Israel’s Election: What Could Change for Palestinians?
The parties, the possible coalitions and what they could mean for the West Bank, Gaza and Palestinian statehood.
R.M. Westerink; 19 October 2026
Israelis vote on 27 October, and the result
could change who governs Israel and who shapes its future. For Palestinians,
more is at stake than who becomes prime minister. The outcome will affect
settlement expansion in the West Bank, military control and reconstruction in
Gaza, and whether Palestinian statehood becomes a political goal or stays
blocked.
A new government could open possibilities
on each of these fronts, but how far it goes depends on the parties it needs to
stay in power. A coalition led by the centre-right would have different
priorities from one that relies on the
Democrats and Arab-led parties. A broad unity government could curb
far-right influence but postpone the question of Palestinian sovereignty.
The election after the election
Israelis vote for national party lists
competing for the 120 seats of the Knesset, Israel’s parliament. A list
generally needs at least 3.25 per cent of the vote to win seats, and a
governing majority normally requires 61. Coming first is therefore not enough:
parties must negotiate a coalition, or secure backing from parties that support
the government from outside without joining it. [10]
This makes the bargaining after polling day
decisive. Party mergers can pool votes, but they also bring differing policies
under one label. The Together
alliance, for example, unites former prime ministers Naftali Bennett and Yair
Lapid, who disagree on Palestinian statehood. Gadi Eisenkot’s Yashar, Avigdor Lieberman’s Yisrael Beiteinu and Yair Golan’s Democrats are running separately. [4, 8]
These parties are often grouped together as
the “Zionist opposition”. The label reflects their commitment to Israel as a
Jewish national home and sets them apart from the Arab-led parties; it
does not mean they are more Zionist than Netanyahu’s
government. They share a determination to replace him, but differ substantially
on territory, citizenship and Palestinian rights.
Netanyahu’s camp combines his own Likud,
the far-right Jewish Power and Religious Zionism–Zehut, and the
ultra-Orthodox Shas and United Torah Judaism. The two
ultra-Orthodox parties focus mainly on religious institutions and the interests
of their communities. They should not be seen as simple copies of the
territorial far right.
Where a majority might come from
Current polls suggest neither main camp has
an easy path to 61 seats. Arab-led parties could help make an
alternative majority possible. Ra’am,
led by Mansour Abbas, has served in
government before; the Joint List
brings together parties that differ on whether to cooperate. Most leading
figures in the Zionist opposition currently reject such partnerships; Golan supports them. [2, 5, 9]
Where the parties stand: five key questions
The first table sets out five questions
that divide the parties and the range of possible answers to each (A to D). The
second shows where each party currently stands.
|
Dimension |
A |
B |
C |
D |
|
1 State and citizenship |
Jewish primacy |
Jewish national home with equal citizenship |
State of all citizens |
— |
|
2 Territory and settlements |
Annexation and expansion |
Continued occupation |
Negotiated withdrawal and land swaps |
— |
|
3 Palestinian self-government |
Reject statehood |
Limited autonomy under Israeli control |
Conditional statehood |
Sovereign Palestinian state |
|
4 Security approach |
Permanent military domination |
Separation with Israeli security control |
Negotiated mutual security |
— |
|
5 Arab-party partnership |
Reject coalition and outside support |
Accept outside support |
Accept coalition participation |
— |
How to read the next table: each letter
refers to a position in the table above. A ? means no sufficiently clear
position; a / means overlapping positions or internal differences. These are
working classifications: the letters are categories, not scores. They reflect
current public positions and do not amount to a shared coalition programme.
|
Party
or alliance |
1 State |
2 Territory |
3 Self-rule |
4 Security |
5 Partnership |
|
Likud — Netanyahu |
A/B |
A/B |
A |
A |
A |
|
Jewish
Power — Ben-Gvir |
A |
A |
A |
A |
A |
|
Religious
Zionism–Zehut |
A |
A |
A |
A |
A |
|
Shas — Deri |
A/? |
? |
? |
? |
? |
|
United
Torah Judaism |
A/? |
? |
? |
? |
? |
|
Yashar — Eisenkot |
B |
B |
B/? |
B |
A* |
|
Together — Bennett / Lapid |
B |
A/B |
A/C† |
B |
A* |
|
Yisrael
Beiteinu — Lieberman |
A/B |
A/B |
A/B |
A/B |
A |
|
The
Democrats — Golan |
B |
C |
C |
B/C |
C |
|
Ra’am — Abbas |
B/C‡ |
C |
D |
C |
C |
|
Joint
List |
C |
C |
D |
C |
Mixed§ |
* Rejection of Arab parties as coalition
partners is clearer than rejection of every form of outside support.
† Together combines Bennett’s rejection of statehood with Lapid’s earlier conditional endorsement
of it.
‡ Ra’am’s pragmatic participation
does not imply that it endorses Jewish primacy.
§ The Joint List’s components differ
on coalition participation and outside support. Evidence on the current
programmes of Shas and UTJ is
limited. [1–5]
Gaza: where the parties stand
Gaza raises four further questions. As
before, the first table defines the possible positions and the second places
the parties.
|
Dimension |
A |
B |
C |
|
Military presence |
Permanent Israeli control |
Until security conditions are met |
Negotiated withdrawal |
|
Israeli settlements |
Support |
Oppose |
— |
|
Civilian administration |
Israeli administration |
Palestinian administration under overriding
Israeli control |
Palestinian administration within an agreed
regional or international framework |
|
Displacement and return |
Promote displacement or emigration |
Reject forced displacement; return position
unclear |
Reject displacement; support return and
reconstruction |
The same notation applies: each letter
refers to a position in the table above; ? = no sufficiently clear position; /
= overlapping or conditional positions.
|
Party
or alliance |
Military
presence |
Israeli
settlements |
Civilian
administration |
Displacement
/ return |
|
Likud — Netanyahu |
A/B |
? |
B |
? |
|
Jewish
Power — Ben-Gvir |
A |
A |
A |
A |
|
Religious
Zionism–Zehut |
A |
A |
A |
A |
|
Shas — Deri |
? |
? |
? |
? |
|
United
Torah Judaism |
? |
? |
? |
? |
|
Yashar — Eisenkot |
B |
? |
B/C |
? |
|
Together — Bennett / Lapid |
? |
? |
? |
? |
|
Yisrael
Beiteinu — Lieberman |
A/B |
? |
International
responsibility* |
? |
|
The
Democrats — Golan |
B/C |
B |
C |
B |
|
Ra’am — Abbas |
C |
B |
Palestinian
rule† |
C |
|
Joint
List |
C |
B |
Palestinian
rule† |
C |
* Lieberman
combines international civilian responsibility with Israeli military freedom of
action, which does not fit neatly into the three administration categories.
† Palestinian rule does not imply endorsement of a specific international
transition. Golan rejects promoted
emigration; a stronger commitment to return is not assumed. Together lacks a sufficiently clear
common position on Gaza. Individual Likud
members’ advocacy of settlements is not treated as a party-wide commitment. [2,
3, 6–8]
Four possible governments and what they could mean
The four scenarios below show how a
government’s dependence on particular partners could shape its policy. They
outline possibilities; they do not predict the result.
1 NETANYAHU RETURNS, dependent on the FAR RIGHT
A new Netanyahu
government that needs Ben-Gvir
(Jewish Power) and Smotrich (National
Union–Tkuma) would give expansionist parties strong influence over
ministries, budgets and territorial decisions. [3, 6, 7, 10]
Gaza:
Pressure for lasting military control, renewed
Israeli settlements and the promotion of Palestinian emigration.
West
Bank: More settlement expansion, legalisation of
outposts and moves towards formal or de facto annexation.
Palestinian
statehood: Continued rejection, while changes on
the ground make a viable state harder to establish.
2 A REPLACEMENT GOVERNEMENT led by the CENTER-RIGHT
A government led by Eisenkot or Bennett
could renew institutions and diplomacy while keeping a mainly security-led
approach to Palestinians. [3, 4, 6, 11]
Gaza:
More scope for a civilian administration not run by
Hamas, and for reconstruction, both
tied to disarmament and Israeli security conditions.
West
Bank: Possible restraint on particular projects and
on settler violence, but settlements and Israeli security control would
continue.
Palestinian
statehood: Deferred or limited to autonomy, with no
shared commitment to Palestinian sovereignty.
3 A government relying on the DEMOCRATS and ARAB-LED PARTIES
If the government depends on the Democrats and Arab-led parties for
its majority, they could secure commitments on Palestinian rights and give
political negotiations a stronger place in its policy. [1, 2, 5]
Gaza:
More scope for negotiated withdrawal, Palestinian
civilian government and reconstruction without displacement.
West
Bank: More scope to halt annexation measures,
restrain settlement expansion and enforce the law against settler violence.
Palestinian
statehood: The clearest opening of the four
scenarios for negotiations and conditional statehood.
4 A BROAD UNITY GOVERNMENT with LESS FAR-RIGHT influence
A coalition of Likud and major opposition parties could weaken the far right’s
power of veto. It would, however, require leaders to revise their current
alliances or commitments.
Gaza:
More room for a regionally or internationally
backed arrangement covering civilian government, withdrawal and reconstruction.
West
Bank: Possible restraint on expansionist demands,
while major settlements and overriding Israeli security control remain.
Palestinian
statehood: Probably postponed to keep the coalition
together, though regional diplomacy could offer an opening.
If no workable majority emerges, current
leaders and policies could stay in place for longer, and Israel could face
another election. [12]
The bottom line
The sharpest contrast is between a
government that depends on the far right (1) and one that depends on the Democrats and Arab-led parties(3). The
first would give territorial expansion more political leverage; the second
would create more room to restrain it and to advance Palestinian political
rights.
The other two scenarios would mainly change
how the conflict is managed. A center-right replacement government (2) could
improve administration and diplomacy without accepting Palestinian sovereignty.
A broad unity government (4) could remove far-right vetoes but postpone the most
divisive territorial decisions.
In Gaza, there is room for practical
agreements on civilian government, withdrawal and reconstruction. In the West
Bank, decisions on settlement and annexation will determine whether space for a
future Palestinian state survives. Statehood itself requires a further
political choice: making Palestinian sovereignty a goal of government policy.
References
[1] The
Democrats official programme https://democrats.org.il/en/home-2/
[2] The Jerusalem Post — Joint Arab List and Ra’am positions
https://www.jpost.com/israel-election-2026/article-907154
[3] The Guardian — Far-right gains and party
positions, 18 October 2026
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/oct/18/theres-a-lot-of-racism-a-lot-of-hatred-far-right-gains-predicted-as-israel-heads-to-the-polls
[4] Reuters — Bennett–Lapid alliance and security policy, 27
April 2026
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/netanyahus-rivals-are-joining-forces-would-they-shift-israels-security-policy-2026-04-27/
[5] Times of Israel — Golan on Arab parties in government
https://www.timesofisrael.com/day-after-meeting-opposition-chiefs-golan-says-arab-parties-could-be-in-next-government/
[6] Israel 2026 — Conflict policy comparison
https://israel2026.co.il/en/left-right-palestinian-conflict.html
[7] Jewish Telegraphic Agency — Promoted emigration
proposals, 6 September 2026
https://www.jta.org/2026/09/06/israel/israeli-ministers-unveil-plans-to-encourage-voluntary-palestinian-emigration-from-gaza
[8] Al Jazeera — Opposition leaders and their
positions, 17 October 2026
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/10/17/the-israeli-politicians-seeking-to-replace-netanyahu
[9] Al Jazeera — The kingmakers, 19 October 2026
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/10/19/the-kingmakers-that-could-determine-israels-election
[10] European Parliamentary Research Service — 2026
Israeli legislative election
https://eprs.europarl.europa.eu/contents/publications/EPRS/2026/10/EPRS_ATA%282026%29796983.html?locale=EN
[11] The Jerusalem Post — Eisenkot and Netanyahu
on security policy, 3 September 2026
https://www.jpost.com/israel-election-2026/article-907531
[12] Reuters — Arab voter turnout and coalition
arithmetic, 19 October 2026
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/arab-voter-turnout-could-make-or-break-netanyahu-israeli-election-2026-10-19/

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