The Chinese Government’s Policy Program Development Process under Xi Jinping: Formal Framework and Informal Dynamics

Mistral Research Aug 26, 2025

The Chinese Government’s Policy Program Development Process under Xi Jinping: Formal Framework and Informal Dynamics

1. Introduction

Under Xi Jinping’s administration, the Chinese government’s policy program development process has undergone significant centralization and institutionalization, reflecting his political agenda to consolidate power and enhance the Communist Party of China’s (CCP) control over governance[1]. This report provides a comprehensive and structured breakdown of the formal institutional framework of policy development at the national level, while also highlighting the critical informal and political dynamics that alter or redirect policy outcomes. The analysis covers the entire lifecycle of policy creation, from issue identification to implementation, incorporating provincial and local processes where they provide essential context or deviations that enhance understanding of the broader system.

2. Formal Policy Development Process

2.1 Issue Identification and Profiling (Needs Side)

At the national level, policy issues or societal "needs" are identified through a complex, multi-layered process involving government bodies, party organs, and research institutions. The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) is pivotal in this phase, responsible for formulating economic and social policies and overseeing the national Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development[2]. The NDRC works in conjunction with other ministries and commissions to identify and profile emerging issues, often leveraging data-driven approaches and ideological filters aligned with Xi Jinping Thought, which emphasizes "Chinese Characteristics" and "Common Prosperity"[1,2].

The Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission (CFEAC) and the Central Comprehensively Deepening Reforms Commission (CCDRC) also play crucial roles in identifying and prioritizing policy needs. These commissions meet regularly to discuss reforms across various policy domains, including economic, social, and political systems, ensuring alignment with the Party’s strategic goals[1,2]. Think tanks, numbering over 1,900, contribute to policy deliberation and promotion, aligning their activities with political agendas to support official policies and narratives[3].

Provincial and local governments contribute through pilot programs and local reports that feed into national prioritization. However, the "top-level design" approach under Xi Jinping tends to suppress bottom-up inputs, emphasizing centralized control and ideological conformity[1,2].

2.2 Resource and Capability Assessment

Once issues are identified, the government evaluates available resources and institutional capabilities to address these needs. The NDRC leads this assessment, conducting formal audits, feasibility studies, and inter-agency consultations to determine resource allocation. It manages trade-offs between competing priorities and ensures that national resource allocation considers provincial and local constraints, such as fiscal disparities and regional development goals[1,2].

The Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the National Council for Social Security Fund (NCSSF) are key players in evaluating financial resources and investments, playing foundational roles in China’s financial system[1,2]. The State Council and its constituent ministries also participate in this phase, providing administrative and technical support for resource assessment[2].

2.3 Options Development and Prioritization

Policy options are generated by key actors including think tanks, expert committees, and party working groups. The CCDRC is particularly influential in this phase, discussing reforms across multiple policy areas and ensuring alignment with the Party’s strategic objectives[1,2]. The NDRC and CFEAC also contribute to the development and prioritization of policy options, often leveraging pilot programs in provinces like Guangdong or Zhejiang to test and refine options before nationwide rollout[1,2].

Formal criteria such as cost-benefit analysis, political feasibility, and alignment with Five-Year Plans or party directives guide the evaluation and prioritization of options. This process is generally opaque, with limited transparency, reflecting the centralized and hierarchical nature of decision-making under Xi Jinping[1,2].

2.4 Decision-Making and Approval

Final policy decisions are made through a highly centralized process dominated by the Party, particularly the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) and the Central Committee. Xi Jinping, as the paramount leader, plays a decisive role in approving policies, often leveraging his consolidated power to install loyal supporters in key positions[1,2].

The State Council and the National People’s Congress (NPC) also play roles in the approval process, although their influence is secondary to the Party’s leadership. Dissenting views or alternative options are typically managed internally within the Party, with formal mechanisms for debate or appeal being limited[1,2].

2.5 Implementation and Monitoring

Policies are implemented at the national and subnational levels through a hierarchical administrative system. The State Council, led by the Premier, oversees the execution of policies, with central ministries, provincial governments, and local cadres playing crucial roles[1,2].

Monitoring and evaluation mechanisms include performance metrics, inspections, and third-party audits to track progress. Failures or deviations are addressed through disciplinary measures and policy adjustments, ensuring compliance with the Party’s directives[1,2].

3. Informal and Political Dynamics

Informal dynamics significantly influence the formal policy process under Xi Jinping. Factional politics and personal networks (guanxi) play crucial roles in shaping policy outcomes. Xi Jinping’s consolidation of power and his emphasis on ideological conformity have intensified the role of informal political pressures in redirecting policy development and implementation[1,4].

The "top-level design" approach under Xi Jinping interacts with bottom-up inputs in a complex manner. While local resistance or adaptation can force national-level adjustments, the centralized control and suppression of dissent limit the extent of such influences[1,4].

4. Provincial/Local Interactions

Provincial and local governments contribute to the policy process through pilot programs, local reports, and bottom-up mechanisms. These subnational processes provide critical context and deviations that enhance understanding of the broader system. For instance, pilot programs in provinces like Guangdong or Zhejiang serve as testing grounds for policy options before nationwide implementation[1,2].

However, the influence of provincial and local governments is constrained by the centralized "top-level design" approach under Xi Jinping, which emphasizes centralized control and ideological conformity. This approach tends to suppress bottom-up inputs and limit the extent of local influence on national policy outcomes[1,2].

5. Conclusion

The Chinese government’s policy program development process under Xi Jinping is characterized by a highly centralized and integrated approach, with the Party and its leading bodies playing dominant roles in all phases of the policy lifecycle. The formal process involves multiple phases: issue identification and profiling, resource and capability assessment, options development and prioritization, decision-making and approval, and implementation and monitoring.

Informal dynamics, including factional politics, personal networks (guanxi), and leadership preferences, significantly shape policy outcomes, often overriding formal procedures. Xi Jinping’s consolidation of power and emphasis on ideological conformity have intensified the role of informal political pressures in redirecting policy development and implementation.

Provincial and local governments contribute through pilot programs and local reports, but their influence is constrained by the centralized "top-level design" approach. This approach tends to suppress bottom-up inputs and limit the extent of local influence on national policy outcomes.

Overall, the policy development process under Xi Jinping is a complex interplay of formal institutional frameworks and informal political dynamics, reflecting his political agenda to consolidate power and enhance the Party’s control over governance.

References

[1] Asia Society Policy Institute. (n.d.). Decoding Chinese Politics. Retrieved from Asia Society

[2] Congressional-Executive Commission on China. (n.d.). China's State Organizational Structure. Retrieved from CECC

[3] Mercator Institute for China Studies. (2021). Whispering advice, roaring praises: The role of Chinese think tanks under Xi Jinping. Retrieved from Merics

[4] Journal of International Affairs, Columbia University. (n.d.). China under Xi Jinping. Retrieved from JIA

Comments

Post a Comment

Popular posts from this blog

Het is tijd voor een Noodplan Woningbouw en Sterke Leiders

Image
_________________________________________________________________________________ Een crisis van bijna 400.000 woningen Het woningtekort in Nederland is groter dan ooit.  In 2025 komen we ruim 396.000 woningen tekort – dat is 4,8% van de totale voorraad. Dat tekort vertaalt zich in te hoge huren, te weinig betaalbare koopwoningen en een generatie starters die nergens terecht kan. De regering wil tot 2030 900.000 woningen bouwen. Een prachtig streven, maar de realiteit is dat de bouw pas vanaf 2027 echt op tempo komt. Intussen blijven de tekorten torenhoog. _________________________________________________________________________________ Het huidige pad: langzaam herstel Volgens de officiële prognoses (ABF Research) krimpt het tekort met het huidige beleid: • 3,9% in 2031 • 2,2% in 2040 Met andere woorden: pas tegen 2040 zitten we in de buurt van een “normale” woningmarkt.  Voor honderdduizenden huishoudens is dat veel te laat. ______________________________________________...
Read more

Classifying EU Voter Groups: Core, Doubters, and Contrarians. Results by Country. Implications..

Image
  Summary This report classifies EU member states into three voter groups— "core" supporters , "doubters" , and "contrarians" —based on attitudes toward European integration, using data from Eurobarometer surveys, national election results, and academic research. The analysis quantifies the size of each group by country and assesses volatility in public opinion, identifying patterns linked to age, urban/rural divides, and economic conditions. Key findings include: "Core" supporters range from 25% to 60% across member states, with the highest concentrations in founding members (e.g., Germany, Ireland) and the lowest in Central and Eastern Europe (e.g., Poland, Hungary). "Contrarians" (hard Eurosceptics) now represent 10–55% of the electorate, with the highest shares in Poland, Hungary, and Italy. Volatility is low in Western Europe, medium in Southern Europe, and high in Central and Easter...
Read more

250.000 NOODPLAN WONINGEN - HEBBEN WE DE RUIMTE WEL?

Image
  Inleiding Wanneer we naast het bestaande natuurbeleid ook de opgave meenemen om in de periode tot 2035 circa 250.000 extra woningen te realiseren — een globale inschatting van de feitelijke behoefte, niet van de huidige overheidsplannen — betekent dit een substantiële ruimtevraag binnen Nederland. Hoe groot is deze ruimteclaim, inclusief de benodigde infrastructuur? Welk deel hiervan zal terechtkomen binnen natuurgebieden? En hoe verhoudt deze opgave zich tot de stikstofproblematiek die het ruimtelijke en ecologische beleid sterk beïnvloedt?   1. Verkenning Ruimteclaim van 250.000 woningen (inclusief infrastructuur) Bepalende basisfactoren: ·      gemiddelde woningdichtheden (woningen per hectare, varieert van stedelijk tot landelijk), ·      aanvullende ruimte voor infrastructuur , groen en voorzieningen (wegen, parkeerplaatsen, scholen, energie-infrastructuur). Typische dichtheden ( referentiewaarden, CBS/RVO/Planburea...
Read more