About this Series
This article is part of
a multi-part series examining how Europe’s competitiveness compares with China,
what structural imbalances have emerged, how these shape geopolitical
realities, and what priority agenda Europe must pursue to restore strategic
strength. The series concludes by assessing Europe’s actual priorities and
policy actions, comparing them with the ideal agenda identified earlier.
Each instalment builds on the previous one to form a coherent and comprehensive
framework for understanding Europe’s competitive position in the world economy.
What We Learned from Parts 1, 2 and 3
Part 1 established the
analytical framework for comparing Europe and China, clarifying the dimensions
of competitiveness and the methodological challenges of cross-system
comparison. Part 2 applied this framework, revealing a structural imbalance:
Europe excels in scientific innovation and specialised advanced industries,
while China dominates in industrial scale, cost structure, and clean-technology
supply chains. Part 3 demonstrated how these imbalances translate into
geopolitical influence, strategic dependency, and constrained policy choices
for Europe. Together, these parts show that Europe’s weakening competitiveness
is not an isolated economic issue but a systemic challenge affecting its
strategic autonomy and long-term resilience.
About This Part
In this fourth part, we
examine the root causes of Europe’s competitive weaknesses. These causes
are structural and accumulated over decades. They arise from fragmentation,
underinvestment, cost disadvantages, regulatory complexity, demographic trends,
and erosion of industrial capabilities. Understanding these systemic sources is
essential for designing an agenda that can realistically restore Europe’s
competitiveness in a world where industrial power and geopolitical leverage
increasingly converge.
1. Introduction: Symptoms vs. Structural Causes
Europe’s competitive
challenges are often described in terms of visible symptoms—rising energy
prices, slow permitting, declining manufacturing shares, or lagging scale-up
funding. Yet these symptoms originate from deeper capabilities and capacities
that shape Europe’s long-term economic performance.
Capabilities refer to
the knowledge, skills, technologies, and institutional competencies Europe
possesses.
Capacities refer to Europe’s ability to deploy these capabilities at
scale—through investment, infrastructure, talent, regulatory agility, and
governance structures.
In many sectors, Europe has
the capabilities but increasingly lacks the capacities to transform
them into competitive advantage.
2. Fragmentation: The Structural Weakness Beneath All Others
2.1 27 Industrial Strategies vs. One Chinese Strategy
Europe’s institutional
design is both its greatest strength and its greatest competitive constraint.
While the Single Market offers scale, the reality is that:
- industrial policy,
- energy policy,
- fiscal policy, and
- education and skills policy
remain largely national
competencies.
This creates fragmented
priorities and uneven capacities, making coordinated industrial action
significantly more difficult than in China’s centralised system.
2.2 Regulatory and Administrative Divergence
Even within the Single
Market, firms face:
- different permitting regimes,
- varying environmental standards,
- inconsistent digital and data rules,
- uneven adoption of EU-level reforms.
Fragmentation raises
transaction costs, slows investment, and weakens Europe’s ability to mobilise
strategic industrial action.
2.3 The Cost of Slow Coordination
China can synchronise
national, provincial, and municipal policies to support strategic sectors with
speed and scale. Europe’s decision-making processes—based on negotiation,
consensus-building, and legal constraints—are slower by design.
This speed gap has
become a competitive disadvantage in fast-moving technologies where
deployment and scale matter as much as innovation.
3. Underinvestment: The Capital Gap
3.1 Chronic Underinvestment in R&D and Industrial Capacity
Although Europe produces
excellent research, its investments in:
- R&D as a share of GDP,
- capital expenditure on manufacturing,
- deep-tech commercialisation infrastructure,
lag behind those of
China and the United States [1][2].
This reduces Europe’s ability to capture the value of its intellectual assets.
3.2 The Fragmented Capital Markets Problem
Europe lacks a unified
capital market comparable to the US. As a result:
- venture capital pools are smaller,
- pension funds take fewer risks,
- cross-border investment is less fluid,
- deep-tech scale-ups often relocate abroad to access growth capital.
This financing structure
is ill-suited to the capital intensity of emerging strategic sectors such as
semiconductors, AI compute, batteries, and biotech.
3.3 Risk Aversion as an Ingrained Financial Culture
European financial
markets display more caution, lower default tolerance, and stricter collateral
requirements. These incentives discourage long-term, high-risk industrial
investment and favour incremental innovation over transformative technology
development.
4. Regulatory Burden and Administrative Complexity
4.1 Europe’s High-Standards Model: Strength and Weakness
Europe excels at
creating robust regulations for safety, environment, consumer protection, and
competition. This has produced global regulatory influence—the “Brussels
Effect” [3].
However, these strengths
come with high compliance costs and long approval cycles, which
disproportionately affect:
- new technologies,
- capital-intensive industries,
- cross-border infrastructure projects.
4.2 Slow Permitting as a Competitive Bottleneck
Permitting times for
industrial facilities, energy projects, and infrastructure can reach five to
ten years in some jurisdictions. This is incompatible with sectors where China
can deploy industrial capacity in months, not years.
4.3 Complexity of Funding Applications
EU-level funding is
often subject to heavy administrative requirements. Firms—especially SMEs—face
long delays, high consultancy costs, and substantial uncertainties in securing
project support. This undermines Europe’s ability to translate policy ambition
into execution.
5. Demographic Pressures and Skills Constraints
5.1 Europe’s Ageing Workforce
Europe faces declining
working-age populations across most member states. This reduces labour market
dynamism, slows productivity growth, and increases fiscal pressure on welfare
systems [4].
5.2 Skills Mismatch in Strategic Sectors
While Europe produces
many graduates, shortages persist in:
- engineering,
- computer science,
- AI and data disciplines,
- semiconductor manufacturing,
- clean-tech and industrial technicians.
This mismatch creates
bottlenecks even when capital and policy are available.
5.3 Talent Attraction Challenges
Europe’s immigration
frameworks vary widely and often favour stability over strategic talent
attraction. Competing with the US, Canada, and China for global high-tech
talent remains difficult without more unified and ambitious mobility policies.
6. Energy and Infrastructure: Structural Cost Disadvantages
6.1 High Energy Costs as a Competitive Burden
Since the early
2000s—and dramatically since 2021—Europe has faced higher industrial energy
prices than both the US and China [5]. This affects:
- chemicals,
- aluminium,
- steel,
- fertilisers,
- data centres and AI compute.
These sectors form the
backbone of many downstream industries.
6.2 Infrastructure Gaps
While Europe has
excellent transportation networks, it faces shortages in:
- modernised electricity grids,
- energy storage capacity,
- hydrogen infrastructure,
- semiconductor fabrication capacity,
- large-scale industrial zones.
Infrastructure delays
compound regulatory delays, slowing Europe’s ability to compete in
time-sensitive technology cycles.
7. Erosion of Manufacturing Capability
7.1 Offshoring Legacy and Loss of Mid-Tier Suppliers
Since the 1990s, Europe
offshored significant segments of electronics, solar, and lower-tier
manufacturing to Asia. As a result:
- supplier ecosystems have thinned,
- industrial clusters have weakened,
- Europe is vulnerable in upstream technologies.
7.2 Hollowing Out of Key Sectors
Energy-intensive
industries have downsized or relocated due to cost pressures. The solar PV
industry largely collapsed under pressure from Chinese competition in the
2010s. Europe risks similar patterns in batteries and EVs without decisive
policy action.
7.3 The Difficulty of Rebuilding Industrial Depth
Rebuilding requires:
- workforce development,
- supply-chain re-integration,
- large-scale private investment,
- long-term policy certainty.
These conditions are
challenging under Europe’s current structural constraints.
8. Governance and Execution Capacity
8.1 The Ambition–Execution Gap
Europe produces
high-quality strategies—on green industry, critical raw materials, digital
transformation, and industrial innovation. Yet the execution gap remains
persistent due to:
- multi-level governance,
- state-aid divergences,
- political fragmentation,
- differing national priorities [6].
8.2 Consensus Dependency
Many EU decisions
require unanimity or qualified majorities across heterogeneous political
economies. This slows responses to external shocks and reduces Europe’s agility
relative to China’s centralised command structure.
8.3 Strategic Inertia
Incrementalism dominates
European policymaking. Transformative industrial moves—comparable to China’s
sectoral bets—are rare without a major crisis to force action.
Conclusion
Europe’s competitive
weaknesses are deeply structural. They do not stem from a lack of talent,
ideas, or technological sophistication, but from fragmentation,
underinvestment, regulatory drag, demographic headwinds, energy costs, and
weakened industrial depth. These weaknesses limit Europe’s capacity to
respond to geopolitical challenges, seize new technological opportunities, and
shape global standards.
Understanding these root
causes is essential before formulating solutions. Thus, in Part 5, we
outline the Priority Agenda Europe needs—a strategic program
designed to rebuild competitiveness across capabilities and capacities. This
normative agenda forms the benchmark against which Part 6 will later assess
Europe’s actual actions.
References
- European
Commission. European Competitiveness Report.
- OECD. Science,
Technology and Industry Outlook.
- Bradford, A.
(2020). The Brussels Effect.
- Eurostat. Demographic
Projections for the EU Population.
- IEA. Energy
Prices and Industrial Competitiveness.
- European
Court of Auditors. Reports on Strategic Dependencies and Industrial
Policy Execution.

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