Europe’s Defence Rebuild: Where Things Stand in 2025

 


Europe is undergoing its fastest defence rebuild since the Cold War. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, uncertainty about long-term US engagement, and years of under-investment have pushed EU and NATO members into a historic rearmament cycle. But is this happening under NATO, under a more autonomous EU framework, or both?

This article gives a clear overview of production, military capabilities, organisational structures, and the delicate balance between NATO-centred defence and European strategic autonomy.

1. A Historic Surge in Defence Spending

The numbers alone tell a story of major change:

  • EU defence spending rose from €218 bn in 2021 to €343 bn in 2024, reaching 1.9% of EU GDP [1].
  • As of 2025, all 32 NATO allies meet or exceed the 2% GDP guideline—up from only three in 2014 [2].
  • NATO has adopted even more ambitious goals: 3.5% of GDP for core defence in the next decade, aiming for 5% by 2035 [3].

This is a European defence renaissance, and it is happening at speed.

2. Rebuilding the Defence Industrial Base

2.1 Emergency Measures (2022–2025)

Europe found itself critically short of ammunition and stockpiles after supporting Ukraine, leading to rapid creation of new EU industrial tools.

Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP)

A 2023 emergency instrument to increase artillery and missile production. ASAP’s first €500 m package helped expand EU ammunition output significantly [4].

European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act (EDIRPA)

A 2023 regulation providing €300 m in incentives for joint procurement, encouraging standardisation and cross-European defence purchases [5].

These tools were not meant to be permanent, but they opened the door to a deeper EU role in defence industrial policy.

2.2 Long-Term Industrial Framework

European Defence Fund (EDF)

With a budget of roughly €8 bn for 2021–2027, EDF has become the EU’s flagship defence R&D and capability development programme [6].

European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS)

Adopted in 2024, EDIS lays out a long-term plan to reduce fragmentation, ensure supply-chain resilience, and promote joint European procurement [7].

European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP)

Adopted in 2025, EDIP builds long-term production capacity, focuses on supply-chain resilience and stockpiling, and makes industrial expansion a structural rather than emergency priority [8].

Industrial Challenges and the “Quantum Leap” Debate

Analysts argue that the EU’s various defence-industrial programmes still require consolidation and scaling up to truly match geopolitical needs [9].

Together, these steps represent Europe’s first attempt at a coherent, long-term defence-industrial policy.

3. Military Capabilities and Force Integration

3.1 NATO Remains the Warfighting Backbone

European states are rebuilding heavy forces, air defences, readiness and logistics overwhelmingly within NATO planning structures:

  • NATO’s spending targets and regional defence plans define capability requirements [3].
  • European allies are building brigades, air wings, and naval groups to fill NATO’s warfighting plans [10].
  • Many states—especially on the eastern flank—are moving toward the new 3.5% and 5% spending benchmarks [11].

NATO retains the command structure, the nuclear umbrella and the collective-defence guarantee.

3.2 The EU’s Own Military Ambitions

  • The EU is not building an army, but it is building meaningful military tools.
  • The EU promotes joint capability development through PESCO, supported by EDA coordination and EU funds [12].
  • EDIS, EDIP, EDF and EDIRPA work together to strengthen the defence industrial base and reduce supply-chain vulnerability [7][8][9].
  • The EU emphasises production capacity, munition stocks, and standardisation as core priorities for the coming decade [13].

While NATO remains responsible for collective defence, the EU aims to ensure European forces have the equipment, production base and interoperability necessary to meet NATO targets.

4. Organisation and Governance

Europe is strengthening its defence governance, though not building a supranational military structure.

  • The European Commission (especially DG DEFIS) now plays a major role in industrial strategy and funding allocations [8].
  • The European Defence Agency (EDA) identifies capability gaps, structures cooperative projects, and pushes interoperability [12].
  • EU strategy documents stress the need for a coherent demand-driven defence policy, aligned with both NATO and EU capability goals [12][13].

Still, member states retain sovereignty over armed forces, deployments and operational command.

5. NATO vs Independent European Defence

Is Europe building an autonomous defence union? The answer is partially, but mainly industrial and political—not military.

What remains NATO-led:

  • Collective defence and Article 5
  • Integrated command and control
  • Nuclear deterrence
  • Heavy warfighting plans

What the EU leads on:

  • Industrial policy (EDF, EDIP, EDIRPA, ASAP)
  • Supply-chain resilience
  • Joint procurement incentives
  • Crisis-response tools
  • Capability development frameworks

Tension and complementarity

  • NATO leaders regularly warn against duplication, stressing that the EU should “complement, not duplicate” NATO [12].
    Strategic autonomy advocates argue the EU must be able to act even if US support weakens—hence the industrial push [7].
  • In practice, Europe is building a stronger European pillar inside NATO, not a replacement.

6. Conclusion

  • Europe is rearming rapidly. The EU is emerging as a powerful defence-industrial and capability-coordination actor, while NATO remains the strategic and operational backbone.
  • The emerging model is not “NATO or Europe.”
    It is NATO + a stronger, industrially competent, more coordinated Europe.
  • This dual structure may be Europe’s most stable security architecture for the next decade.

References

  1. EU defence budget rise (EP Think Tank) — https://epthinktank.eu/2025/10/08/eu-defence-funding/
  2. NATO defence expenditure trends — https://www.nato.int/content/dam/nato/webready/documents/finance/def-exp-2025-en.pdf
  3. NATO’s 3.5% and 5% defence spending goals — https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/introduction-to-nato/defence-expenditures-and-natos-5-commitment
  4. Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP) — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Act_in_Support_of_Ammunition_Production
  5. EDIRPA (EU Council) — https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/defence-industry-programme/
  6. European Defence Fund (EDF) — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Defence_Fund
  7. European Defence Industrial Strategy (CER analysis) — https://www.cer.eu/insights/eus-defence-ambitions-are-long-term
  8. European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) — https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/defence-industry-programme/
  9. IAI analysis: EU defence industrial challenges — https://www.iai.it/en/pubblicazioni/c05/eu-defence-industrial-initiatives-quantum-leap-needed
  10. NATO capability planning background — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO
  11. SIPRI analysis on new NATO spending targets — https://www.sipri.org/commentary/essay/2025/natos-new-spending-target-challenges-and-risks-associated-political-signal
  12. EDA capability and cooperation framework — https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/blg-1185020.pdf
  13. EU defence industrial resilience (analysis) — https://andriuskubilius.lt/en/european-union-added-value-in-the-development-of-european-defence/

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