Why Russia’s War in Ukraine Follows a Fragile Expansion Logic

 

In Part 1, Understanding States Expansion Through Ontology Analytics — The 4 Basic Expansion Types, we explored a simple ontological framework that explains why states expand and how they seek to integrate others. We identified four major expansion logics that recur across history:

• Type A — Coercive, predatory domination
• Type B — Administrative empire building
• Type C — Ideological or civilizational mission
• Type D — Voluntary, rule-based integration

These types are not moral judgments. They are structural patterns describing how different systems achieve — or fail to achieve — expansion.

In this second and final part, we apply the framework to one of the defining conflicts of our time: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
By viewing the war through the ontology lens, we uncover a deeper logic behind Russia’s actions, the European Union’s role, and the conflict’s long-term trajectory.

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1. Two Opposing Expansion Logics at the Heart of the Conflict

The Russian–Ukrainian war is often framed as a geopolitical contest, a dispute over territory, or a clash of national identities. While all of these matter, they sit atop a more fundamental structural divide:

The European Union expands through voluntary, rule-based integration (Type D).

Russia expands through a mix of coercive and ideological mechanisms (Type A + Type C).

Understanding this clash is essential because expansion types shape:

• the tools states use,
• the narratives they rely on,
• the level of resistance they face,
• and the sustainability of their outcomes.

In short: Russia and the EU operate according to incompatible logics of power.

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2. Applying the Framework: Four Hypotheses About Russia’s Expansion

Next four hypotheses align tightly with the ontology of expansion types. When viewed through this lens, the war becomes far less mysterious — and far more structurally predictable.

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Hypothesis 1

EU enlargement threatens Russia’s centralized model because it showcases a more attractive, voluntary alternative.

The EU does not expand by force; it expands by appeal. Membership offers:

• economic prosperity,
• rule of law,
• free movement,
• shared political decision-making.

For countries near Russia — including Ukraine — the EU represents a clear and tangible path toward stability and opportunity.

This poses a profound threat to Russia’s Type A/C system:

• It undermines the idea that Russia is the “natural” center of the region.
• It exposes the limitations of Russia’s political and economic model.
• It allows neighbouring populations to imagine a future independent of Moscow.

In structural terms:

A voluntary expansion system (Type D) destabilizes a coercive–ideological system (Type A/C) simply by existing nearby.

This is not a military threat.
It is a systemic, identity-level threat to Russia’s form of rule.

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Hypothesis 2

Unable to offer competitive incentives, Russia turns to ideology and historical destiny to maintain influence.

Russia cannot match the EU’s material or institutional offer.
It cannot promise:

• rising living standards comparable to the EU,
• predictable law and governance,
• shared sovereignty,
• or protection of political rights.

So it must rely on identity-based narratives, such as:

• “We are one people,”
• “Russia protects the region from Western encroachment,”
• “Ukraine belongs to the historical space of Russia,”
• “Only Russia can preserve Slavic civilization.”

This ideological fallback is not circumstantial.
It is structural — a substitute mechanism when a system lacks attractive benefits.

In ontological terms:

Type C ideology becomes essential when a state cannot sustain a Type B empire or compete with a Type D union.

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Hypothesis 3

When soft pressure failed, Russia escalated until war became the chosen tool for restoring control.

Before the full-scale invasion, Russia attempted multiple forms of influence:

• political pressure,
• economic coercion,
• energy leverage,
• covert destabilization,
• disinformation campaigns.

These tools failed because Ukraine increasingly aligned with the EU model — a shift that directly challenged Moscow’s ideological narrative and regional dominance.

For a Type A/C system, loss of influence is not merely a setback; it is a threat to internal legitimacy.

When influence declines:

• coercion intensifies,
• narratives become more extreme,
• and escalation becomes the default response.

This pattern is historically consistent across coercive and ideological expansion systems.

Thus:

Russia’s path to war was not accidental. It followed the internal logic of a system whose legitimacy cannot withstand voluntary defection by neighbours.

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Hypothesis 4

Russia’s expansion is structurally unsustainable: the long-term costs exceed the achievable benefits.

Even if Russia retains portions of Ukrainian territory, the strategic equation is overwhelmingly negative:

• Heavy military casualties
• Severe economic sanctions
• Greater NATO unity and enlargement
• Accelerated Russian demographic decline
• Isolation from global markets and technology
• A Ukrainian population now solidly anti-Russian
• Dependence on repression at home
• Erosion of future economic capacity

Russia gains land but loses almost everything that underpins long-term national strength.

From the ontology perspective, this is predictable:

• Type A expansion collapses without constant coercion.
• Type C ideology collapses when material realities contradict the narrative.
• Resistance from a highly mobilized population (Ukraine) drastically increases costs.
• External balancing (EU–NATO) accelerates in response to aggression.

In essence:

Russia is using an expansion model suited for the 19th century in a global environment dominated by 21st-century voluntary systems.

This mismatch all but guarantees instability.

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3. Stability Outlook: What the Ontology Predicts

Ontologies do not provide dates or timelines — but they reveal trajectories.
Here is what the framework suggests about the future of the conflict.

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(1) The EU’s model will remain attractive.

Type D expansion — slow, bureaucratic, voluntary — remains the most durable historical pattern.
Its appeal to Ukrainians will outlast the war.

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(2) Russia’s system faces compounding internal stress.

To sustain a Type A/C expansion, Russia must invest ever-increasing energy in:

• repression at home,
• propaganda,
• militarization,
• and isolationist mobilization.

These are self-weakening strategies over the long term.

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(3) Ukraine’s national identity has hardened irreversibly.

The war has intensified unity, purpose, and Western alignment — making reintegration into a Russian sphere effectively impossible.

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(4) Russian-controlled territories will remain unstable.

History shows no example where coerced populations, backed by external support, become a stable part of an unwilling empire.

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(5) Russia’s expansion will continue to degrade Russia itself.

The regime framed the war as essential to national strength, but the material, demographic, and geopolitical toll steadily erodes that strength.

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(6) In the long run, voluntary systems tend to outlast coercive systems.

This is the core ontological insight:
expansions built on choice are more stable than expansions built on force.

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4. Conclusion: A War of Opposing Models

The war in Ukraine is not merely a border conflict or a geopolitical disagreement.
It is a confrontation between two incompatible expansion logics:

• Russia’s coercive–ideological model (Type A + C)
• Europe’s voluntary–rule-based model (Type D)

One seeks control; the other offers cooperation.
One demands submission; the other requires consent.

History — and our ontological framework — strongly suggest which model prevails over time.

Voluntary systems generate resilience.
Coercive systems generate resistance.
The outcome flows from the structure.

Russia’s war in Ukraine follows a fragile expansion logic — one that is already revealing its limits.
Understanding this helps us see not only why the war happened, but why its long-term trajectory points toward instability for the aggressor and deeper integration for the defender.