-ministers-21-june-2026.en.mfa

[4] European External Action Service, “Joint Press Communiqué: Eighth Round of the European Union-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue,” 1 June 2026. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/joint-press-communiqu%C3%A9-eighth-round-european-union-pakistan-strategic-dialogue-1-june-2026_en

[5] European Commission, “Middle East, North Africa and the Gulf — Directorate-General (DG MENA).” https://commission.europa.eu/about/departments-and-executive-agencies/middle-east-north-africa-and-gulf_en

[6] European Commission, “Kaja Kallas — High Representative/Vice-President: Responsibilities.” https://commission.europa.eu/about/organisation/college-commissioners/kaja-kallas_en

[7] Council of the European Union, “Foreign Affairs Council,” 13 July 2026. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/fac/2026/07/13/

[8] European External Action Service, “Informal meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers (Gymnich): Press conference by High Representative Kaja Kallas,” 28 May 2026. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/informal-meeting-foreign-affairs-ministers-gymnich-press-conference-high-representative-kaja-kallas_en

 

[A] Europe Needs Its Own Middle East Strategy. https://europe-is-us.blogspot.com/2026/06/europe-needs-its-own-middle-east.html

[B] Europe's Missing Role in the Middle East. https://europe-is-us.blogspot.com/2026/06/europes-missing-role-in-middle-east.html

The Maghreb Pressure Cooker: The Maghreb's Problems, Europe's Migration Challenge

 

The Maghreb Pressure Cooker

The Maghreb's Problems, Europe's Migration Challenge

R.M. Westerink; September 1, 2026 

At the end of July 2026: Ceuta.

Tens of thousands of people, overwhelmingly from Morocco, moved towards or crossed into the small Spanish enclave on the North African coast. Buses and trains filled with young people heading north. Others arrived by taxi or on foot. Some attempted to swim around the border barriers. Many believed that, suddenly, Europe had become accessible.

It had not.

Social media posts had circulated claims that the border was effectively open or that people reaching Spanish territory could no longer be immediately returned. Instagram, Facebook, TikTok and WhatsApp rapidly multiplied the message. Images of successful crossings reinforced it. Within a remarkably short time, an online perception of opportunity had become a physical movement of people. More than 70,000 ultimately crossed, according to Spanish authorities, and scores died in the attempt.[1][2]

The precise origins of the rumors remain disputed. What matters here is something else.

Social media did not create tens of thousands of people wanting to leave Morocco. It revealed how many were already prepared to move when they believed an opportunity had appeared.

Ceuta was therefore more than a border-control failure. It offered a glimpse inside the Maghreb pressure cooker.

Three Countries Under Pressure

Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia are very different countries.
Morocco has developed substantial manufacturing, tourism and export industries.
Algeria possesses enormous hydrocarbon resources.
Tunisia has a comparatively educated population and longstanding economic connections with Europe.

Yet they share structural problems, particularly employment for younger generations.

Algeria's overall unemployment rate was 12.7 percent in 2024, but youth unemployment reached 29.3 percent. Its economy also remains heavily dependent on hydrocarbons.[3]

Tunisia's situation is more difficult still. Youth unemployment reached 36.8 percent in 2025, while almost 30 percent of Tunisians aged 15–29 were neither employed nor in education or training in 2024.[4]

Morocco is economically more dynamic, with growth reaching 4.6 percent in 2025. But employment opportunities remain particularly problematic for young people.[5]

This is therefore not simply a story about poor and uneducated migrants. Across the Maghreb are young people who have invested in education but find that their economies cannot provide the jobs, income or social advancement they expected.

And immediately across the Mediterranean lies Europe.

Add Water

Another pressure is steadily intensifying: water.

North Africa has always been dry. Climate change is making that constraint more severe through higher temperatures, drought and changing rainfall.

Morocco provides a striking example. Renewable water availability declined from about 2,560 cubic meters per person annually in 1960 to around 620 by 2020. The World Bank has warned that Morocco could fall below 500 cubic meters by 2030—the threshold for absolute water scarcity.[6]

That does not mean drought automatically sends migrants towards Europe. The mechanism is more complex.

Water scarcity weakens agriculture and rural livelihoods. People move towards cities. Urban labour markets receive additional workers. Informal employment expands. For young people already struggling to establish an independent economic life, another reason to look elsewhere has been added.

Climate pressure therefore interacts with unemployment and regional inequality. It becomes an economic and social multiplier.

Europe Is Very Close

Geography transforms these domestic problems into a European challenge.

Europe is not a distant destination. At the Strait of Gibraltar, Spain and Morocco are separated by only kilometers of sea. Ceuta and Melilla place European territory physically on the African continent.

The psychological distance may be even smaller. Millions of North Africans already live in Europe. Family connections, smartphones and social media provide a continuous picture—sometimes realistic, sometimes decidedly not—of European life.

For a young person without stable employment, Europe can therefore become less a foreign continent than an alternative life strategy.

Ceuta demonstrated what can happen when that aspiration encounters a perceived opportunity.

The smartphone has effectively become part of the migration infrastructure. It transmits success stories and practical information, connects prospective migrants and can link them to smugglers. It can also spread false information faster than governments can correct it.

The pressure cooker was already heated. Social media briefly appeared to lift the lid.

The Maghreb Is Responding

It would nevertheless be misleading to present Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia as countries simply exporting their problems northward.

Algeria is attempting to diversify its hydrocarbon-dependent economy and strengthen private-sector investment.[3]
Morocco has invested heavily in infrastructure, industrial development, renewable energy and water security, including desalination, dams and irrigation modernization.[6]
Tunisia is pursuing employment programs while struggling with weak growth, fiscal constraints and high youth unemployment.[4]

Migration control itself has also become an important governmental function. Morocco works extensively with Spain and the EU on border management, anti-smuggling operations and returns.

This was demonstrated when another Ceuta mobilization was promoted on social media for 15 August. Moroccan authorities reinforced the area and intercepted people heading towards the border.[7]

Ceuta therefore illustrated two different things. The first mobilisation revealed the underlying pressure. The response to the next mobilisation showed that government action can contain its immediate expression.

Neither removes the pressure itself.

Europe Is Already Involved

Europe, meanwhile, is doing considerably more than building fences.

EU cooperation with Morocco for 2021–2025 amounted to approximately €1.15 billion, covering areas including green transition, education, social protection, investment and skills.[8] Migration cooperation adds border management, anti-smuggling measures and return arrangements.

The EU–Tunisia partnership signed in 2023 similarly combined economic stability, trade and investment, green energy and migration. A €105 million migration package included border management, anti-smuggling measures and voluntary returns.[9]

European and international programs also target employability among young people outside employment, education or training.[10]

Europe therefore already recognises that migration cannot be addressed exclusively at the border.

European politics, however, inevitably concentrates attention there.

Controlling the European End

Since June 2026, the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum has introduced common procedures for screening irregular arrivals, faster asylum and return procedures and clearer responsibility between member states.[11]

Europe is also strengthening returns. Only around 28 percent of people ordered to leave the EU were effectively returned in 2025. A new common European return regime is intended to improve that performance.[12]

This matters.

Asylum is a fundamental right for people requiring international protection. But unemployment, climate stress or the understandable desire for a better life do not by themselves constitute grounds for asylum.

Part of the Maghreb's socioeconomic migration problem arrives in Europe through an asylum system designed primarily to determine who requires protection from persecution.

Faster procedures and effective returns are therefore legitimate components of migration management.

But they remain downstream solutions.

Moving Upstream

The broader sequence starts much earlier.

Water scarcity and climate pressure weaken rural economies. Insufficient job creation leaves young people without convincing prospects. Europe offers a visible alternative. Migration networks and social media reduce the perceived distance. Irregular movement follows. Only then do European border controls, asylum procedures and return policies become relevant.

Most European political debate begins near the end of that chain.

The more difficult strategic question lies near its beginning:

Can Europe and the Maghreb reduce the number of people for whom irregular migration appears to be their most promising available life strategy?

That does not mean Europe should solve North Africa's problems. Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia remain responsible for their own economies, education systems, labour markets and governance.

But interests on both sides of the Mediterranean are not necessarily contradictory.

The Maghreb needs investment, productive employment, water security and credible opportunities for younger generations. Europe needs workers in particular sectors, while wanting fewer irregular arrivals and a functioning asylum and return system.

That provides room for a more explicit partnership.

Maghreb governments can improve economic conditions and vocational preparation, control irregular departures and cooperate on readmission. Europe can contribute investment, water and climate infrastructure, vocational development and controlled legal routes into European labour markets.

The beginnings already exist. EU Talent Partnerships with Morocco and Tunisia seek to connect training and legal mobility with European labour-market requirements.[13]

The strategic objective could therefore be remarkably simple:

Make staying more attractive.
Make legal migration realistically possible.
Make irregular migration less attractive.

The Lesson of Ceuta

Ceuta should not primarily be remembered for the extraordinary number of people who crossed a border in a few days.

Its deeper significance lies in how quickly they mobilised.

A rumour did not create North Africa's unemployment. Instagram did not create Morocco's water scarcity. TikTok did not create the economic differential between North Africa and Europe.

Social media connected those existing pressures to a suddenly perceived opportunity.

That makes Ceuta a warning.

Border controls may stop people. Faster asylum procedures may process them. Return agreements may send some of them home.

But none of these measures reduces the pressure building on the other side of the Mediterranean.

Europe's long-term migration strategy therefore cannot begin at Europe's border. It has to begin much further south.

References

[1] Associated Press, "Runaway online rumors sparked frantic rush by migrants to the Spanish territory of Ceuta," August 2026.

[2] Le Monde, "Ceuta crisis: The elusive search for the origins of the rumor that drew would-be migrants," 4 August 2026.

[3] World Bank, Algeria — Country Overview, 2026.

[4] International Labour Organization, Y-NEET in Tunisia, 3 February 2026.

[5] World Bank, Public Investment Powers Morocco's Strongest Growth in a Decade, 23 July 2026.

[6] World Bank, Morocco Country Climate and Development Report: Water Scarcity and Droughts.

[7] Reuters, "Morocco arrests 111 migrants headed for Spain's Ceuta in security crackdown," 14 August 2026.

[8] European Commission, Morocco — EU Bilateral Cooperation, 2026.

[9] European Commission, EU–Tunisia Memorandum of Understanding: Migration Support, 2023.

[10] International Labour Organization, EU and ILO to Improve the Employability of Youth NEETs in the MENA Region, 2024.

[11] European Commission, New Migration and Asylum Rules Enter into Application, 12 June 2026.

[12] European Commission, Commission Welcomes Political Agreement on the Return Regulation, 2 June 2026.

[13] European Commission, Talent Partnerships, updated 2025.

 

We hebben een Noodplan Immigratiemanagement nodig —
en Sterke Leiders

R.M. Westerink; August 2026 

Een jaar geleden schreef ik op deze plaats: “Het is tijd voor een Noodplan Woningbouw en Sterke Leiders.”[A]

Niet omdat Nederland geen woningbouwbeleid had. Er waren plannen, doelstellingen, subsidies en afspraken met provincies en gemeenten.
Het probleem was eenvoudiger: er kwamen te weinig woningen.

Daarmee werd woningbouw een voorbeeld van een groter Nederlands bestuurlijk probleem. We organiseren beleid, verdelen verantwoordelijkheden en maken nieuwe plannen. Maar wanneer de uitvoering jarenlang onvoldoende resultaat oplevert, stapelen problemen zich op. Een beleidsprobleem wordt dan een maatschappelijk probleem.

Bij immigratie zien we inmiddels iets vergelijkbaars.

Ook hier ontbreekt het niet aan beleid

Nederland heeft asielbeleid, arbeidsmigratiebeleid, opvangbeleid, integratiebeleid en Europese afspraken. We hebben ministeries, IND, COA en gemeenten met ieder hun eigen verantwoordelijkheid.

En toch blijft Nederland spreken over grip op migratie.

Asielprocedures duren lang. Opvangplaatsen blijven bezet omdat statushouders geen woning kunnen vinden. Ter Apel werd het terugkerende symbool van een systeem dat zijn capaciteit niet op orde heeft. Gemeenten worden geconfronteerd met opvangvraagstukken terwijl woningen en voorzieningen lokaal al onder druk staan.

Kabinetten en regels veranderen. Het onderliggende probleem blijft.

Net als bij de woningbouw is het probleem niet dat Nederland geen beleid heeft. Het probleem is dat het geheel onvoldoende resultaat oplevert.

Daarom hebben we een Noodplan Immigratiemanagement nodig. Niet omdat immigratie een nationale noodtoestand is, maar omdat de normale manier waarop we immigratie besturen onvoldoende resultaat oplevert.

Instroom én capaciteit

Onze analyse van Nederland met het E–I–σ-model [B] wees op een combinatie van twee problemen: nieuwe immigratiedruk én capaciteitstekorten die zich inmiddels hebben opgehoopt.

Minder nieuwe asielaanvragen lossen bestaande IND-achterstanden niet op. Ze creëren geen woningen voor statushouders. Maar steeds meer capaciteit toevoegen is evenmin een duurzame oplossing wanneer de druk sneller groeit dan Nederland capaciteit kan realiseren.

Een noodplan zou daarom kunnen beginnen met tijdelijke en gerichte vermindering van immigratiedruk waar dat daadwerkelijk helpt een vastgelopen systeem te herstellen.

Dat betekent niet dat alle immigratie omlaag moet. Asielzoekers, kennismigranten, arbeidsmigranten, internationale studenten en gezinsmigranten komen om verschillende redenen en vragen verschillende vormen van capaciteit.

We zouden per migratiestroom moeten vragen: waarom vindt deze migratie plaats, wat levert zij Nederland op of welke verplichting ligt eraan ten grondslag, hoeveel invloed hebben we erop en beschikken we over de benodigde capaciteit?

Waar Nederland invloed heeft en een migratiestroom substantieel bijdraagt aan een capaciteitsprobleem, kan tijdelijke beperking ademruimte creëren.

Gebruik die ademruimte

Die ademruimte heeft alleen zin wanneer Nederland tegelijkertijd de reeds opgebouwde druk verwijdert.

Bij asiel moeten aanvraag, beslissing, opvang, huisvesting en vestiging in gemeenten daarom als één keten worden bestuurd:

aanvraag → beslissing → opvang → huisvesting → gemeente

Begin 2026 wachtten meer dan 51.000 mensen op een asielbesluit. De gemiddelde wachttijd in de algemene asielprocedure lag rond 67 weken.

Snellere procedures helpen. Maar wanneer erkende vluchtelingen daarna geen woning vinden, verplaatst het probleem zich naar de opvang. Meer opvang helpt, maar wanneer procedures vastlopen raakt die capaciteit opnieuw gevuld.

Voeg minder vermijdbare druk toe en verwijder tegelijkertijd de reeds opgebouwde druk uit het systeem.

Gebruik Europa waar Europa nodig is

Ook Europa moet onderdeel zijn van het management. Buitengrenzen, secundaire migratie binnen Europa, verantwoordelijkheid voor asielaanvragen en terugkeer zijn onderwerpen waarbij Nederland Europese samenwerking nodig heeft.

Nederland deed in 2025 bijvoorbeeld 6.313 verzoeken om mensen volgens de Dublinregels aan andere Europese landen over te dragen. Uiteindelijk vonden 1.865 overdrachten plaats. Betere Europese uitvoering kan dus verschil maken.

Maar Brussel kan geen Nederlandse IND-achterstand wegwerken, geen woningen bouwen en geen lokaal draagvlak voor opvang organiseren.

Gebruik Europa waar het probleem Europees is. Lever zelf waar het probleem Nederlands is.

Stop met één immigratiedebat

Een Noodplan Immigratiemanagement moet ook het idee doorbreken dat Nederland één immigratiebeleid nodig heeft dat alleen maar ruimer of strenger kan worden.

Nederland kan kennismigranten willen aantrekken en tegelijkertijd minder afhankelijk willen worden van laagproductieve arbeidsmigratie. We kunnen bescherming bieden aan vluchtelingen en tegelijkertijd secundaire asielmigratie proberen te verminderen.

Soms ontstaat migratievraag bovendien mede door onze eigen keuzes. Wanneer bedrijfstakken structureel afhankelijk zijn van buitenlandse arbeidskrachten, mogen we ook naar die economische structuur kijken — maar alleen wanneer het migratie-effect substantieel is én er onafhankelijk daarvan goede redenen zijn om die structuur te veranderen.

Het doel is niet zo weinig mogelijk immigratie.
Het doel is een niveau en samenstelling van immigratie die Nederland daadwerkelijk kan besturen en dragen.

Hetzelfde probleem als bij de woningbouw

Daarmee komen woningbouw en immigratie bij elkaar. Het zijn verschillende problemen, maar ze raken elkaar. Onvoldoende woningbouw vermindert de capaciteit om bevolkingsgroei op te vangen. Immigratiebeleid zonder rekening te houden met woningen, opvang, procedures en lokale voorzieningen kan die capaciteit verder belasten.

Kan de overheid nog voldoende resultaat leveren wanneer een probleem meerdere ministeries, bestuurslagen en maatschappelijke systemen tegelijk raakt?

Bij woningbouw formuleerden we jarenlang doelen. Terwijl het tekort opliep. Bij immigratie beloofden opeenvolgende kabinetten grip terwijl delen van het systeem vastliepen.

Dan is nog een plan alleen niet genoeg. Er moet verantwoordelijkheid komen voor het resultaat van het geheel.

Daar zijn sterke leiders voor nodig

Sterke leiders zijn niet de politici die het hardst over immigratie praten.
Sterk leiderschap betekent: Bepalen wat Nederland werkelijk kan beïnvloeden, eerlijk zeggen wat niet kan, keuzes maken waar dat wel kan — en vervolgens zorgen dat de overheid levert.

Geen onmogelijke beloften of excuses over Europa. Geen gemeenten opzadelen met nationale problemen zonder voldoende middelen en voorspelbaarheid. Geen burgers vertellen dat zichtbare capaciteitsproblemen vooral beeldvorming zijn. Maar ook niet beloven dat één lager immigratiecijfer alle opgebouwde problemen oplost.

Sterke leiders zijn politici die bepalen wat Nederland daadwerkelijk kan uitvoeren, daar keuzes aan verbinden en vervolgens zorgen dat het gebeurt.

Dat is uiteindelijk dezelfde les als bij de woningbouw.

Nederland heeft niet alleen behoefte aan beter beleid. Nederland heeft behoefte aan een overheid die weer levert.

Een Noodplan Immigratiemanagement hoeft ons niet voor of tegen immigratie te maken. Het moet iets fundamentelers bereiken:

Nederland moet weer in staat zijn immigratie te besturen.

Dat vraagt om keuzes. Dat vraagt om uitvoering.

En ja — dat vraagt om sterke leiders.

Referenties

[A] Het is tijd voor een Noodplan Woningbouw en Sterke Leiders; 
https://europe-is-us.blogspot.com/2025/10/het-is-tijd-voor-een-noodplan.html

[B] The Dutch Immigration Case Article II — When Capacity Cannot Keep Up;
https://europe-is-us.blogspot.com/2026/08/the-dutch-immigration-case-article-ii.html

 

The Dutch Immigration Case
Article II — When Capacity Cannot Keep Up

Using E–I–σ to Find Plausible Directions for Dutch Immigration Policy

R.M. Westerink; August 2026 

Our former E–I–σ  Dutch Case “Article I — When Pressure Becomes Politics” analysis concluded that the Netherlands has both an incoming-pressure problem and an accumulated-capacity problem.[A]

That immediately sets the policy question.
Reducing immigration alone will not clear IND backlogs, empty reception centers or create housing.
Expanding capacity alone may not work quickly enough if incoming pressure continues.

In Immigration Policy Is Also Social Policy, we argued that government can respond through three broad fields: influence incoming change (I), strengthen the receiving society (E), and address circumstances (σ) that amplify or dampen the resulting social stress.

Given the diagnosis, what could the Dutch government plausibly do?

 

Create breathing space — and use it

Dutch absorptive capacity can be increased, but not instantly. Homes take years to build. IND capacity takes time to expand. Reception locations require facilities, procedures and municipal cooperation.

When E cannot adjust quickly enough to I, selectively reducing incoming pressure becomes a plausible part of capacity recovery. That does not mean concluding that all immigration is too high. Asylum, labor migration, international students, family migration, EU mobility and temporary protection place different demands on Dutch society and are subject to different degrees of government control.

The relevant test is more precise: would reducing a particular flow materially relieve a capacity problem that government has actually diagnosed?

Asylum illustrates the logic. Fewer new applications can reduce additional pressure, but they do not remove the pressure already accumulated. At the beginning of 2026 more than 51,000 people were waiting for an asylum decision, while recognized status holders were also occupying reception places because housing was unavailable.

The asylum chain therefore has to recover at the same time:

application → decision → reception → housing → municipal settlement

Improving only one part may simply move the bottleneck elsewhere.

Stop adding avoidable pressure,  while removing the pressure already accumulated inside the system.

Temporary or selective reduction of I can create breathing space. Its value depends on using that space to repair E.

Use Europe where Europe adds leverage

European membership limits some unilateral Dutch choices. It also provides leverage the Netherlands does not possess on its own.

External entry into the European asylum system, secondary movement, responsibility allocation between member states and returns all have a European dimension.

The evidence suggests keeping expectations realistic. In 2025 the Netherlands made 6.313 outgoing Dublin requests but completed 1.865 outgoing transfers. Better European implementation could therefore matter, but it will not by itself resolve Dutch asylum pressure.

Europe can help reduce pressure entering or moving through the European system. The Netherlands must repair pressure already embedded in its own processing, reception and housing systems.

 That makes Europe a supporting control multiplier, rather than either the source of Dutch helplessness or an escape route from domestic problems.

Manage migration by stream, not by slogan

Once immediate capacity alignment begins to recover, the same reasoning could change Dutch migration policy more fundamentally. There is no single type I.

Government could examine the principal migration streams separately: why does this type of migration occur, what benefit or obligation justifies it, how controllable is it, what Dutch capacity does it require, and is that capacity available?

The answers need not point in one direction. The Netherlands might want to facilitate migration carrying high economic or social value, accept other migration because legal or humanitarian obligations require it, and reduce streams whose benefits no longer justify their capacity demands.

The same test can occasionally be applied from the other side. Some migration demand originates inside E because Dutch industries or institutions recruit abroad. Addressing those activities should only become an immigration-policy option where the migration effect is substantial and the change is independently defensible for reasons such as productivity, labour standards, environmental policy or spatial planning.

This is more discriminating than an aggregate target of “more” or “less” immigration. It amounts to matching migration choices more explicitly to the capacity required to sustain them.

And make government predictable

The Dutch case also showed why σ matters. Ter Apel was a genuine capacity failure, but then also became a national symbol of loss of control. AZC decisions turned national policy into local conflicts. Governments raised expectations that implementation could not always meet.

Communication cannot solve such failures. Predictable government (avoiding the inconsistent handling of the Spreidingswet) can however prevent adding unnecessary uncertainty to them.

A government could therefore organize both policy and communication around five straightforward ideas:
Control — reduce avoidable pressure and make existing rules work.
Capacity — repair systems that have fallen behind.
Fairness — distinguish between migration streams and unequal local burdens.
Europe — use collective leverage where the problem is European.
Review — measure whether temporary restrictions and capacity measures are actually restoring alignment.

This is not about persuading citizens that a failing system works. It is about allowing them to see what government is trying to change and whether it is succeeding.

A plausible Dutch direction

Taken together, the E–I–σ diagnosis points toward a combination rather than one dominant instrument.

In the near term, the Netherlands could reduce avoidable incoming pressure while recovering immigrants’ processing, reception and housing capacity, supported by European action where the pressure is genuinely European.

Over the medium term, migration streams could be managed more selectively and connected more explicitly to the capacities they require.

Over time, government could replace recurring emergency management with periodic capacity assessment: has E changed sufficiently, what is happening to I, and are developments in σ creating new social or political pressure?

The objective would be neither permanently lower immigration nor unlimited expansion of absorptive capacity. It would be capacity alignment:

Reduce pressure where necessary, recover capacity where it has fallen behind, and reassess the balance as circumstances change.

 

Reference

[A] The E–I–σ Framework - A Diagnostic Model for Understanding the Social Mechanics of Immigration; https://europe-is-us.blogspot.com/2026/08/the-ei-framework-diagnostic-model-for.html

 

 

The Dutch Immigration Case
Article I — When Pressure Becomes Politics

An E–I–σ briefing on what the Netherlands’ immigration problem actually is

R.M. Westerink; August 2026 

A briefing, not another immigration argument

Dutch immigration politics is often presented as a choice between two explanations. One says that the Netherlands has allowed too much immigration and lost control. The other says that the deeper problem is failing housing, asylum administration and political amplification. The Dutch case suggests that neither explanation is sufficient on its own.

The E–I–σ framework offers a simple way to separate the mechanisms.
E is the society that already exists: its housing market, institutions, political divisions, municipalities, labor market and accumulated experience.
I is incoming population change: not one number, but different streams arriving at different speeds and under different legal and social conditions.
σ represents the circumstances that make the interaction easier or harder: political salience, media attention, institutional confidence, local conflict, security incidents and historical experience.

The framework was developed in:
The E–I–σ Framework: A Diagnostic Model for Understanding the Social Mechanics of Immigration,[A] and its policy implications in: 
Immigration Policy Is Also Social Policy: Using E–I–σ to Understand and Manage Social Stress.[B]
In this article the purpose is narrower: To brief an informed reader on the analysis what happened in the Netherlands and what kind of immigration problem Dutch government now inherits.

Conclusion: The Netherlands has both an incoming-pressure problem and an accumulated-capacity problem.

 

The Netherlands did not enter this period as a blank sheet

When the Schoof government took office in July 2024, immigration was already embedded in Dutch society and politics. On 1 January 2024, about 2.9 million residents had been born outside the Netherlands and another 2.1 million had at least one foreign-born parent. CBS estimated that international migration accounted for 97% of Dutch population growth over the preceding five years. At the same time, the country faced a housing shortage of more than 400,000 homes, and the asylum reception system had already produced the highly visible failures associated with Ter Apel. [1][2][3]

This matters because E–I–σ does not ask what immigration does to an abstract country. It asks what incoming change encounters when it arrives. The Dutch receiving society was migration-experienced, prosperous and institutionally strong, but it was also housing-constrained, administratively stretched in parts of the asylum chain, and politically divided over humanitarian responsibility, cultural continuity, fairness and national control. The 2023 election did not create those tensions. It converted them into an unusually strong expectation that national policy would change direction. [4][5]

Every new immigration episode starts from where society has already arrived.

 

The political paradox: 
Asylum pressure stayed high while applications fell

The Schoof coalition promised the 'strictest asylum regime ever' and concentrated heavily on changing I: emergency-law ambitions, an EU opt-out request, border controls, tighter family-reunification rules, a two-status system and other restrictive measures. Yet the period did not begin with an accelerating asylum inflow. First asylum applications in 2024 were 16% lower than in 2023, and the first quarter of 2025 fell to roughly half the level of the same quarter a year earlier. [6][7]

Nevertheless, the asylum system continued to look and feel overloaded. Ter Apel remained vulnerable to overcrowding. IND waiting times and case stocks remained high. Recognised status holders could not leave reception quickly enough because ordinary housing was scarce. Municipalities struggled to find locations and maintain local support. The Spreidingswet required reception capacity to be distributed while the national government simultaneously promised to repeal it. [8][9]

This is the first central Dutch finding. A fall in new applications did not automatically produce a fall in experienced pressure. Part of the problem was already stored inside E. Lower inflow can slow the accumulation of pressure; it cannot instantly clear a backlog, build houses, create reception sites or restore local confidence.

Ter Apel became more than a reception centre

Ter Apel is important because it joins material reality and political experience. The overcrowding was real. In 2022 people had slept outside the center; later periods again brought court action, capacity breaches and emergency transfers. By May 2026 more than 2.300 people were present at a site subject to a 2.000-person ceiling, and controlled access was introduced because safety and livability could no longer be guaranteed. [10][11]

But Ter Apel also became a national symbol. Most Dutch citizens never encounter the asylum reception chain directly. They encounter it through recurring images, statistics, political statements and news reports. In E–I–σ terms, asylum therefore has both a directly experienced I and a mediated, system-level I. A real administrative failure can become evidence, in the public mind, for a much broader proposition: that immigration as a whole is out of control.

That does not make the concern imaginary. Nor does it prove every explanation attached to it. The useful diagnostic rule is: take the concern seriously, then test the explanation.

National politics moved into the municipalities

The Spreidingswet exposed another mechanism. National government can decide that reception must be distributed, but implementation occurs in municipalities, neighborhoods and specific buildings. The national capacity solution therefore redistributes some of the social and political pressure locally.

During 2025 and 2026, proposed or new asylum reception locations produced a series of highly visible protests. Some escalated into intimidation, fireworks, vandalism, police intervention or violence. Yet the evidence also cautions against treating these incidents as a picture of the whole country. An Ipsos I&O study of 132 municipalities found that existing reception locations generally did not produce uncontrollable tensions; the greatest difficulties arose around announcing and establishing new locations. In June 2026, a NOS reconstruction found the same small groups of travelling activists at many protests. [12][13]

The political lesson is subtle. Local resistance cannot simply be dismissed as manufactured extremism, because municipalities face real siting, housing, service and legitimacy problems. But nationally visible disorder cannot simply be read as the spontaneous opinion of every affected community either. E–I–σ separates the underlying capacity issue, the local social response and the amplification around particular events.

The fall of Schoof did not reset the system

The Schoof coalition collapsed in June 2025 over asylum policy even though first asylum applications had already fallen. That divergence is revealing. The political demand for control was no longer tracking the current flow alone. It had become connected to accumulated capacity failure, expectations of governmental delivery and a wider conflict over what immigration meant for the Netherlands. [14]

The demissionary period strengthened that conclusion. The principal restrictive coalition had broken apart, but Ter Apel, reception shortages, municipal disputes and asylum protests persisted. The national political component of σ changed; much of E did not.

This is why a change of government cannot be expected to reset immigration-related social stress. Winning an election does not instantly change the receiving society or its institutional capacities.

Jetten changed the governing style. The conflict persisted.

The Jetten government, installed in February 2026, offered a useful further test. Its approach was different: retain the Spreidingswet, seek fewer asylum arrivals partly through European cooperation, build more permanent reception capacity, accelerate procedures, support earlier participation and make municipal financing more predictable. The national message became a combination of control and capacity rather than emergency restriction alone. [15]

Yet local conflict continued. Reception disputes featured in municipal politics; protests in several towns escalated; Ter Apel again exceeded capacity; and by August 24 municipalities had been placed under active supervision for failing to meet their reception obligations. [11][16]

This does not show that national rhetoric is irrelevant. Governments can amplify or dampen salience. It shows something more important: by 2026 the conflict had become partly path dependent. A new government inherited not only migrants and policy files, but reception infrastructure, housing constraints, expectations, local protest networks, distrust and accumulated social memory.

A government can change in a day. E cannot.

 

So, what is the Dutch immigration problem?

The answer is not 'immigration' in the singular. The Netherlands has several migration streams with different causes, benefits, obligations and degrees of national control. Asylum has dominated political salience, but labor migration, family migration, international students, EU mobility and temporary protection affect E through different mechanisms.

Nor is the answer simply 'insufficient capacity'. Capacity is not infinitely elastic. Housing, administrative staffing, reception sites and municipal consent take time to build. When incoming change moves faster than those systems can adjust, the mismatch itself becomes politically consequential.

The most concise diagnosis is therefore a capacity-alignment problem. Some pressure comes from I: the scale, speed or composition of incoming change. Some comes from E: shortages, backlogs and institutional choices already accumulated inside Dutch society. Some comes from σ: high salience, political expectations, local conflict and the way particular failures become symbols of the whole immigration system.

These components interact. That interaction is the point. An asylum center exceeding capacity is an administrative problem. Repeated failure can become a confidence problem. A national distribution measure can relieve one bottleneck while creating a local political confrontation. A fall in applications can coexist with a full reception system. A less confrontational cabinet can inherit a conflict whose mechanisms have already become embedded.

Five things a political reader should retain

·        Dutch immigration stress cannot be explained by immigration numbers alone.

·        It also cannot be explained away as merely political manipulation, media amplification or xenophobia.

·        Real capacity failures became politically salient symbols, particularly in the asylum system.

·        Reducing new pressure does not automatically remove pressure already accumulated in Dutch immigrants’ processing, reception and housing.

·        Once the interaction has run for years, changing government or changing one immigration rule does not immediately restore the previous social equilibrium.

The question this leaves for government

If this diagnosis is approximately right, the policy question changes.
It is no longer simply whether the Netherlands should accept more or fewer migrants.
It becomes more discriminating: which incoming pressures should government reduce or redirect; which capacities should it strengthen; where can European cooperation provide leverage; and how should government communicate unavoidable trade-offs without reproducing the sense of permanent crisis?

That is the subject of Dutch Case Article II. The E–I–σ policy principle is straightforward: do not begin with the immigration policy you prefer. Begin by diagnosing the social mechanism you are actually confronting.

Immigration concern is a symptom, not a diagnosis. Because different immigration problems require different responses.

 

Appendices — Behind the Briefing

The main article deliberately presents the diagnosis as a briefing. These appendices provide compact substantiation for the questions an informed reader is most likely to ask. They are not intended as exhaustive statistical or legal reviews.

Appendix A — Did Dutch immigration really increase, and what kind?

Yes, immigration has been a major contributor to Dutch population change, but the politically dominant asylum story should not be confused with total migration. The pre-Schoof baseline records a population of 17.94 million at the start of 2024, with roughly 2.9 million foreign-born residents and 2.1 million Netherlands-born residents with at least one foreign-born parent. CBS estimated that 97% of population growth over the preceding five years resulted from international migration. [1]

At the same time, overall migration and asylum did not move in one direction throughout the case. First asylum applications fell in 2024 and again in 2025, while other streams—labor, family, study, EU mobility and temporary protection—followed their own dynamics. The diagnostic implication is that 'immigration' should be disaggregated before policy conclusions are drawn.

Appendix B — Was there genuinely a capacity problem?

Yes. The evidence is strongest in housing and the asylum chain. Around the transition into the Schoof period, the national housing shortage was above 400,000 homes. By the start of 2026 more than 51.000 people were waiting for an IND asylum decision and average waiting time in the general asylum procedure was about 67 weeks. Ter Apel repeatedly approached or exceeded its court-backed capacity ceiling, while recognized status holders remained in reception because ordinary housing was unavailable. [3][17]

These are not interchangeable bottlenecks. Faster decisions can release one constraint only if people can subsequently leave reception. More reception places can prevent acute overcrowding without solving the housing shortage. This is why the case is better described as capacity alignment than as a single capacity number.

Appendix C — How important is asylum compared with other immigration?

Asylum is much smaller than total migration, but politically it can be disproportionately salient because it concentrates visible state responsibility: admission, registration, reception, legal procedure, housing and municipal placement. Failures therefore become directly attributable to government. Labor and student migration may create important housing or local pressures, but they do not usually produce an equivalent Ter Apel-type national symbol.

This is a case where numerical share and political significance should not be treated as the same variable.

Appendix D — Did public concern have a broader basis than protest?

Yes, but it was heterogeneous. SCP and election research before and during the case show immigration and asylum as important concerns, while also finding different underlying interpretations: pressure on housing and services, questions of fairness and control, humanitarian responsibility, cultural continuity and dissatisfaction with government performance. [4][5][18]

The evidence therefore does not support reducing public concern to a single motive. Nor do protest events provide a prevalence estimate. Existing reception locations were often managed without uncontrollable tension, even while proposed new locations generated acute conflict. [12]

Appendix E — Why does Ter Apel matter so much?

Because it is simultaneously a real bottleneck and a salience mechanism. Recurrent overcrowding made abstract claims about asylum capacity visible. The same images could support different interpretations: humanitarian failure, administrative incompetence, excessive inflow, insufficient distribution, or loss of national control.

E–I–σ does not decide which interpretation a citizen must adopt. It identifies why one location could become a national political reference point far beyond the number of people directly affected.

Appendix F — Did the Schoof government reduce the problem?

It changed the political direction decisively and pursued a broad restrictive program, but the evidence does not allow the subsequent fall in asylum applications to be attributed simply to Schoof policy. Applications were already declining in a wider European context, several measures were not yet implemented, and the Raad van State warned that key asylum bills had not demonstrated that they would reduce inflow or improve administrative efficiency. [6][19]

The more secure conclusion is that the coalition raised expectations of control while inherited capacity problems remained visible. Its collapse over asylum policy despite falling applications illustrates the gap between flow statistics and political resolution.

Appendix G — What changed under Jetten?

The policy mix shifted toward combined control and capacity: fewer arrivals through European and external measures, continued distribution of reception, more permanent capacity, faster procedures and earlier participation. What did not disappear were the inherited constraints and local conflicts. Because the period examined runs only from February to August 2026, claims about policy effects must remain provisional. [15][16]

Appendix H — How much can Europe solve?

Europe can materially affect some components of Dutch asylum pressure, particularly responsibility allocation, secondary movement, external-border management and return cooperation. But the scale should not be exaggerated. In 2025 the Netherlands made 6.313 outgoing Dublin requests and carried out 1.865 outgoing transfers. Those figures are material but are not cohort-compatible with annual first-asylum applications and should not be treated as a conversion rate. Dublin is also bidirectional: the Netherlands receives transfers from other states. [20]

The EU cannot transfer away a Dutch IND backlog, create Dutch housing or settle municipal implementation disputes. The practical division is therefore clear: Europe can help stop avoidable additional pressure in European parts of the chain; the Netherlands must remove pressure already accumulated inside its own system.

Selected references

[A] The E–I–σ Framework - A Diagnostic Model for Understanding the Social Mechanics of Immigration; https://europe-is-us.blogspot.com/2026/08/the-ei-framework-diagnostic-model-for.html

[B] Immigration Policy Is Also Social Policy: Using E–I–σ to Understand and Manage Social Stress; https://europe-is-us.blogspot.com/2026/08/immigration-policy-is-also-social.html

[1] CBS, Integratie en samenleven 2024; CBS population/migration-background data.

[2] CBS, immigration and emigration figures 2023–2025.

[3] Rijksoverheid, Woontop: shortage of more than 400,000 homes, 11 Dec 2024.

[4] Nationaal Kiezersonderzoek 2023, De verkiezingen van 2023: Van onderstroom naar doorbraak.

[5] SCP, Migratie als spiegel van maatschappijbeelden, 1 Apr 2025; SCP Burgerperspectieven series.

[6] CBS, asylum figures 2024–2025; first asylum applications fell in 2024 and 2025.

[7] IND/CBS quarterly asylum data, Q1 2025.

[8] VNG, asylum/integration implementation and status-holder housing material, 2024–2025.

[9] Rijksoverheid and municipal material on the Spreidingswet and reception allocations.

[10] Inspectie Justitie en Veiligheid, situation at Ter Apel, 7 Dec 2023; NOS, outside sleeping at Ter Apel, 27 Aug 2022.

[11] NOS, Ter Apel capacity and safety reporting, 20 May and July 2026; Rijksoverheid, additional measures, 13 Jul 2026.

[12] Ipsos I&O, Opvang nieuwkomers leidt (nog) niet tot onbeheersbare spanningen in gemeenten, 10 Jul 2025.

[13] NOS, Dezelfde activisten bij 48 asielprotesten, 16 Jun 2026.

[14] NOS, Wilders breekt met coalitie, 3 Jun 2025.

[15] Rijksoverheid, Jetten-government migration/asylum policy communications, spring–summer 2026.

[16] NOS and Rijksoverheid, Spreidingswet implementation and municipal supervision, Jun–Aug 2026.

[17] IND, Annual figures 2025: fewer applications, long waiting times, high penalty payments.

[18] SCP, Asielzorgen als symptoom van andere problemen, 13 Feb 2025.

[19] Raad van State, advice on Asielnoodmaatregelenwet and two-status system, 10 Feb 2025.

[20] Eurostat, Key data on the Dublin system 2025; Dutch Additional Evidence File v0.3.