R.M. Westerink; October 2026
Europe is receiving fewer asylum
seekers than at any time in the past five years.
Irregular border crossings are
down roughly 90 percent from the 2015 peak. And yet anti-immigration parties
have never been stronger. In Saxony-Anhalt, the AfD has just won a state
election.
Immigration is shrinking. The
politics of immigration is growing. Something has come loose.
The Italian think tank ISPI puts
it plainly: European migration policy "increasingly appears to operate
independently of migration trends themselves." The debate has become a
machine that keeps running whether or not there is anything to feed it.
This essay is about that
machine: how it works, how it ran its course in the United States, why it is
still running here, and what it costs us. It is written for the Welcomers among
us, and it carries an uncomfortable message.
The short version: Europe’s Welcomers have fixed half of their blind spot. The other half keeps the machine running. And while it runs, Europe is losing time it does not have.
How the machine works
The machine needs only two
things. The first is a real, practical problem that people experience and that
those in charge do not solve. The second is a way of talking about that problem
that makes it impossible to raise without being called a bigot. Put the two
together and you get a field of unanswered grievance. Someone will always step
in to claim it.
Call the two camps what they
are.
The Welcomers see receiving refugees as a moral identity and a
duty.
The Gatekeepers see controlled, limited and orderly immigration as
the precondition of a functioning state.
Both camps have the same bad habit: they judge motives instead of arguments. To Welcomers, Gatekeepers are xenophobes. To Gatekeepers, Welcomers are naïve idealists, or worse. Each side has its alibi for not listening. This essay is about the Welcomers’ version, because that is the one Welcomers can fix.
America: the machine at full power
Until around 2020, the American
debate was mostly a quarrel about motives. "Kids in cages" on one
side, "open borders" on the other. Then the numbers arrived. Between
2021 and 2025, U.S. border authorities recorded more than 8 million encounters
at the southern border. Shelters filled up. Asylum courts fell years behind.
Cities far from the border, like New York and Chicago, struggled to house the
new arrivals.
This is where both Welcomer
blind spots showed.
The numbers blind spot.
The asylum system had a capacity, and the inflow exceeded it. For too long,
many Welcomers treated that as a detail, or even as a reason to loosen the
rules further. A moral stance turned into an operational failure that everyone
could see.
The alibi blind spot. Because
resistance to immigration had been defined as a moral failing, Welcomers had no
language left for the practical problem. Admitting it felt like giving in to
xenophobia. "They are bigots" became a reason not to look.
The Biden administration did
change course, eventually.
It restricted asylum above a daily threshold, backed
a bipartisan border bill and expanded legal routes. But the turn came late. By
2024, immigration was Trump’s strongest issue and Harris’s weakest. Trump did
not invent his immigration theme. The Welcomers handed him the material: a
crisis they would not measure and a grievance they would not let be spoken.
What happened next is
instructive, though not in a comfortable way. Crossings fell to historic lows.
Enforcement under Trump went too far for many Americans. And public support for
immigration rebounded, to 79 percent.
It would be convenient to read
this as proof that Welcomers who learn their lesson can switch the machine off.
The American story does not prove that. It proves something more modest, and
still important, just that the machine cán stop. When the practical problem
disappears from people’s daily lives, the grievance loses its power and opinion
swings back.
Europe: the numbers fell, the machine kept running
Now look at Europe.
Here, the
practical problem has largely shrunk. Asylum applications and irregular
crossings are falling year after year. By the American logic, the machine
should be slowing down. It is not. Governments are still competing on strictness,
outsourcing asylum procedures and building processing centers in Albania, while
arrivals keep falling.
Two things keep it running.
Twenty-seven arenas instead
of one. In the United States, one federal government owned the problem and
could be judged on it. When the numbers fell, everyone could see it. Europe has
twenty-seven national arenas, each with its own elections and its own
Gatekeeper parties. Brussels manages the rules, but nobody owns the result.
Falling numbers at European level do not register as a success anywhere in
particular.
The EU’s Migration and Asylum
Pact was presented as the answer to the far right. The far right was not
impressed. Anti-immigration parties grew from 18 percent of the European
Parliament in 2019 to 26 percent in 2024, and Poland’s prime minister threatened
not to implement the pact at all. In Europe, the grievance does not get
resolved. It moves around.
The alibi survives.
European Welcomers have learned the first lesson. Nearly every mainstream party
now accepts that migration must be limited and controlled. In the Netherlands,
GroenLinks-PvdA campaigns for "effective and humane" asylum policy.
But the second lesson has not
landed. When AfD voters, Rassemblement National voters, or residents of a
village with a new asylum center voice their worries, the reflex is still to
explain those worries away: as prejudice, as manipulation, as fear stoked by
others.
The numbers blind spot has been cured. The alibi has not.
That is the real difference with
America. There, once the numbers fell the machine
ran dry. In Europe, our fragmented politics keeps the grievance in circulation
without needing the numbers.
What keeps it alive is the gap the alibi leaves:
concerns that are heard but never answered.
That gap is the one part of the
machine the Welcomers control. It is also the one part they have not yet
repaired.
Fighting the last war
The issue matters far beyond
migration, because migration is not the question that decides Europe’s future:
•
Defense: rearmament, Ukraine, the eastern flank,
credible deterrence.
•
Economic power: competitiveness, technology,
energy.
•
Unity: whether Europe can act as one when it has
to.
Each of these requires exactly
what the migration debate keeps using up: political attention, trust between
member states, and voters who believe Europe works for them.
Look at what migration does to
European politics today. It crowds summit agendas. It sets member states
against each other: frontline states against destination states, east against
west. It has brought back border checks inside the Schengen area, one of the
most tangible things Europe ever gave its citizens. And election after
election, it pushes voters toward parties that distrust the very European
cooperation on which defense and economic strength depend.
A wedge, Europe
keeps driving into itself. Every election fought over migrants rather than
over Europe’s place in the world is an election in which the questions that
will decide our future go unasked and unanswered.
Welcomers who keep migration at the center
of their identity are fighting the last war. Without meaning to, they help keep
the wedge in place.
From Welcomers to Europeans
This is what the title means. It
is not a call to give up humanitarian principle. It asks Welcomers to move
their identity: away from a single issue, and toward the European agenda on
which a humane migration policy itself depends. Two commitments follow.
Europe first. A
humane migration policy can only be built by a Europe that exists as a
political actor. Defense, economic strength and unity are where Europe’s future
will be decided. Migration should become what it can be: a well-run, shared and
largely technical file, like fisheries or customs. Something Europe handles,
not something Europe fights about.
Closing the alibi gap. The
American lesson cuts both ways. Support for a generous policy returns when
people believe the system is under control. And that trust is built in the
street, not in Brussels.
Housing shortages, full classrooms, disorder in public
spaces, the sense that rules apply to some and not to others: these are not
prejudices to be deconstructed but governance problems to be solved.
Picture a town where a new
reception center is announced.
In one version, residents who raise concerns at
the town meeting are told they are being manipulated.
In the other, they leave
with a named contact person, an extra teacher for the local school paid from a
European fund, and a date on which the municipality will report back. Only the
second version builds the trust that Europe needs for everything else.
The two commitments fit
together: calm and technical at European level, visible and practical at street
level. The solidarity mechanisms of the Migration Pact are a start. They should
grow into a standing, funded instrument that makes "Europe protects"
something people can see in their own village, and not just at the border.
One discipline belongs to both
commitments: stop disqualifying the other side.
The Welcomer reflex of seeing
every restrictionist as morally suspect mirrors the Gatekeeper reflex of seeing
every humanitarian as a traitor. Both are alibis. Both make problems
undiscussable and opponents unreachable. A politics that wants to remove the
wedge has to stop speaking its language.
The wedge only works on a divided Europe
The United States showed that
the machine can stop. It stopped when the practical problem went away. Europe
has the falling numbers, yet the machine keeps running. Our fragmented politics
keeps the grievance in circulation, and the Welcomers’ alibi keeps it
unanswered.
The numbers will not save us this time. Closing the alibi gap
might.
Meanwhile, the questions that
really matter have little to do with migration.
Europe’s ability to defend
itself, to compete and to act as one is being decided now. Every round of
Welcomers against Gatekeepers uses up attention, trust and unity that this agenda
cannot spare.
From Welcomers to Europeans
means this. Keep the humane conviction. Drop the single-issue identity. Make
Europe’s future the first priority, and earn the mandate for it by taking
seriously what people experience where they live.
The wedge only works on a
divided Europe.
Our closing task as Welcomers is to make ourselves, as a
separate identity, unnecessary.
Sources
Nieuws.nl: EU
heeft opnieuw minder asielverzoeken dan jaar ervoor
BNR: Aantal
asielaanvragen in Europese Unie op laagste niveau in vijf jaar
Reformatorisch Dagblad: Aantal
asielaanvragen in EU eerste helft 2026 verder omlaag
ISPI: Europe’s
Migration Policy: Have We Entered a Permanent State of Crisis?
Deutsche Welle: Refugees
and migration: Is Europe closing its doors?
GZERO Media: Europe’s
anti-immigration parties are surging as immigration numbers fall
he Local: Migration
to Europe is falling, so why are countries pushing on with crackdown?
GlobalEurope Journal: European
Union Migration Policy in Times of Geopolitical Upheaval
Democracy Journal: The
Democrats and Immigration
NOTUS: Democrats
Wonder Whether the Lesson of 2024 Is to Shift Further to the Right on Border
Security
Brookings: How
2026’s divisive immigration politics could lead to a solution down the road
Third Way: Memo
to Democrats on Immigration: To Turbocharge Generosity, Get Order Right
Al Jazeera: How
have Democrats’ policies shifted since the last major US election?
