Strategic Voting in the Context of the Upcoming Dutch Elections: Concepts, Models, and Implications


Introduction

The Netherlands’ upcoming parliamentary elections, scheduled for October 29, 2025, are taking place in a highly fragmented and volatile political landscape. The withdrawal of Pieter Omtzigt—the founder and figurehead of the New Social Contract (NSC)—from national politics in April 2025 has led to the near-total collapse of his party’s support [1,2,3,4]. NSC, which won 20 seats in the 2023 election, is now projected to win no seats at all, according to the latest polls [5,6,7]. This development has reshaped the strategic calculus for Dutch voters, as the number of viable kingmaker parties has diminished, and the far-right PVV remains the largest party in the polls, though with reduced support compared to 2023 [5,6,7].

This report provides a comprehensive, structured analysis of strategic voting in the Dutch context, explaining the concept and motivations behind it, reviewing models and analytical frameworks, applying these insights to the current political landscape, and assessing the potential impact of strategic voting on future coalition formation.

The Concept of Strategic Voting: Definition, Motivations, and International Context

Definition and Core Motivations

Strategic voting occurs when voters choose a party not primarily because it is their most preferred option, but because they believe this choice will lead to a more favorable political outcome, such as influencing coalition formation or preventing an undesirable party from winning [8,9,10]. In the Netherlands, strategic voting is motivated by:

  • Preventing a disliked party from winning or entering government: Voters may support a less preferred party if it is the most viable option to block a party they strongly oppose, such as the PVV.
  • Maximizing policy influence: Voters may choose a party that is more likely to be part of a governing coalition, thereby increasing the chance that their preferred policies will be implemented.
  • Avoiding "wasted" votes: Even in proportional representation systems with low thresholds, voters may still worry about voting for parties that have little chance of winning seats or influencing government formation [8,9,10].

Differences from Sincere Voting

Sincere voting reflects voters' true preferences without regard to electoral strategy. Strategic voting, by contrast, involves a calculation about the likely outcome of the election and the role of parties in government [8,9,10].

Historical and International Examples

Strategic voting is well-documented in various electoral systems, including the Netherlands, where it has influenced past elections and coalition formations [8,9,10].

Models and Analytical Frameworks for Identifying Strategic Voting

Types of Models

Several models have been developed to study strategic voting, particularly in multi-party and proportional representation systems:

  • Game-Theoretic Models: Assume voters are rational and forward-looking, constructing expectations about coalition formation and policy outcomes based on seat distributions [11,12].
  • Statistical and Survey-Based Models: Use voter data to estimate the proportion of votes affected by strategic considerations. The Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies (DPES) provide rich datasets for such analyses [11,12].

Key Variables Considered

  • Voter preferences and ideological positions
  • Polling data and expected seat distributions
  • Electoral thresholds and party fragmentation
  • Coalition probabilities [11,12].

Empirical Validation and Assumptions

  • Studies using DPES data estimate that approximately 9% of votes in Dutch elections may be influenced by strategic factors [11,12].
  • Models assume voter rationality and access to polling information, which may not always hold in practice [11,12].

Application of Strategic Voting Models to the Upcoming Dutch Elections

Current Political Landscape and Electoral System Specifics

The Dutch electoral system is one of the most proportional in the world, with a 0.67% threshold for parties to gain seats in the 150-seat parliament. The upcoming election features a dramatically altered landscape due to the collapse of NSC and the continued dominance of PVV, though with reduced support. The Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) and the GreenLeft–Labour Party (GL/PvdA) are now the main centrist and left-wing options, respectively, with D66 also playing a potential kingmaker role [5,6,7].

Projected Scenarios for Strategic Voting

Strategic voting is likely to emerge in several ways:

  • Voters shifting from smaller or niche parties to larger "kingmaker" parties: For example, voters from smaller left-wing parties may shift to GL/PvdA or D66 to strengthen their position in coalition negotiations and block the PVV.
  • Voters supporting centrist or moderate parties to prevent extremist parties from entering government: The PVV’s continued polarizing presence motivates strategic voting to prevent its inclusion in government.
  • Voters choosing parties based on coalition preferences: Some voters may support the CDA or D66 to enable a centrist or national unity coalition [5,6,7].

Role of the Electoral System

The Dutch proportional representation system with a low threshold enables strategic voting by allowing many parties to compete and form coalitions. The D'Hondt method of seat allocation further influences party strategies and voter calculations [5,6,7].

Potential Impact of Strategic Voting on Future Dutch Coalition Formation

Historical Precedents

Strategic voting has significantly influenced past Dutch coalition formations, both stabilizing and destabilizing governments depending on voter behavior and political context [8,9,10].

Assessment of Impact

Strategic voting tends to stabilize centrist coalitions by encouraging voters to support parties that can form viable governments. However, it can also destabilize coalitions by shifting support unpredictably, especially in fragmented party systems. The impact depends on voter rationality, party loyalty, campaign messaging, and media narratives [8,9,10].

Counterarguments and Limitations

Some argue that Dutch voters are highly loyal to their preferred parties, limiting the extent of strategic voting. However, recent elections show that strategic voting remains a significant factor, especially in close races and volatile political contexts [8,9,10].

Summary Table: Key Parties, Polling, Potential Coalition Partners, and Strategic Voting Dynamics (Updated October 2025)

Party

Ideological Position

Current Polling (Seats)

Potential Coalition Partners

Likelihood of Strategic Voting Impact

PVV

Right-wing populist

31–33

VVD, BBB

High – voters may shift to block PVV or support it

GL/PvdA

Left-wing, social democratic

22–25

D66, SP, PvdD, CDA, Volt

High – voters may shift to strengthen left coalition

CDA

Christian democratic

22–26

VVD, D66, GL/PvdA, Volt

High – kingmaker role, voters may shift to influence coalition

VVD

Conservative liberal

13–14

CDA, D66, BBB

Moderate – voters may shift to support centrist coalition

D66

Social liberal

13

GL/PvdA, VVD, CDA, Volt

High – potential kingmaker, voters may shift to support national unity

JA21

Right-wing liberal

12

VVD, CDA

Moderate – voters may shift to support right-wing coalition

Volt

Eurofederalist, social liberal

4

GL/PvdA, D66, CDA

Moderate – potential kingmaker for green/red or centrist coalition

BBB

Agrarian, right-wing populist

3–4

VVD, CDA

Moderate – voters may shift to support right-wing coalition

SP

Democratic socialist

3–5

GL/PvdA, D66

Low – limited strategic impact due to smaller size

PvdD

Animal rights, left-wing

5

GL/PvdA, D66, Volt

Low – limited strategic impact due to smaller size

NSC

Christian democratic

0

None

None – party no longer viable

Note: Polling data as of October 2025, based on Ipsos I&O, Verian, and Peil.nl polls [5,6,7].

Conclusion

The withdrawal of Pieter Omtzigt and the collapse of NSC have fundamentally altered the Dutch political landscape, reducing the number of viable kingmaker parties and increasing the importance of strategic voting for the remaining centrist and left-wing options. Strategic voting is likely to play a crucial role in the upcoming elections, with voters shifting support to parties like GL/PvdA, CDA, and D66 to block the PVV or influence coalition formation. The Dutch electoral system’s low threshold and proportional rules enable this strategic behavior, distinguishing it from other electoral systems.

Historically, strategic voting has both stabilized and destabilized Dutch coalitions, depending on voter behavior and political context. The current landscape, marked by fragmentation and volatility, suggests that strategic voting will continue to shape coalition formation, potentially influencing the direction of Dutch politics for the next government term [1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12].

References

[1] DutchNews.nl. (2025, April 18). NSC leader Pieter Omtzigt quits politics, citing toll on health. Retrieved from https://www.dutchnews.nl/2025/04/pieter-omtzigt-quits-national-politics/

[2] NL Times. (2025, April 18). NSC leader Pieter Omtzigt quits national politics for good, citing lengthy burnout. Retrieved from https://nltimes.nl/2025/04/18/nsc-leader-pieter-omtzigt-quits-national-politics-good-citing-lengthy-burnout

[3] NL Times. (2025, May 13). Gov't not "visibly solving Netherlands' core problems": Omtzigt as he leaves parliament. Retrieved from https://nltimes.nl/2025/05/13/govt-visibly-solving-netherlands-core-problems-omtzigt-leaves-parliament

[4] DutchNews.nl. (2025, May 13). Omtzigt bows out, condemns 'poisonous' political climate. Retrieved from https://www.dutchnews.nl/2025/05/omtzigt-bows-out-condemns-poisonous-political-climate/

[5] Al Jazeera. (2025, October 24). Dutch voters hit polls as immigration fears propel far right towards power. Retrieved from https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/10/24/dutch-voters-hit-polls-as-immigration-fears-propel-far-right-towards-power

[6] Wikipedia. (2025, October 24). 2025 Dutch general election. Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025_Dutch_general_election

[7] DutchNews.nl. (2025, July 30). With three months to the election, the CDA soars to second place. Retrieved from https://www.dutchnews.nl/2025/07/with-three-months-to-the-election-the-cda-soars-to-second-place/

[8] University of Twente Research Information. Strategic and semi-strategic voting under different electoral systems. Retrieved from https://research.utwente.nl/en/publications/strategic-and-semi-strategic-voting-under-different-electoral-sys

[9] University of Twente Research Information. Government Formation and Strategic Voting in Multi-Party Systems: Voting for Coalitions in the Netherlands. Retrieved from https://research.utwente.nl/en/publications/government-formation-and-strategic-voting-in-multi-party-systems-

[10] Wikipedia. Strategic voting. Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strategic_voting

[11] American Enterprise Institute. (n.d.). Strategic Voting Under Proportional Representation: A Model with Evidence from the Netherlands. Retrieved from https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/strategic-voting-under-proportional-representation-a-model-with-evidence-from-the-netherlands/

[12] ScienceDirect. Strategic voting and constituency context: Modelling party preference and vote in multiparty elections. Retrieved from https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S096262980600103X

  

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