A EUROPE-IS-US Review, supported by Mistral.ai

Introduction

The European Union (EU) is a unique supranational entity that balances the sovereignty of its member states with the need for collective action. Its decision-making processes reflect this duality, oscillating between a Service Organisation model—where policy emerges from bottom-up synergy and consensus—and a Leadership Model, characterized by top-down, faster, and potentially more effective decision-making. Understanding when and why the EU shifts between these models is critical for assessing its capacity to respond to internal and external challenges. This report explores the hypothesis that the added value of a leadership- driven EU—namely, speed and effectiveness in decision-making—becomes most compelling to member states only under external threats, such as defence crises or trade pressures. It synthesizes conceptual distinctions, empirical evidence from recent crises, member state dynamics, theoretical frameworks, and future scenarios to validate and refine this hypothesis.

Conceptual Framework:
Service Organisation vs. Leadership Model

The EU’s decision-making can be conceptualized along a spectrum from bottom-up to top- down approaches. The Service Organisation model emphasizes synergy and consensus-building, with balance and control mechanisms applied before decisions are made. This model leverages the diverse expertise and perspectives of member states and EU institutions, fostering broad buy-in but often at the cost of speed. Decisions emerge from extensive consultation, negotiation, and compromise, ensuring policies reflect a wide range of interests but potentially diluting effectiveness and slowing implementation.

Conversely, the Leadership Model is characterized by top-down decision-making, where balance and control mechanisms are applied after decisions are made, enabling faster and potentially more effective policies. This model prioritizes rapid response and strong policy implementation, which is especially valuable in crises requiring swift action. The Leadership Model can overcome the inefficiencies of consensus-building by centralizing authority and streamlining processes, but risks reducing member state autonomy and democratic legitimacy.

Dimension	Service Organisation (Bottom-Up)	Leadership Model (Top-Down)
Decision-Making Speed	Slower due to consensus-building	Faster, centralized decision-making
Policy Effectiveness	Broad buy-in but potential dilution	Stronger, more adaptive policies
Balance/Control Mechanisms	Applied before decision-making	Applied after decision-making
Member State Buy-In	High, through consultation and negotiation	Variable, potentially lower due to reduced autonomy
Examples of Implementation	Eurozone debt crisis, COVID-19 response	Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, trade defence measures

This conceptual distinction is supported by management theory and EU integration literature, which highlight the trade-offs between inclusivity and efficiency in complex organizations [1][2][3][4][5].

Empirical Evidence:
Cases of Top-Down Leadership Under Threats

The EU’s experience during the Russia-Ukraine war exemplifies the shift toward top-down leadership under external threat. Faced with an unprecedented security crisis, the EU rapidly adopted sanctions, increased defence spending, and launched initiatives such as the European Defence Fund (EDF) and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). These measures were characterized by a Leadership Model approach, enabling swift, coordinated action that would have been difficult under the traditional bottom-up model. The European Council and Commission played central roles in driving these policies, with member states accepting a higher degree of supranational leadership to meet the urgency of the crisis [6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13][14][15][16][17][18][19].

Similarly, trade pressures from the US-China rivalry have pushed the EU toward more assertive, top-down trade defence mechanisms, including anti-dumping duties and investment screening. These measures require rapid, coordinated responses to protect European industries and strategic sectors, again favouring a Leadership Model [20].

These cases demonstrate that under external threats, member states perceive the added value of speed and effectiveness in top-down decision-making as outweighing the costs of reduced autonomy. The EU’s ability to act rapidly and decisively in these contexts enhances its strategic autonomy and collective security.

Counterexamples and Limitations

Not all EU decision-making shifts to top-down leadership require external threats. For instance, in climate policy and digital regulation, the EU has adopted top-down approaches driven by internal imperatives for market integration and regulatory coherence. These areas demonstrate that the EU can employ leadership models even in the absence of external threats when the benefits of uniformity and rapid implementation are clear [21][22].

Conversely, there are cases where external threats failed to catalyse top-down leadership. For example, during the Eurozone debt crisis, despite the urgency, decision-making remained largely bottom-up due to deep-rooted national sovereignty concerns and institutional inertia. This highlights that external threats alone are not sufficient; political will, trust, and institutional capacity also play critical roles [23][24].

The risks of top-down leadership include democratic legitimacy concerns, member state resistance, and potential long-term cohesion challenges. The EU’s complex institutional framework and the need for consensus can slow down even top-down processes, and the requirement for near-unanimous decisions in the Council can create inefficiencies and decision-making traps [22][23][24].

Member State Perspectives

Member states’ acceptance of top-down leadership varies significantly based on size, vulnerability, and strategic interests. Smaller and more vulnerable states, such as the Baltic states or Ireland, often show greater openness to supranational leadership during crises, as they benefit from collective security guarantees and rapid EU-wide responses. In contrast, larger states like France and Germany may resist or embrace top-down leadership depending on the strategic context and their national interests [6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13][14][15][16][17][18][19].

Structural prerequisites, such as qualified majority voting and emergency clauses, facilitate the shift to top-down leadership during crises by reducing the risk of vetoes and streamlining decision-making. These mechanisms make it easier for member states to accept temporary reductions in autonomy in exchange for faster, more effective collective action [7][8][9][10][11][12][13][14][15][16][17][18][19][24].

Theoretical Frameworks

EU integration theories provide insights into when and why member states accept top-down leadership. Neofunctionalism suggests that crises create functional pressures that push member states to delegate more authority to supranational institutions to achieve collective goals. Intergovernmentalism and liberal intergovernmentalism highlight the role of national interests and bargaining in shaping EU decision-making, emphasizing that top-down leadership is more likely when member states perceive a clear added value in speed and effectiveness, especially under external threats [22][23][24].

Academic literature also underscores the importance of institutional design and decision rules in determining the efficiency and effectiveness of EU decision-making. The EU’s complex multi-institutional framework and the need for consensus can slow decision-making, but reforms such as majority voting can enhance efficiency and member state buy-in [22][23][24].

Policy Implications and Future Scenarios

The EU’s ability to shift to top-down leadership under external threats has significant policy implications. It suggests that the EU can enhance its strategic autonomy and collective security by institutionalizing faster decision-making mechanisms, such as majority voting and emergency clauses, which reduce the risk of vetoes and streamline processes [7][8][9][10][11][12][13][14][15][16][17][18][19][24].

Looking ahead, emerging threats such as AI regulation, migration crises, and climate disasters may again push the EU toward top-down leadership models. The sustainability of such shifts beyond immediate crises will depend on the EU’s ability to balance speed and effectiveness with democratic legitimacy and member state autonomy [21][22][23][24].

Conclusion

The European Union’s decision-making dynamics reveal a nuanced interplay between its Service Organisation and Leadership Model approaches. While the bottom-up, synergy- driven model ensures broad member state buy-in and democratic legitimacy, it often sacrifices speed and effectiveness. The top-down, leadership-driven model, by contrast, enables faster and potentially more effective decision-making, which becomes especially valuable under external threats such as defence crises or trade pressures.

Empirical evidence from the Russia-Ukraine war and trade defence measures confirms that member states are more willing to accept top-down leadership when facing urgent external challenges. However, the shift is not automatic; it depends on political will, institutional capacity, and the perceived added value of rapid, coordinated action. Member states’ acceptance varies by size and vulnerability, with smaller states often more open to supranational leadership during crises.

Theoretical frameworks explain this dynamic as a function of neofunctionalist pressures, intergovernmental bargaining, and institutional design. Future scenarios suggest that the EU can institutionalize faster decision-making mechanisms to respond to emerging threats, but must carefully balance speed with democratic legitimacy and cohesion.

In sum, the added value of a leadership-driven EU—speed and effectiveness—becomes most compelling to member states under external threats, validating the hypothesis while recognizing the importance of political and institutional context.