Russia vs NATO/EU Capabilities: What They Mean for the Long War Path in Ukraine

 


The background of the Ukraine war has been reviewed in [1] with 6 possible Paths to the future identified. As the war in Ukraine now enters another year, the possibility of Path 6., a long, grinding conflict becomes increasingly plausible. This “long war path” may involve entrenched frontlines, periods of escalation, hybrid attacks across Europe, and a slowly shifting balance of capabilities between Russia and NATO/EU countries.

Understanding how this might unfold requires a clear picture of current military capabilities, realistic war-fighting prospects, and how these strengths may evolve over the next decade.

This article provides a concise, structured overview.

1. Current Defense Capabilities: Russia vs NATO/EU

Russia

Russia has reorganized its economy to support large-scale war production:

  • Defense budget (2024–2025): roughly $110–140 billion, depending on conversion rates and off-budget items.
  • Defense spending as share of GDP: approximately 7%, extraordinarily high for a major economy.
  • Active military personnel: approx. 1.1 million, bolstered by wartime mobilization.
  • Strengths:
    • Large ground forces
    • Significant production of artillery, drones, and missiles
    • Deep stockpiles of Soviet-era equipment
    • Advanced air-defense systems
  • Weaknesses:
    • Sanctions restricting advanced electronics
    • High attrition of experienced troops
    • Limited aircraft production
    • Difficulty sustaining precision weapons manufacturing

Russia’s near-term advantages lie in mass, mobilization capacity, and proximity to the battlefield.

NATO/EU

NATO’s combined strength is vastly larger, but not all of it is available for Ukraine, and Europe is still ramping up industrially.

  • Total NATO defense spending (2024): approx. $1.45 trillion.
  • European Allies + EU subset: approx. $550–600 billion of that total.
  • Long-term pledge: NATO members have agreed to move toward 3.5–5% of GDP for defense and security-related spending by 2035.
  • European defense industry:
    • Revenue ~$350 billion annually (defense + aerospace)
    • Defense segment growing rapidly after 2022.
  • EU ammunition initiative: new funding packages to boost shell and missile production, including the ASAP program (~$550 million initial allocation).

Strengths:

  • Huge aggregate economic base
  • Superior airpower and naval capability
  • Vast technological advantages
  • Strong cyber and intelligence capacity
  • Ability to sustain long-term production increases

Weaknesses (short term):

  • Slow procurement cycles
  • Political fragmentation on spending priorities
  • Insufficient ammunition output (improving but still behind Russian tempo)

2. What These Capabilities Mean for Real War-Fighting Chances Today

A. Inside Ukraine

Russia currently has operational initiative in many sectors due to:

  • Higher artillery output
  • Localized manpower superiorities
  • A fully mobilized war economy

Ukraine, meanwhile, depends heavily on Western ammunition, air defense, ISR, and financial support. When Western deliveries slow, Ukraine’s battlefield performance drops sharply.

Short-term military balance:

  • Russia: advantages in mass and attrition warfare.
  • Ukraine: advantages only when Western precision systems flow steadily.

Ukraine can hold large areas—but large-scale counteroffensives require consistent Western supply.

B. Hybrid Conflict Across Europe

Russia is engaged in hybrid and covert activity across Europe, including:

  • Cyberattacks
  • GPS jamming
  • Sabotage of rail, energy, and infrastructure
  • Disinformation operations
  • Probing activity near NATO borders

NATO/EU are shifting from pure defense to active defense, including:

  • Offensive cyber
  • Counter-sabotage task forces
  • Greater policing and intelligence integration
  • Hardening of subsea cables and energy networks

Hybrid space remains the most likely domain for escalation pressures, since it stays below the Article 5 threshold.

C. Direct Russia–NATO Conflict

A direct, conventional Russia–NATO war remains highly unlikely because:

  • NATO would have overwhelming conventional superiority, especially with U.S. air/naval forces.
  • Both sides understand the nuclear escalation risk.

Thus, both prefer to compete:

  • inside Ukraine, and
  • below threshold through hybrid means.

3. How Capabilities May Evolve Over the Next 10 Years

A. Russia: Strong in the short term, strained in the long term

Near term (0–3 years):

  • Russia’s war economy can maintain high weapons output.
  • Short-term battlefield performance remains robust.
  • Mobilization remains politically manageable.

Medium term (3–10 years):

  • Sanctions restrict microchips, avionics, optics, and machine tools.
  • Demographic decline and skilled-worker emigration reduce manpower and innovation.
  • Industrial quality deteriorates, quantity remains high.
  • Increasing fiscal pressure: sustaining ~7% of GDP on defense becomes difficult.

Strategic implication:
Russia’s ability to wage high-intensity war gradually weakens, but its ability to wage long, low-intensity attrition conflict remains.

B. NATO/EU: Weak short-term coherence, strong long-term trajectory

Near term (0–3 years):

  • Ammunition output is expanding but still short of needs.
  • European air defense and drone production are improving but uneven.
  • Political debates slow decision-making.

Medium term (3–10 years):

  • Massive increases in defense budgets reshape the industrial base.
  • Ammunition and air-defense production multiply.
  • New European capabilities emerge:
    • Integrated air/missile defense
    • High-end drone and counter-drone systems
    • Larger stockpiles and readiness levels
    • Expanded ISR and space assets
  • The U.S. continues providing essential enablers (AWACS, satellites, logistics).

Strategic implication:
By the early 2030s, Europe alone will likely be far more militarily capable, reducing Russia’s relative leverage.

C. What This Means for the Long War Path

Putting the trends together:

Inside Ukraine

  • If Western support holds:
    Ukraine becomes progressively stronger; Russia struggles to keep pace.
  • If Western support weakens:
    Russia could gain more territory before its long-term decline limits further advances.

Hybrid conflict

  • Expect 10+ years of cyber, sabotage, and intelligence competition.
  • Europe will harden infrastructure, but Russia will remain persistent and innovative.

Escalation risks

Over a decade, the most significant danger is:

“Hybrid → escalation by miscalculation → limited kinetic clash.”

Not deliberate war, but accident + misinterpretation.

4. Strategic Summary

  • Currently: Russia is locally stronger and fully mobilized; NATO/EU are larger but still scaling up.
  • Over 10 years: NATO/EU’s advantage grows sharply if political commitments hold.
  • For the long war scenario: Russia leans on hybrid pressure and attrition; NATO/EU gradually strengthen Ukraine while securing Europe.

The outcome depends on political will, not just industrial capacity.

References

  1. https://europe-is-us.blogspot.com/2025/12/the-ukraine-war-cultural-roots.html

 

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