Monday, October 19, 2026

Israel’s Election: What Could Change for Palestinians?

 


Israel’s Election: What Could Change for Palestinians?

The parties, the possible coalitions and what they could mean for the West Bank, Gaza and Palestinian statehood.

R.M. Westerink; 19 October 2026 


Israelis vote on 27 October, and the result could change who governs Israel and who shapes its future. For Palestinians, more is at stake than who becomes prime minister. The outcome will affect settlement expansion in the West Bank, military control and reconstruction in Gaza, and whether Palestinian statehood becomes a political goal or stays blocked.

A new government could open possibilities on each of these fronts, but how far it goes depends on the parties it needs to stay in power. A coalition led by the centre-right would have different priorities from one that relies on the Democrats and Arab-led parties. A broad unity government could curb far-right influence but postpone the question of Palestinian sovereignty.

The election after the election

Israelis vote for national party lists competing for the 120 seats of the Knesset, Israel’s parliament. A list generally needs at least 3.25 per cent of the vote to win seats, and a governing majority normally requires 61. Coming first is therefore not enough: parties must negotiate a coalition, or secure backing from parties that support the government from outside without joining it. [10]

This makes the bargaining after polling day decisive. Party mergers can pool votes, but they also bring differing policies under one label. The Together alliance, for example, unites former prime ministers Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid, who disagree on Palestinian statehood. Gadi Eisenkot’s Yashar, Avigdor Lieberman’s Yisrael Beiteinu and Yair Golan’s Democrats are running separately. [4, 8]

These parties are often grouped together as the “Zionist opposition”. The label reflects their commitment to Israel as a Jewish national home and sets them apart from the Arab-led parties; it does not mean they are more Zionist than Netanyahu’s government. They share a determination to replace him, but differ substantially on territory, citizenship and Palestinian rights.

Netanyahu’s camp combines his own Likud, the far-right Jewish Power and Religious Zionism–Zehut, and the ultra-Orthodox Shas and United Torah Judaism. The two ultra-Orthodox parties focus mainly on religious institutions and the interests of their communities. They should not be seen as simple copies of the territorial far right.

Where a majority might come from

Current polls suggest neither main camp has an easy path to 61 seats. Arab-led parties could help make an alternative majority possible. Ra’am, led by Mansour Abbas, has served in government before; the Joint List brings together parties that differ on whether to cooperate. Most leading figures in the Zionist opposition currently reject such partnerships; Golan supports them. [2, 5, 9]

Where the parties stand: five key questions

The first table sets out five questions that divide the parties and the range of possible answers to each (A to D). The second shows where each party currently stands.

Dimension

A

B

C

D

1 State and citizenship

Jewish primacy

Jewish national home with equal citizenship

State of all citizens

—

2 Territory and settlements

Annexation and expansion

Continued occupation

Negotiated withdrawal and land swaps

—

3 Palestinian self-government

Reject statehood

Limited autonomy under Israeli control

Conditional statehood

Sovereign Palestinian state

4 Security approach

Permanent military domination

Separation with Israeli security control

Negotiated mutual security

—

5 Arab-party partnership

Reject coalition and outside support

Accept outside support

Accept coalition participation

—

How to read the next table: each letter refers to a position in the table above. A ? means no sufficiently clear position; a / means overlapping positions or internal differences. These are working classifications: the letters are categories, not scores. They reflect current public positions and do not amount to a shared coalition programme.

Party or alliance

1 State

2 Territory

3 Self-rule

4 Security

5 Partnership

Likud — Netanyahu

A/B

A/B

A

A

A

Jewish Power — Ben-Gvir

A

A

A

A

A

Religious Zionism–Zehut

A

A

A

A

A

Shas — Deri

A/?

?

?

?

?

United Torah Judaism

A/?

?

?

?

?

Yashar — Eisenkot

B

B

B/?

B

A*

Together — Bennett / Lapid

B

A/B

A/C†

B

A*

Yisrael Beiteinu — Lieberman

A/B

A/B

A/B

A/B

A

The Democrats — Golan

B

C

C

B/C

C

Ra’am — Abbas

B/C‡

C

D

C

C

Joint List

C

C

D

C

Mixed§

* Rejection of Arab parties as coalition partners is clearer than rejection of every form of outside support.
† Together combines Bennett’s rejection of statehood with Lapid’s earlier conditional endorsement of it.
‡ Ra’am’s pragmatic participation does not imply that it endorses Jewish primacy.
§ The Joint List’s components differ on coalition participation and outside support. Evidence on the current programmes of Shas and UTJ is limited. [1–5]

Gaza: where the parties stand

Gaza raises four further questions. As before, the first table defines the possible positions and the second places the parties.

Dimension

A

B

C

Military presence

Permanent Israeli control

Until security conditions are met

Negotiated withdrawal

Israeli settlements

Support

Oppose

—

Civilian administration

Israeli administration

Palestinian administration under overriding Israeli control

Palestinian administration within an agreed regional or international framework

Displacement and return

Promote displacement or emigration

Reject forced displacement; return position unclear

Reject displacement; support return and reconstruction

The same notation applies: each letter refers to a position in the table above; ? = no sufficiently clear position; / = overlapping or conditional positions.

Party or alliance

Military presence

Israeli settlements

Civilian administration

Displacement / return

Likud — Netanyahu

A/B

?

B

?

Jewish Power — Ben-Gvir

A

A

A

A

Religious Zionism–Zehut

A

A

A

A

Shas — Deri

?

?

?

?

United Torah Judaism

?

?

?

?

Yashar — Eisenkot

B

?

B/C

?

Together — Bennett / Lapid

?

?

?

?

Yisrael Beiteinu — Lieberman

A/B

?

International responsibility*

?

The Democrats — Golan

B/C

B

C

B

Ra’am — Abbas

C

B

Palestinian rule†

C

Joint List

C

B

Palestinian rule†

C

* Lieberman combines international civilian responsibility with Israeli military freedom of action, which does not fit neatly into the three administration categories.
† Palestinian rule does not imply endorsement of a specific international transition. Golan rejects promoted emigration; a stronger commitment to return is not assumed. Together lacks a sufficiently clear common position on Gaza. Individual Likud members’ advocacy of settlements is not treated as a party-wide commitment. [2, 3, 6–8]

Four possible governments and what they could mean

The four scenarios below show how a government’s dependence on particular partners could shape its policy. They outline possibilities; they do not predict the result.

1  NETANYAHU RETURNS, dependent on the FAR RIGHT

A new Netanyahu government that needs Ben-Gvir (Jewish Power) and Smotrich (National Union–Tkuma) would give expansionist parties strong influence over ministries, budgets and territorial decisions. [3, 6, 7, 10]

Gaza: Pressure for lasting military control, renewed Israeli settlements and the promotion of Palestinian emigration.
West Bank: More settlement expansion, legalisation of outposts and moves towards formal or de facto annexation.
Palestinian statehood: Continued rejection, while changes on the ground make a viable state harder to establish.

2  A REPLACEMENT GOVERNEMENT led by the CENTER-RIGHT

A government led by Eisenkot or Bennett could renew institutions and diplomacy while keeping a mainly security-led approach to Palestinians. [3, 4, 6, 11]

Gaza: More scope for a civilian administration not run by Hamas, and for reconstruction, both tied to disarmament and Israeli security conditions.
West Bank: Possible restraint on particular projects and on settler violence, but settlements and Israeli security control would continue.
Palestinian statehood: Deferred or limited to autonomy, with no shared commitment to Palestinian sovereignty.

3  A government relying on the DEMOCRATS and ARAB-LED PARTIES

If the government depends on the Democrats and Arab-led parties for its majority, they could secure commitments on Palestinian rights and give political negotiations a stronger place in its policy. [1, 2, 5]

Gaza: More scope for negotiated withdrawal, Palestinian civilian government and reconstruction without displacement.
West Bank: More scope to halt annexation measures, restrain settlement expansion and enforce the law against settler violence.
Palestinian statehood: The clearest opening of the four scenarios for negotiations and conditional statehood.

4  A BROAD UNITY GOVERNMENT with LESS FAR-RIGHT influence

A coalition of Likud and major opposition parties could weaken the far right’s power of veto. It would, however, require leaders to revise their current alliances or commitments.

Gaza: More room for a regionally or internationally backed arrangement covering civilian government, withdrawal and reconstruction.
West Bank: Possible restraint on expansionist demands, while major settlements and overriding Israeli security control remain.
Palestinian statehood: Probably postponed to keep the coalition together, though regional diplomacy could offer an opening.

If no workable majority emerges, current leaders and policies could stay in place for longer, and Israel could face another election. [12]

The bottom line

The sharpest contrast is between a government that depends on the far right (1) and one that depends on the Democrats and Arab-led parties(3). The first would give territorial expansion more political leverage; the second would create more room to restrain it and to advance Palestinian political rights.

The other two scenarios would mainly change how the conflict is managed. A center-right replacement government (2) could improve administration and diplomacy without accepting Palestinian sovereignty. A broad unity government (4) could remove far-right vetoes but postpone the most divisive territorial decisions.

In Gaza, there is room for practical agreements on civilian government, withdrawal and reconstruction. In the West Bank, decisions on settlement and annexation will determine whether space for a future Palestinian state survives. Statehood itself requires a further political choice: making Palestinian sovereignty a goal of government policy.

References

[1] The Democrats official programme https://democrats.org.il/en/home-2/

[2] The Jerusalem Post — Joint Arab List and Ra’am positions https://www.jpost.com/israel-election-2026/article-907154

[3] The Guardian — Far-right gains and party positions, 18 October 2026
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/oct/18/theres-a-lot-of-racism-a-lot-of-hatred-far-right-gains-predicted-as-israel-heads-to-the-polls

[4] Reuters — Bennett–Lapid alliance and security policy, 27 April 2026 https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/netanyahus-rivals-are-joining-forces-would-they-shift-israels-security-policy-2026-04-27/

[5] Times of Israel — Golan on Arab parties in government https://www.timesofisrael.com/day-after-meeting-opposition-chiefs-golan-says-arab-parties-could-be-in-next-government/

[6] Israel 2026 — Conflict policy comparison
https://israel2026.co.il/en/left-right-palestinian-conflict.html

[7] Jewish Telegraphic Agency — Promoted emigration proposals, 6 September 2026
https://www.jta.org/2026/09/06/israel/israeli-ministers-unveil-plans-to-encourage-voluntary-palestinian-emigration-from-gaza

[8] Al Jazeera — Opposition leaders and their positions, 17 October 2026
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/10/17/the-israeli-politicians-seeking-to-replace-netanyahu

[9] Al Jazeera — The kingmakers, 19 October 2026
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/10/19/the-kingmakers-that-could-determine-israels-election

[10] European Parliamentary Research Service — 2026 Israeli legislative election
https://eprs.europarl.europa.eu/contents/publications/EPRS/2026/10/EPRS_ATA%282026%29796983.html?locale=EN

[11] The Jerusalem Post — Eisenkot and Netanyahu on security policy, 3 September 2026 https://www.jpost.com/israel-election-2026/article-907531

[12] Reuters — Arab voter turnout and coalition arithmetic, 19 October 2026
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/arab-voter-turnout-could-make-or-break-netanyahu-israeli-election-2026-10-19/


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